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Abstract 
This thesis is an exploration of the condition of critical debate in contemporary liberal 
democracies that is based upon a combined reading of the works of Hannah Arendt 
and Jurgen Habermas. It begins with an elaboration of the position that Arendt and 
Habermas identify a similar malaise as afflicting modern liberal democracies, which 
is argued to result from a shared perception that such democracies fail to create a 
forum for critical public engagement. The argument that their democratic theories are 
highly complementary is further developed through an examination of their solutions 
to this critical failure, for these solutions reflect a sharing of important premises 
concerning the nature of power and freedom on the parts of Habermas and Arendt. A 
complementary reading of Arendt and Habermas also allows for a synthesis of their 
theories that results in a highly coherent picture of the form and processes of an ideal 
democratic forum. This synthesis of Habermas and Arendt, however, also suggests 
(or, at least, allows for the theorising of) the emergence of a new genus of political 
actor who is unlikely to engage in such a forum – a genus hereafter referred to as 
homo spectaculorum. 
 
This thesis, therefore, makes three related claims. The first, and most important, is 
that it is possible to read Arendt and Habermas together as highly compatible 
democratic theorists and that their analysis of contemporary political conditions 
presents a single position from which to view the critical failings of liberal 
democracies. The second claim is that synthesising Arendt’s and Habermas’s 
democratic theories enables the theorising of an ideal public space, along with the 
emergence of homo spectaculorum. The third, and final, claim made in this thesis is   iv 
that the same conditions that lead to the emergence of homo spectaculorum can be 
understood to undermine the emancipatory potential otherwise proffered through 
critical public spaces.    v 
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Introduction 
 
A crowd has gathered, facing a light, an illumination brought about by a fire, an 
event, an ideology – or an ideal. The strong light casts shadows and as the light 
moves toward the back and diminishes, the mood degenerates, rowdiness, disorder 
and violence occur, showing the fragile nature of man. Illumination, hope 
involvement, hilarity, irritation, fear, illness, violence, murder and death – the flow of 
man’s emotion through space. Raymond Mason ‘The Illuminated Crowd’, Montreal 
 
The original contribution of this thesis lies in its exploration of the ways in which 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories apply to the functioning of actually 
existing liberal democracies. What is particularly original about this thesis is that I 
present Habermas and Arendt as developing, for the most part, complementary 
theories, insofar as they each identify very similar problems with democratic function. 
I also contend that they both understand that “freedom” in a democracy equates to the 
ability to partake in a critical communication about issues of power and that each 
seeks to appropriate democracy in order to facilitate this communication. In addition, 
both theorists assert that the liberal understanding of democratic citizenship has 
serious flaws when applied to liberal democracies in their time. 
   10 
This use of Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories as the basis for an analysis of 
contemporary liberal democracy begins by identifying the flaws in liberal 
democracies with which they are familiar. Habermas and Arendt both criticise these 
democracies because of their failure to be both critical and engaging and this indicates 
a common theme in their projects. While this failure is also identified by liberal critics 
of democracy, who also criticise modern democracies for lacking critical inputs, the 
crucial point is that both Habermas and Arendt emphasise the fundamental 
importance and inevitability of personal engagement in politics. This means that they 
are opposed to the general liberal understanding that involvement in politics is 
dictated by personal inclination and a choice as to whether one will become involved. 
Rather they contend that the self can not be separated from world, a view that takes a 
particular salience in the context of contemporary information and communication 
technologies. In the thesis, therefore, I argue that Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories of 
democracy offer deep insights into the problems that societies under the influence of 
liberal forms of democracy are currently experiencing. 
 
I also suggest in this thesis that reading Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories together 
provides more than an important opportunity for examining the conditions of 
contemporary liberal democracies. This reading also suggests that more significant 
problems are emerging in contemporary liberal democracies as a result of a collapse 
in the availability of critical public space. Both Arendt and Habermas defend the 
importance of public space and public discourses in developing emancipatory 
democracy, yet each argues that such spaces and discourses are increasingly hard to 
find. This process has continued to the point that critical public space has been lost 
and a new subjectivity can be argued to emerge that neither needs nor seeks a critical   11 
public space. In this thesis I seek to make a further contribution to scholarship on 
Habermas and Arendt by outlining what happens to Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories 
of emancipation following the change in subjectivity brought about following the loss 
of critical public space. I present the argument that the resultant development of a new 
subjectivity - which I refer to as homo spectaculorum - sustains the myopia of liberal 
democracies, as described by Habermas and Arendt, while it undermines their hope 
that we might be progressing toward a more emancipatory form of human 
sovereignty. 
 
In order to provide a brief overview of the aims and construction of this thesis, I shall 
initially offer some background as to why I embarked upon this project. I shall then 
go on to introduce the major themes of the project, identifying where it is located 
within the wider discourses of democratic theory and critical theory. Finally, I shall 
provide a structural introduction to the thesis, providing a brief account of the 
structure of each chapter and the contribution each chapter makes toward the 
complete project. Through introducing the thesis in this way I hope that the scope and 
intentions of my research are made clear. 
Background 
I originally conceived of this thesis as an exploration of the kind of political system 
Australia should institute upon achieving sovereignty. At the time of the 1999 
referendum on the republic, there was a view amongst Australians that the time to cut 
our constitutional ties with the British Monarchy was well and truly upon us. I felt 
that this constitutional change might prove to be the single most important event in 
the history of the Australian nation; namely a nation constituted not just by   12 
indigenous Australians or immigrants, but a nation constituted by all these peoples. 
Such a constitution would face the challenge of appearing legitimate to its citizens, a 
difficult feat considering the diverse interpretations of what constitutes Australia 
(Smith, R. 2001: 84). As a student of politics I became preoccupied with the 
hypothetical question: what would be the ideal political system for an Australian 
republic? 
 
With an awareness of the possibilities that this moment of founding presented, in 
particular as an opportunity to explore and create a new political system, I set about 
researching democratic theory – focusing on what were considered to be democracy’s 
weaknesses and how democratic systems might be improved
1. Following the great 
liberal democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century, John Stuart Mill had 
declared the rise of democracy was part of an inexorable historical progression 
towards personal sovereignty that ‘dates from the dawn of modern civilisation, and 
has continued steadily advancing from that time’
2. I felt that if Australia’s new 
democratic forum was to be as progressive as possible, I should seek to explore how 
democratic politics could better harness the sovereignty of individuals. That is, I 
should explore the possibility of reconciling personal agency with public power. 
 
While I sought to examine the ways in which democratic systems could be more 
amenable to individual sovereignty, it became abundantly clear that current 
democratic institutions no longer reflect individual sovereignty. That is, contemporary 
                                                 
1 ‘Democracy’ is understood throughout as meaning a government where power is vested in the people. 
Such a definition includes, but is certainly not limited to, the currently dominant ‘liberal democracy’ 
which is heavily influenced by the notion allowing individuals’ freedom from the duties of 
government.  
2 From J.S. Mill’s ‘Introduction’ to (Tocqueville 1961: vi).   13 
democratic systems are largely unable to harness an individual’s critical and 
constructive engagement with the world they occupy. This realisation was informed 
by a variety of scholarly discourses about democracy which highlighted the loss of the 
political in liberal democracies
3. It was also apparent, however, due in no small part to 
the public antipathy towards politics, politicians and the prospects of an Australian 
republic
4. Rather than finding a nation of individuals fervent about the prospect of 
sovereignty, I found individuals tended to resile from discussing the republic almost 
as if it were taboo. It was as if discussing politics forced them to answer questions 
they did not want asked. It was not as if they were never asked to make choices which 
would reflect their values and beliefs, as I believed that such choices were 
increasingly being provided by the market, with one’s purchases constituting the 
means for “saying” something about oneself. I came to the view that, while humanity 
was steadily advancing toward personal sovereignty in some ways, the existing 
political system was being left behind.  
 
From this point the focus of my thesis changed from analysing the prospects of 
Australian democracy, to a critical analysis of contemporary democratic systems. In 
the work of Jurgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt I found two theorists who offer a 
convincing explanation for why politics has ceased to be a subject of critical personal 
engagement for citizens. Both Habermas and Arendt contend that modern democratic 
systems have marginalised citizens from political involvement and suggest that both 
the citizen and the public suffer as a result. At the same time I found their theories 
offered some hope that a properly designed democratic forum might act as an 
                                                 
3 See, for example, (Boggs 2000), (Bobbio 1990). 
4 As examined in (Smith, R. 2001: esp Ch.2 and 3) and (Cook 1997).   14 
emancipatory force that would generate freer and happier citizens. I have since 
studied the work of Habermas and Arendt in order to gain an understanding of the 
reasons why modern democratic institutions are failing to harness personal 
sovereignty and what might be done to redress this problem. 
A Review of Existing Literature about Habermas, Arendt and 
Democracy 
Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas are two political theorists who have theorised 
the possibility that democracy might be reformed in order to achieve human 
emancipation. Arendt identifies public engagement with political decisions as a 
critical mechanism for preventing mindless behaviour and promoting virtue. 
Habermas, who searches for the possibility of emancipation in the universal 
conventions of language, does so on the basis of his view that a legitimate political 
system depends upon a high degree of critical interaction with its constituents. The 
differences in these accounts have meant that Arendt and Habermas are generally 
understood to be the central theorists behind the agonistic and deliberative schools of 
democratic theory respectively. These two schools of democratic theory are each 
opposed to liberal democratic theory, though for slightly different reasons. The 
argument I am developing in this thesis is that both schools concur that the failure of 
liberal democracy is, in essence, a failure to promote critical engagement with public 
power. 
 
The members of the deliberative school of democratic theory are preoccupied with the 
critical capacities of democratic systems. Deliberative democratic theorists, such as 
John Dryzek, James Bohman and Jurgen Habermas emphasise the need for public 
spaces that are conducive to critical discussion in order to ensure the legitimacy and   15 
reasonableness of public power. They see democratic political systems and public 
spaces as deliberative mechanisms through which the people can engage in rational 
debate about the ethos and functioning of the state. A central preoccupation of 
deliberative democratic theorists is to make debate accessible and inclusive, for they 
believe that this is necessary in order to address the critical deficit that exists in liberal 
democracies. 
 
Those of the agonistic school of democratic theory emphasise the importance of 
personal engagement in politics as an aspect of living well. Agonistic theorists 
criticise liberal democracy for isolating citizens from the activity of political 
involvement by only allowing for representation. They argue that such isolation 
undermines the appropriateness of liberal democracy as a political forum.  Agonistic 
theorists, such as Michel Foucault, Chantal Mouffe and Hannah Arendt, seek to 
identify ways in which democracy can be redesigned in order to harness the innate 
political expression of each individual. Whilst primarily occupied with the importance 
of political expression as an element of living well, agonistic democratic theorists do 
point out that liberal representative democracies also manufacture a critical deficit by 
excluding individuals’ political expression.   
 
While I am seeking to interpret Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories as largely 
complementary, the majority of literature concerning Habermas, Arendt and 
democratic theory seeks to counter pose Habermas and Arendt in order to highlight 
the differences between the deliberative and the agonistic schools of democratic 
theory. Authors such as Craig Calhoun (Calhoun 1997), Wayne Gabardi (Gabardi 
2001), Dana Villa (Villa 1997) and Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 2000b) have all   16 
contrasted deliberative and agonistic democratic theories in order to comment upon 
the relative merits of their respective ideals of public space. Such arguments are 
developed by appropriating Arendt as a theorist of agonistic democracy and 
emphasising the role that the public plays as a place for personal disclosure and 
validation. On the other hand Habermas is appropriated as a deliberative democratic 
theorist who emphasises the role that public debate fulfils in generating reasonable 
outcomes.  
 
The conclusion that those who contrast these different democratic theories draw, 
particularly in the case of Calhoun, Villa and Mouffe, is that Habermas’s emphasis on 
the rationality of public space gives rise to a rigid set of conditions for public 
discourse that undermines the expressive conditions that Arendt regards as so 
important. While this is surely an important distinction which creates an interesting 
area of dialogue within democratic theory, I contend that these theorists 
misunderstand the intentions of Habermas’s project. I develop this argument in the 
second chapter, where I argue that Habermas designed his theory of communicative 
action as an inherently reflexive set of conditions for communication that will produce 
reasonable outcomes for all participants. He does not wish to establish a hegemonic 
criterion by which all arguments should be judged, but rather seeks to outline how 
argumentation can be approached in order to be legitimate and acceptable to all 
parties
5.  As an ideal this is entirely compatible with what Arendt understands to be 
                                                 
5 Habermas does not call on participants to leave their individuality behind in favour of the public good 
(as Habermas criticised Rawls for doing in (Habermas 1998: esp. Chapters 2 & 3)). He calls on them to 
publicly redeem their claims to truth. For that reason he implores individuals to establish publics, 
transcend incommensurability and, in the process, learn more about themselves and the world that 
surrounds them.    17 
the requirements of public debate and, as I shall argue, even complements Arendt’s 
theory by indicating how adversaries can coordinate action without antagonism. 
 
Three authors who have presented Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories as compatible 
rather than divergent and have sought to synthesise aspects of their work to some 
degree are Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Seyla Benhabib and Diana Saco. In an article 
on Aristotle and the role of politics (Triadafilopoulos 1999) Triadafilopoulos argues 
that certain elements of rhetoric generate deliberation by inviting agonism, thus 
providing a point of reconciliation for the agonistic and deliberative schools of 
democratic theory. This idea has been expressed more consistently by Benhabib, who 
has carried out a synthesis of the theories of Habermas and Arendt in developing her 
own narrative theory. In a series of articles Benhabib has highlighted some of the 
complementary features of their theories while still acknowledging their differences
6. 
The central thrust of Benhabib’s argument is that the act of narrative - the telling of 
stories - not only imparts meaning, but also publicly discloses the self. In this way 
narrative presents a form of political discourse that is both deliberative and agonistic 
and, from the standpoint of both Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories, admirable. Diana 
Saco has recently published a book on democracy and the internet (Saco 2002) in 
which she asserts that, when they are considered in light of the possibilities of ideal 
political fora generated by new information and communication technologies, 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories are highly complementary. Like Triadafilopoulos 
and Benhabib, her argument is that, when we come to understanding the ways that we 
can get politics to assume public importance, as opposed to slipping into an uncritical 
                                                 
6 See (Benhabib 1990; Benhabib 1992; Benhabib 1996b; Benhabib 2002). Although Benhabib rarely 
makes her complementary readings of Habermas and Arendt explicit, the fact that she does so has been 
acknowledged by others such as (Calhoun 1997).   18 
obscurity, Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories are highly complementary and 
particularly useful when applied to contemporary conditions. 
 
The difference between those who read Habermas and Arendt as presenting opposing 
theories and those who read them as developing complementary theories reflects the 
distinction between those writing democratic theory and those writing critical theory. 
The over-drawing of the distinction between Arendt and Habermas is understandable 
amongst democratic theorists, who seek to comment upon the differences between 
two theorists who have each theorised democracy extensively and not always in 
obviously sympathetic ways. When approaching Habermas’s and Arendt’s work in 
terms of general social problems and what role politics might play in addressing these 
problems, however, the work of these theorists evidences far greater cohesion and 
agreement.  
 
In this thesis, I seek to present Arendt and Habermas as highly complementary 
theorists while still remaining aware of their differences. In order to defuse allegations 
that such an appropriation is unjustifiable I have paid particular attention to 
highlighting the performative benefits of Habermas’s ideal deliberation and the 
critical benefits of Arendt’s agonistic engagement. At the same time I defend my 
reading of these theories as complementary on the grounds that, in moments of 
founding, we should be investigating what we can do and what acts we can endorse, 
rather than discussing further the theoretical merits of idealisations. In this respect I 
agree with John Roberts and Nick Crossley that ‘the concern for the limits of the 
political has undermined the stress that the political, in itself, is disappearing’ 
(Roberts and Crossley 2004: 14).    19 
Structural Introduction 
The thesis comprises three chapters. The first provides an introduction to the thought 
of Arendt and Habermas as well as presenting the problems that they took to be 
endemic to modern liberal democracies. The second chapter outlines Habermas’s and 
Arendt’s conception of ideal political discourse and the ways in which they expect 
emancipatory change to occur. The third and final chapter consists of an account of 
the insights and concerns that arise when Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories are 
applied to current democratic conditions.  The thesis, therefore, can be divided 
conceptually into two parts. The first part, Chapters One and Two, deals explicitly 
with Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories, examining their analyses of the 
problems of liberal democracies and the solutions to these problems that they present. 
The second part, Chapter Three, is an attempt to apply Habermas’s and Arendt’s 
analyses to the contemporary material conditions of liberal democratic societies. The 
first part deals with the myopia of modern democracies as a symptom of the 
hegemony of instrumental reason in the political public sphere. The second part is an 
application of democratic theory to society as it is affected by this corrupted public 
sphere. The first part is a description of liberal democracy’s failure to engage citizens 
in a meaningful way. The second part is an attempt to apply Habermas’s and Arendt’s 
democratic theories to a society in which the political system has already failed to 
engage the real political interests of its citizens and which, as a result of this, is 
ceasing to function as a critical realm for political action. 
 
The first chapter of the thesis is a close examination of what Habermas and Arendt 
identify as the fundamental problems of contemporary democratic fora. This 
examination of Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories reveals that they share   20 
the view that modern democracies suffer from a lack of critical engagement on the 
part of the citizen. Each agrees that existing representative democracies lack that 
amount of engagement with public policy-making required to render the outcomes of 
that policy-making reasonable. Each identifies a similar source for this malaise. This 
is the emergence of instrumental thought as the only legitimate form of public 
reasoning, which leads to the abuse of public space in the service of preconceived 
ends. The first chapter, therefore, serves to highlight Habermas’s and Arendt’s 
criticisms of the capture of public space by those who wish to use it as a forum for 
legitimating political decisions made elsewhere, as opposed to a public space for 
critical engagement. 
 
The second chapter outlines the ways that, according to Habermas and Arendt, the 
instrumental dominance of public life might be undermined. Both Habermas and 
Arendt present an ideal form of democracy that not only increases the critical 
engagement of citizens with their democratic governments but, in doing so, also opens 
up the possibility for human emancipation through political participation. Here I 
outline Habermas’s theory of communicative action, which rests upon the possibility 
of using ideal discursive conventions as a critical tool. Habermas suggests that the 
critical potential of individual sovereignty is constituted not only within the state 
apparatus, but also within everyday discursive practices. In order to harness the 
emancipatory potential of speech acts, Habermas outlines an ideal speech situation 
that is governed by a set of conditions that produce reasonable outcomes from 
discussion. The conclusion to Chapter Two outlines the complementary features of 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories, indicating that a synthesis of the two   21 
theorists’ work suggests that there is a natural tendency towards emancipatory 
democracy. 
 
In the third chapter I investigate why, despite this “natural” tendency, it is difficult to 
perceive an emancipatory democratic system emerging from contemporary 
conditions.  In doing so I highlight the ways in which the agonistic drive of 
individuals has been harnessed and placated by those with control over steering 
media. This is essentially an analysis of how private interests have usurped public 
space. Through this analysis I present the occlusion of the political by the social as 
being at the base of the lack of critical engagement with political space. I contend that 
what we find in contemporary society is not only a public space dominated by 
instrumental thought, but also a myopic society that is a response to this impoverished 
political practice. One crucial result is that public space is not simply dominated by 
instrumental reason but becomes a mediatised spectacle. This spectacle serves to 
engage the individual’s agonism and, in the process, displaces the identity forming 
context of true public space. The result of this displacement of public space is not 
only a continuation of the critical deficit of contemporary liberal democracies. Such a 
displacement also undermines the basis for hope that there may be a “natural” 
inclination towards emancipatory democracy. 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I seek to use Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories to reassert the 
emancipatory potential of democratic systems, but only insofar as it appropriates 
democracy as an idiom of personal freedom and an institution that encourages 
individuals to engage in the critical composition of public power. A large part of this   22 
thesis is, therefore, critical of democracy as it is currently practised. This thesis is 
based upon the understanding that the myopic tendencies of late capitalist societies 
and the ossification of democratic systems within these societies are inherently linked. 
It does not hold up western civilization and politics as an ideal to be emulated, but 
rather calls for critical thinking about what kind of political culture we in the west are 
exporting, given liberal democracy’s apparent failure to engage the personal power of 
its constituents.  
 
The thesis is intended to serve as more than a useful summary of Habermas’s and 
Arendt’s democratic theories.  The thesis also aims to describe these theories in such a 
way as to highlight their appropriateness for an analysis of the contemporary 
conditions of liberal democracy. As argued in the second chapter, by reading 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories as complementary, it is possible to imagine how 
democratic reform might lead to real human emancipation and this alone makes such 
a reading worthwhile. Whilst the third chapter undermines any false hope that such 
emancipation might be an historical inevitability, it serves to emphasise exactly what 
we are losing by not pursuing democratic reform - in particular a gratifying 
relationship with a natural and real world. This thesis is based upon the understanding 
that identifying what has gone wrong with the relationship between self and world in 
contemporary liberal democracies is the first step towards addressing the social 
myopia that results from the contemporary form of this relationship.   23 
Chapter One: The Problem with Modern 
Democracies 
Introduction 
The aim of this first chapter is to indicate the ways in which contemporary 
democracies can be seen to suffer from a critical deficit. The ambiguity of the term 
“critical” in this statement is intended. That is to say that this chapter shall suggest 
that the major flaw of modern democracies is that they suffer from a deficit of 
criticism; at the same time the chapter advances the argument that this deficiency is of 
critical importance for the possibilities of individual and social happiness and 
freedom. 
 
In order to draw attention to the critical deficit of democracy I intend to explore the 
evaluations of modern democracy presented in the works of Hannah Arendt and 
Jurgen Habermas. These two theorists can be seen as representatives of the agonistic 
and deliberative schools of democratic thought respectively, and while there is much 
that separates their analyses of contemporary democracy, there is enough consistency 
in their diagnosis of its problems to present a cohesive picture of its shortcomings.   
 
Hannah Arendt presents us with an elaboration of the failure of modern liberal 
democracies to emulate the original aim of the classical Greek polis. This failure is 
manifested in modern democracy’s inability to either stimulate critical thought or to 
produce a forum for the process of debate. Arendt describes this absence through a 
description of the “occlusion of the political by the social”. This is a shift in the   24 
purpose of public space from a critical forum for the discussion of, and celebration of, 
public deeds, to that of a space of social coercion, where producers and consumers are 
seen to “behave” or be excluded.  
 
Jurgen Habermas also presents the failures of modern democracies through a 
comparison with an idealised version of a public sphere. In this case, instead of 
comparing modern democracy to the original ideal of the classical Greeks, he 
compares it to the early bourgeois public sphere of the Enlightenment. In an early 
work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas describes this 
public milieu as maintaining the required critical social commentary for a democratic 
government to function legitimately. However, this democratic public sphere was 
chimerical, appearing briefly in order to elevate the bourgeois to political power and 
then becoming corrupt under the ossifying conditions of capitalist society.  
 
My intentions in highlighting the critiques of both theorists are twofold. First, I feel it 
is necessary to establish that there is a problem with actually existing democracy; 
these two theorists present the problem as oriented around a critical deficit. Second, a 
sound exploration of the philosophical groundings of these theorists’ own projects 
will be of great benefit to understanding the basis of and limits to their solutions to 
democracy’s problems, which shall be explored in the second chapter. 
Part 1: Arendt’s Problem with Modern Democracies 
This initial discussion of the political thought of Hannah Arendt is based largely upon 
her work The Human Condition (Arendt 1958). In this work Arendt asserts a powerful 
criticism of modern democracies and outlines the philosophical foundations of this   25 
critique. In order to present the most cohesive version of Arendt’s problem with 
modern democracies, I shall initially develop an account of the reasons why critical 
thought is so central to Arendt’s conception of the good life. Following this I shall 
summarise the arguments developed in The Human Condition concerning the critical 
deficiencies of the public realms constituted through labour and work, and outline the 
virtue of the polis of classical Greece. This will serve to give the reader a sound 
understanding of the premises that underpin Arendt’s criticisms of modern 
democracies, which will be fully explored in the final section. 
Arendt and Thinking 
If we are to gain a thorough appreciation of Arendt’s critique of modern democracies, 
it is useful to first understand her philosophical assumptions about the importance of 
thinking. In order to do this, I intend to outline the primacy of thinking, acting and 
speaking within the context of what Arendt defines as “The Human Condition”. I 
shall go on to indicate the danger Arendt describes as fundamental to instrumentalist 
thought, which is inherent in the distinction between “thinking” and “knowing”. In 
doing so my aim is to establish, at this early point, Arendt’s emphasis on the role 
public space plays in generating critical thought.  
 
According to Arendt, humanity makes itself remarkable through the interrelated 
faculties of thought, speech and action. Arendt understands the ability to think to be 
the ability of a free human in a free society (Horowitz 1999: 273). Thinking and 
manifesting this thought through speech and action in the world is the unique 
characteristic of human existence that presents the possibility for glory. To avoid 
thinking is to go through life abiding by rules and norms, which is an aberration of the   26 
human condition. Life without thinking, acting and speaking, would destroy the 
‘potentialities of human power… [and] dispossess us of all power [such that] we can 
repeat along with Jesus: ‘It were better for him that a millstone were hanged around 
his neck, and he cast into the sea’ (Arendt 1958: 241 citing Luke 17:4). Arendt’s 
esteem for speech, thought and action arises not from biblical endorsements, however, 
but through her understanding of what contributes to healthy and happy human 
existence. In order to identify from where these presumptions arise, I shall examine 
the qualities of thought that establish it as an Arendtian virtue. I shall then go on to 
use the example of Arendt’s discussion of Adolf Eichmann to display how thought 
manifests itself through speech and action.  
 
Central to Arendt’s assessment of the virtue of a democratic system is its ability to 
foster thought. Arendt states that thought is the process of creating a dialogue with 
oneself. This is a fundamentally use-less pursuit, which nonetheless guards against 
conformism and the ultimate “banality” of evil. The notion of thought as such a 
dialogue as a conversation between “me” and “myself” has been central to philosophy 
since the time of Plato (Arendt 1958: 76). Arendt believes that such a dialogue creates 
an awareness of the nuances of existence. 
 
The advantage of such a conversation with oneself is the inherent appeal of its 
honesty. A conversation between “me” and “myself” is unique in the fact that both 
participants are communicating from the same position within a shared understanding.  
Arendt refers to this “honesty” through evidence of a lack of external impetus. ‘Truth’ 
she states, citing Thomas Aquinas, ‘can reveal itself only in complete human stillness’ 
(Aquinas 1947: 182 cited in; Arendt 1958: 15), ‘Thought…has neither an end nor aim   27 
outside of itself’ (Arendt 1958: 170).  The honesty of the inner duality of 
contemplative thought gives thought itself a fundamentally critical nature. 
 
Arendt believes that the benefit of thinking is that it presents the ability to offer a kind 
of recourse to basic human value. As Heidegger described it, ‘Thinking says what the 
truth of Being dictates; it is the original dictare.  Thinking is primordial poetry’ 
(Heidegger 1973-74: 583). We experience what we do while thinking because we are 
confronted in our own minds only with what emerges from our ‘opaque and 
impenetrable’ hearts (Arendt 1971: 418). The result of this inner contemplation is that 
it reveals the truth, not only about everything that can be held to be true in the 
phenomenal world, but also about the nature of the contemplator (Arendt 1958: 75-
76). The result is a process that involves inherent critique from a position beyond 
reproach that is nonetheless subjectively constituted and unique. As Arendt notes in 
The Life of the Mind, ‘The experience of the activity of thought is probably the 
aboriginal source of our notion of spirituality in itself, regardless of the forms it has 
assumed’ (Arendt 1978b: 44).  
 
The notion of spirituality provides us with an interesting way to distinguish the 
critical nature of thought and to understand the dichotomy Arendt establishes between 
“thinking” and “knowing”.  Thinking involves critical personal reflection; whereas 
knowing depends upon the acceptance of truth as external to individual perception. 
While Arendt believes that the process of prayer has much in common with the inner 
dialogue of thinking, there is a fundamental distinction as to whether critical space 
may emerge, which distinguishes thought from knowledge (Arendt 1958: 76-77). 
Prayer may be likened to thought insofar as it involves a process of questioning   28 
dialogue, but the moment it becomes a process of passively beholding a “known” 
truth it ceases its relentless questioning and becomes “knowing”. 
 
Knowing, or cognition, most readily manifests itself through a flight from thought 
into the security of structure. According to Arendt there is a modern human 
propensity to “know” which arises from a deep mistrust of the human capacity to 
identify reality (Arendt 1958: 310). This reflects the themes of Immanuel Kant in his 
work ‘Answering the Question: What is the Enlightenment?’, where he describes ‘the 
self incurred immaturity’ of people who are afraid of independent thought (Kant 
1985). While Kant’s project rests upon supporting reason in the face of dogmatic 
religions and customs, Arendt suggests that modern “knowledge”, as a flight from 
thought, appears through Cartesian reason and instrumental sciences. 
  
Cartesian thought entails a process of reduction to only those things that cannot be 
doubted. Arendt notes that this eminent scepticism leads to faith only in knowing 
what the mind itself has produced, which manifests itself in a mathematical approach 
to knowledge (Arendt 1958: 283). As a result of our distrust of our own capacities to 
receive reality, we cling to the “objectivity” of our measuring instruments. Although 
this “objectivity” is entirely relative, and as such not objective at all
7, the material 
nature of measuring provides evidence of a material reality. This material reality is 
not submitted to critical scrutiny and becomes the “objective” and “real” standard 
through which everything else is known. While thought becomes critical because of 
                                                 
7 This was pointed out by Heisenberg, who observed that the process of observation invariably affects 
the properties of the object being observed (Arendt 1958: 261).   29 
the worldlessness of inner duality, knowing is fundamentally uncritical, based upon 
an external, objective “truth”.  
 
The importance of this distinction between thinking and knowing can be seen in 
Arendt’s encounter with the mind of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann, 
formerly a vacuum-cleaner salesman, rose unspectacularly through the managerial 
ranks of the Nazi party to be placed in charge of the “final solution” to the Jewish 
problem during World War Two. This position entailed the design, construction and 
supervision of the Nazi death camps. When Eichmann was apprehended some years 
after the war Arendt attended the trials to report on them from a Jewish perspective. 
When confronted with Eichmann, the man who had authorised the extermination of 
millions of human beings, what Arendt found remarkable was his banality; his evil 
nature existed not in the perverse nature of his thought, but in the lack of any critical 
thought and the subsequent dominance of external notions of truth. 
 
For Arendt, what was obviously lacking in Eichmann’s thought process was the two-
in-one – he lacked the capacity to question the legitimacy of his own actions. As a 
result this “average” and “normal” person displayed the horror achievable by 
someone with the inability to decide for themselves between “right” and “wrong” 
(Arendt 1964: 26). Arendt has been accused of being overly sympathetic to 
Eichmann, in not being able to see his demonic intention in constructing and 
designing death camps (Kristeva 2001a: 145). To her critics she seems to have a 
misplaced faith that Eichmann would not have been able to carry out these 
unconscionable acts had he engaged in an internal dialogue; that is, had he started 
actually thinking as opposed to knowing.  Indeed it may appear that the line Arendt   30 
draws between banality and evil serves no other purpose than to stress her own faith 
in a particular type of non-instrumental thought. However, Arendt bases her 
estimation of Eichmann’s thinking processes on both his speech and his action - his 
appearance in the world. According to Arendt, appearance in the world is defined 
through these two outputs of the mind that manifest themselves publicly (Arendt 
1958: 3).  Hence in her work on Eichmann, Arendt emphasises how his lack of 
thinking manifested itself in both his action and his speech.  
 
In support of this argument Arendt highlights the thoughtlessness of Eichmann’s 
actions throughout his career in the Nazi Party. She asserts that Eichmann did not join 
the National Socialist party out of any deep-seated conviction, but rather as an 
unemployed and lonely individual who was looking for membership of any fraternity 
– indeed his application to the National Socialists was only processed after he 
unsuccessfully attempted to join the Freemasons (Arendt 1964: 29). His rise through 
the ranks of the Nazi Party was not due to any particular brilliance on his part; his 
remarkable characteristics were rather that he was efficient and unquestioning, key 
components of instrumental thought. He distinguished himself by conceiving of a new 
way of processing disenfranchised Germans such as Jews and Gypsies, a sort of 
human  de-ssembly line which would strip people of their German citizenship, 
property and money in one efficient procedure. This sort of dehumanisation flourished 
due to its lack of contemplative involvement during the processing – the processing 
centre operated as a machine whose success was gauged upon its efficiency. The 
efficiency of the machine was heightened by specifically excluding contemplative 
human involvement. Eichmann distinguished himself by his capacity to act out the   31 
objectives set before him by the Nazi Party without question – as Arendt states he 
‘merely…never realised what he was doing’ (Arendt 1964: 288). 
 
Arendt’s estimation of Eichmann’s thoughtlessness is also based upon his qualities as 
a speaker. Arendt stresses that speech is the public manifestation of thought, insofar 
as ‘whatever men do or know or experience can make sense only to the extent that it 
can be spoken about’ (Arendt 1958: 4). In this respect, Eichmann distinguished 
himself by his use of fixed expressions and reliance on unoriginal phrases that 
appeared to be a direct recital of party propaganda (Kristeva 2001a: 148). Arendt 
expressed dismay at his trite phrases and bureaucratic vernacular: ‘he was genuinely 
incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché’ (Arendt 1964: 48). 
Arendt concludes from this that ‘his inability to speak was closely connected with an 
inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else’ (Arendt 
1964: 49). For Arendt, Eichmann’s inability to speak without relying on clichés and 
fixed expressions exemplified the fact that his thinking also relied upon external 
templates, indicating that he did not think, but, rather, knew.  
 
Arendt’s encounter with Adolf Eichmann illustrates the nuances of her philosophy. 
Here we encounter a thinker who holds thought in the highest esteem, but only 
thought insofar as it is critical, reflective and evidences an inner dialogue about 
goodness. She holds instrumental thought, the process of cognition as objective and 
instrumental in its ignorance of any such plurality, in contempt. Thought, of whatever 
degree of integrity, manifests itself in the world through the human faculties of speech 
and action. This manifestation, in turn, allows us to assess the life of each individual 
as a narrative that indicates the goodness of the lived life, a goodness that is   32 
exemplified by the degree of critical thought involved. It is critical thought that 
fundamentally underpins a healthy and free human existence, and as we move beyond 
Arendt’s philosophical foundations to her appreciation of the public sphere we shall 
find that it is the capacity of a public sphere to promote critical thought that 
determines its greatness. 
Arendt’s Three Conceptions of Public Space 
Arendt’s criticism of modern society is based upon its inability to promote critical 
thought through the function of the polis – a communal space provided to deliberate 
upon issues of universal relevance. This section is devoted to highlighting how Arendt 
believes public space can be misappropriated by being a place for conformism or 
instrumental thought rather than being a space for (critical) thought, speech and 
action.  This description of the pejorative potentials of the public realm is necessary in 
order to understand the foundations of Arendt’s criticism of modern democracies. 
 
Arendt’s description of this problem has been described as ‘the occluding of the 
political by the social and the transformation of the public space into a pseudospace of 
social interaction, in which individuals no longer “act” but “merely behave” as 
economic producers, consumers and urban city dwellers’ (Benhabib 1990: 169). 
Rather than approach this problem by trying to produce a definition of Arendt’s use of 
the word “social”
8, I shall attempt here to describe the problem in terms of the use of 
public space. By concentrating upon Arendt’s definition of public space as the realm 
of appearance and the manner in which the potential of this realm is defined by the 
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activities contained within it, it is possible to come to an understanding of the basis 
for Arendt’s approach to the possibilities of the polis. 
 
We have seen in the last section that action and speech are central to Arendt’s 
political thought due to their nature as public manifestations of identity. As she states 
in The Human Condition, ‘the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the 
“sharing of words and deeds”. Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship 
to the public part of the world, but is the one activity which constitutes it’ (Arendt 
1958: 198). Action is central to political space because, for Arendt, our very ability to 
act and to speak gives rise to the need for such a forum.  
 
At this point it becomes necessary to introduce the concept of vita activa, which 
Arendt uses to designate the three types of action available to humans: labour, work 
and action
9. In The Human Condition Arendt explores the type of public realm 
manifested by each of these forms of action. The public realm produced through the 
activity of labour is the public realm of animal laborans. The public realm produced 
through the activity of work is that of homo faber. The public realm dominated by 
action is the only truly human public realm and was exemplified in the agonistic polis 
of Classical Greece. Arendt’s description of the public realms of animal laborans, 
homo faber and human actors at times seems like a recipe for “progress”, that one 
kind of existence might be said to lead to another, like Marx’s vision of historical 
materialism. However, it is important to realise that Arendt rails against any such 
deterministic thought that denies the primacy of human agency. All humans have the 
                                                 
9 Such an introduction highlights the important connection Arendt makes between the qualities of 
public space and the kind of activity public space allows.   34 
potential to become fully human, the question of the public realm is the question of 
what might be most conducive to achieving this potential.  
The Public Realm of Animal Laborans 
The public space created by animal laborans is that of a public realm manifested by 
the activity of labouring. Arendt differentiates labouring from work as a “worldless” 
activity, which is transient and leaves nothing behind (Arendt 1958: 87). As a 
labourer is paid for their labour, and not their product, they operate in space, but make 
no appreciable contribution to this space. Labouring is a mentally uninvolved process, 
requiring knowledge of externally determined objectives, but certainly not thought, 
speech or political action. As a result the public space dominated by labouring is most 
remarkable because of absences. There is no contribution towards public space made 
by labour; rather there is an acknowledged process and understanding of implicit 
hierarchy that is only contestable through non-participation. 
 
In Arendt’s conception, a public sphere dominated by animal laborans is devoid of 
any meaningful public space. Rather, the animal laborans is ‘imprisoned in the 
privacy of his own body, caught in the fulfilment of needs in which the body can 
share and which nobody can fully communicate’ (Arendt 1958: 118-119). The activity 
of labouring does not allow for thought, speech or (public) action and, as a result, 
does not manifest a public organisation of people that arises out of speaking and 
acting together.  Indeed, the labouring process is often designed to inhibit public 
contemplation, communication or action. Hence, Arendt agrees with the Marxist 
notion that a public realm dominated by labourers would result in ‘the withering 
away’ of the state (Arendt 1958: 117), although each regards the desirability of such a 
withering very differently.    35 
 
While Marx relished the thought of the decline of the state and the concurrent rise of 
the animal laborans (identified in Marx’s writing as ‘worker’), Arendt regards this 
prospect with distaste.  Whereas Marx looks forward to the world of the socialised 
worker in anticipation of the good works they will be able to accomplish once freed 
from the restrictions of labour  (Marx 1990: 22 and 373), Arendt suggests that such 
freedom, without public space for thought, speech and action, can only lead to more 
insular patterns of production and consumption. What such a freedom lacks is the 
appropriation of critical thought, which leaves the existence of animal laborans open 
to the control of those who maintain public status. 
 
This idea has interesting parallels with views Arendt expresses in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism where she lambasts the Soviet government for failing to involve 
workers in their own public realm and, instead, installing an autocratic regime which 
purported to exemplify the model of public will but whose isolation from such public 
influences led to abuse of administrative power (Arendt 1967). Here we see an 
example of a community of labourers whose failure to manifest their own public 
realm does not result in communal freedom, but rather in domination by those who 
retain control of public space, and therefore the direction of development. 
 
We can see then that the activity of labouring does not actually manifest a public 
realm of any kind. Rather, it serves as an occupation, an activity that goes on in the 
private realm but is directed by those who do control the public realm.    36 
The Public Realm of Homo Faber 
Unlike  animal laborans,  homo faber does manifest a public space. Homo faber 
represents the ‘work’ element of the tripartite vita activa, and is recognisable largely 
through the creation of products and uses. Arendt’s critique of the public realm 
generated through a social dominance of homo faber is based upon the quality of such 
a realm, rather than its failure to materialise. This critique rests upon the instrumental 
nature of value in homo faber’s public realm, that is, it is a public dominated by 
knowing as opposed to thinking. 
 
Homo faber distinguishes itself from animal laborans through its capacity for work. 
Work in turn distinguishes itself from labour through its tangible output, its reification 
in the material world.  
[These reifications] are mostly, but not exclusively, objects for use and they possess the 
durability Locke needed for the establishment of property, the ‘value’ Adam Smith needed for 
the exchange market, and they bear testimony to productivity, which Marx believed to be the 
test of human nature. Their proper use does not cause them to disappear and they give the 
human artifice the stability and solidity without which it could not be relied upon to house the 
unstable and mortal creature which is man. (Arendt 1958: 136) 
The world produced through work has important consequences for Arendt’s 
understanding of human existence. Through the process of constructing the human 
artifice, working to a large extent shapes our material experience of being, and the 
material quality of human existence as a result. 
 
Arendt’s analysis of the process of work is based upon a critique of homo faber’s 
appropriation of means and ends. She points out that in the process of fabrication the 
end justifies the means and suggests that this relationship between means and ends 
pervades the thought of homo faber. The goal of fabrication gives rise to the 
construction of tools and implements as means to achieve this goal: ‘The end justifies   37 
the violence done to nature to win the material, as the wood justifies killing the tree 
and the table justifies destroying the wood… During the work process, everything is 
judged in terms of suitability and usefulness for the desired end, and for nothing else’ 
(Arendt 1958: 153).  The activity of work therefore entails a thorough knowledge of 
means, as opposed to a thorough evaluation of ends. This approach to action clearly 
has its uses, but, Arendt argues, such action is detrimental if it comes to dominate the 
public realm. 
 
The result of this preoccupation with means is a public realm obsessed with utility. 
The distinct problem with such a public realm is ‘an inane incapacity to understand 
the distinction between utility and meaningfulness’ (Arendt 1958: 154). With nothing 
to measure value apart from the instruments of their own construction, humans are left 
to believe that things have value only insofar as they serve human ends. Arendt makes 
the point that ‘Only in a strictly anthropocentric world, where the user, that is, man 
himself, becomes the ultimate end which puts a stop to the unending chain of ends 
and means, can utility as such acquire the dignity of meaningfulness’ (Arendt 1958: 
155). Nature, philosophy, religion – all facets of existence - thereby lose their 
meaningfulness, except insofar as they serve human ends, being the ends 
instrumentally deducted by homo faber. 
 
The danger of a public realm dominated by homo faber is that it is orchestrated 
through knowing, as opposed to thinking.  Arendt’s problem with this form of a 
public realm is intimately tied up with her fear of banality – of life without thought. 
This fear can be seen in a succinct description of the problem, which is worth quoting 
at length:   38 
The point of the matter is that Plato saw immediately that if one makes man the measure of all 
things for use, it is man the user and instrumentalizer, and not man the speaker and doer or 
man the thinker, to whom the world is being related. And since it is in the nature of man the 
user and instrumentalizer to look upon everything as a means to an end – upon every tree as 
potential wood – this must eventually mean that man becomes the measure not only of things 
whose existence depends upon him but of literally everything there is…. If one permits the 
standards of homo faber to rule the finished world as they must necessarily rule the coming 
into being of this world, then homo faber will eventually help itself to everything and consider 
everything that is a mere means for himself. (Arendt 1958: 158) 
Homo faber establishes utility as the known goal of action, and thereby reduces all 
action to work, and all debate to a discussion of means. While Arendt objects to the 
public realm of animal laborans due to its inability to manifest speech and action, her 
objection to the public realm of homo faber is based more on the type of thought 
encouraged by such activity. 
 
Arendt concludes that the public realm of homo faber is exemplified by the exchange 
market, ‘where he can show the products of his hand and receive the esteem which is 
due him’ (Arendt 1958: 160). The idea of value being a function of utility rather than 
thought and deliberation is abhorrent to Arendt, yet it holds public power in the world 
of homo faber. Adam Smith and his many followers exemplify the thought of homo 
faber when they state that it is this system of establishing value based upon utility and 
demand that distinguishes humans from animals (Smith, A. 12). Arendt rejects such a 
system because of its instrumental nature; its inability to distinguish value from its 
own existence – or its inability to facilitate thinking as opposed to knowing. 
The Ideal Public Realm of Action 
In order to appreciate Arendt’s vision of the virtue of an agonistic polis, it is helpful to 
realise that Arendt dismisses the public space of animal laborans and homo faber not 
because people in such realms cannot think, but rather because they are not 
encouraged to do so.  The ideal public forum would provide everybody with ‘an   39 
opportunity to engage in those activities of expressing, discussing and deciding which 
in the positive sense are the activities of freedom’ (Arendt 1990: 235). In opposition 
to the public realms of animal laborans and homo faber, Arendt places an idealised 
conception of the polis of Classical Greece. Deriving her perspective from the works 
of Plato and Aristotle, she imagines the polis as the ideal public space due to its 
ability to promote thought through providing a forum for action – the third activity in 
Arendt’s vita activa. 
 
Arendt distinguishes action from work due to the fact that action has no physical 
reification; it is generated by an actor and is entirely subjective and reflexive of the 
surrounds of the act. Action is ‘the only activity that goes on directly between men 
without the intermediary of things or matter’ and, therefore ‘corresponds to the human 
condition of plurality [such as the plurality found in thought], to the fact that men, not 
Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’ (Arendt 1958: 7). Arendt presents action 
as subjective; that is as non-instrumental, not based in knowing, aware of plurality 
and, therefore, grounded in thought. 
 
Action is distinguished from labour because, as Arendt explains, action is never silent, 
but always exists as a manifestation of the agent involved in the action. Here she 
follows the classical notion that through acting agents reveal something of their own 
nature (Dante 1950: 13). Action is an actualisation of the “who”, a direct expression 
of the individual’s unique existence that is both gratifying and ingratiating
10. Unlike 
labour, which is silent and concerned only with sustaining life, action is a form of 
disclosure, and its prevalence gives rise to a very human conversation about the good.  
                                                 
10 (Arendt 1958: 175) cited in (Kristeva 2001a: 171). 
Comment [TH1]: Now, we 
might say that work is an 
actualization of the ‘who’.   40 
 
Arendt posits that the closest approximation to a public realm constituted by action 
occurred in Classical Athens. Embodied in the polis of the city-state, this public realm 
was remarkable in part for its exclusion of the majority of the population
11. The polis 
was created as a political structure for the public realm and as a result no activity that 
served only the purpose of making a living was permitted to enter the political forum 
(Arendt 1958: 37). It was argued that to allow the polis to be permeated by questions 
of economy would be contrary to its meaning. At the time economics was considered 
housekeeping, an essentially private matter that had no bearing on the debate on 
public virtue central to the function of the polis. 
 
The function of the polis was to provide a forum for debate over virtue by presenting 
a chance  to win immortal fame. Through speech and action the polis of Ancient 
Greece provided a forum for citizens to express themselves in their unique 
distinctness, and gave them an opportunity to voice the story of their existence. 
The polis was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to 
distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was 
best of all. The public realm, in other words, was reserved for individuality; it was the only 
place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably were. (Arendt 1958: 41) 
Rather than being a forum for consensus, the polis provided an adversarial, yet not 
antagonistic, forum for revealing difference and justifying that difference as evidence 
of virtue through the telling of stories. This proliferation of stories was stimulated by 
debate about what ought to be immortalised and by consideration of the good life; the 
immediacy and intimacy of participation promoted thinking as opposed to knowing.  
 
                                                 
11 See (Canovan 1978) for a criticism of Arendt on this account.   41 
The polis also provided a refuge against the futility of action and speech. Hericlitus’s 
view that humanity distinguishes itself from animals through its ability to contribute 
to the immortal found its ideal public realm in the agonal polis (Arendt 1958: 19). The 
polis, in institutionalising a communal forum for notions of the good life, provided 
some permanence to good actions that were communally admired – enabling great 
humans to leave a legacy for so long as that legacy maintained itself as a valid 
contribution. An eternally brilliant idea or act (such as Hercules’ heroics) would 
achieve eternal recognition in the polis of Classical Greece, as it would continue to 
guide and inform the lives of those involved in the polis. In turn the agent who 
conveyed this act would achieve the worthy goal of immortality.  
 
By providing space that privileged action, the polis of Classical Greece harnessed the 
public spirit of the citizens in a forum that empowered individual uniqueness and 
encouraged adversarial debate. Arendt believes that these factors combined to 
produce a citizenry that was both critically informed and whose members were 
unafraid to assert their individuality
12. The extent to which the public forum 
contributed to the citizen’s sense of humanity can be seen when Aristotle describes 
slaves and barbarians as those deprived ‘of a way of life in which speech and only 
speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each 
other’ (Arendt 1958: 27). Where the central concern of the public realm is utility, we 
are condemned to an impoverished reality that has no public space for personal 
revelation and perspective. By claiming to ‘know’ the legitimate way to distribute 
                                                 
12 There is some debate about the accuracy of Arendt’s reading as there is some evidence to suggest 
that the Athenian polis was somewhat hostile to individualism – perhaps best exemplified by the trial 
of Socrates. However, Arendt certainly paints the polis as a forum for collaborative individualism; 
convinced by the heroism inspired by the Athenian polis, epitomised by Socrates defence of the virtue 
of the polis during his trial.   42 
power, our current democratic systems reduce their critical potential. In order to 
appreciate Arendt’s critique of modern democracy, we must now examine the way 
that the modern public realm has deviated from the idealised classical model 
articulated by Arendt. 
The Problem with Modern Democracies 
Hannah Arendt’s critique of modern democracies is often approached through her 
description of the occlusion of the political sphere by the social sphere
13. What 
exactly is meant by the term “social” is a subject of some debate
14. My understanding 
is that Arendt refers to the “social” as a catchall phrase to describe homo faber’s and 
animal laborans’ concurrent dominance of the public sphere. What I shall attempt to 
do here is advance an argument that the failure of modern democracy can be seen 
through the triumph of the values of animal laborans and homo faber over those of 
Classical Athens. Rather than engage in a debate about the problems raised by 
Arendt’s conception of the social, my aim is to highlight the various social factors that 
Arendt believes prohibit the emergence of a desirable public realm of the kind seen in 
Classical Athens and to identify the negative effect on humanity these factors might 
have. 
 
In investigating the relationship between the origins and subsequent problems of the 
modern political realm, it is easy to be too keen to suggest some kind of determinacy. 
It seems logical to believe that an uncritical public realm will generate uncritical 
citizens, which will in turn further reduce the critical capacity of the public realm in a 
                                                 
13 This critique was first described as the ‘occlusion of the public by the social’ in (Benhabib 1990); it 
has subsequently been discussed by (Pitkin 1998) and (Isaac 1994) among others. 
14 A debate directly addressed in (Pitkin 1998).   43 
never ending downward spiral; and is it not equally true that a benign public sphere 
would be needed to be instrumentally applied to break this process? It is once again 
crucial to remember that Arendt abhors determinacy of any kind. The agency of 
humanity, the possibility of action, is the source of all Arendt’s hopes for an improved 
human condition. Her only concession to any form of determinacy lies in her faith 
that human needs are such that individual fulfilment can only be achieved through a 
forum for speech and action, and hence that there is some “natural” tendency toward 
this goal through the agency of unfulfilled citizens (Arendt 1958: 236). With this in 
mind I intend to explore Arendt’s discussion of the problem with the modern public 
realm through analysing her views on the growing dominance of instrumental 
thought, the concurrent changing role of philosophy, the development of a waste 
economy and the effect of these conditions on modern democracies. All these 
conditions are seen equally as results of a troubled public realm and further obstacles 
to the establishment of an engaging and thought-provoking forum for speech and 
action. 
The Philosophical Dominance of Instrumental Thought 
If we were to question Arendt about an approximate time and place for a discernable 
origin of the problems of contemporary democracies, she would most likely point us 
towards Descartes. Motivated by the discoveries of Galileo who, through the 
invention of the telescope, overthrew the popular belief of his time that the sun 
revolved around the earth, Descartes was the first to base his philosophical position 
upon incredulity towards the adequacy of the human senses for revealing the world. 
Confronted with the evidence that even the most apparent fact could be incorrect, 
Descartes reduced his entire basis for knowledge to what he knew to be true, arriving 
at the obscure yet normatively significant statement “I think therefore I am”. Arendt   44 
argues that Descartes’ status as the first “modern” philosopher is attributable to his 
acceptance that the instrument of the telescope more readily interpreted reality than 
the faculties of his senses. He advanced the notion that reality was something that 
existed prior to our encounter with it and that reality could only be determined by 
removing the flaws created through human perception. This represents the initial 
aggrandisement of knowing over thinking and has led to fundamental changes in the 
realms of thought, action and speech. 
 
The public “realisation” that truth was not to be arrived at through thought, but rather 
through the manipulation of instruments can be seen as the origin of the philosophical 
ascendency of homo faber. Prior to the invention of the telescope, truth had been the 
subject of philosophy – the most accurate account of reality was to be provided 
through a discussion between the wisest and most perceptive members of any 
community. The members of these groups had arrived at the conclusion that the sun 
revolved around the earth, and as far as this understanding was coherent in 
appearance, it was true. Arendt argues that Galileo’s use of the telescope did not 
render this truth invalid, and indeed did not differ from the established arguments of 
many other philosophers without telescopes (Arendt 1958: 258). What changed the 
order of thought and knowledge was the acclaim given to the instrument itself, and 
Descartes’ abdication before the evidence of the telescope as he concurrently reduced 
the realm of philosophy to accounting for the ‘experience between man and himself’ 
(Arendt 1958: 254). The instrument provided a demonstrable fact in place of 
speculation, and thus rendered all further speculation irrelevant. Science, through its 
process of measuring, naming and categorising, appeared to present exciting new 
possibilities for human potential. At the same time, philosophy was “revealed” as 
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being subjective and obscure, and hence displaced from the role of imparting truth 
about the external world to that of commenting only on those aspects of existence that 
could not be “objectively” measured (Arendt 1958: 303-304). From this point on, 
knowledge assumed a primacy over thought. Knowledge became oriented to how the 
universe affects our measuring instruments, a process that based itself on the 
reduction and elimination of human contemplation. Hence Descartes’ realisation of 
the inadequacy of the senses to reveal truth limited the scope of philosophy at the 
same time as he reduced thinking to knowing. 
 
This fundamental reversal of the hierarchy of thinking and knowing went hand in 
hand with the rise of homo faber in the realm of action. Following the instrumental 
turn of philosophy, the world of things inherited a new importance insofar as 
instruments could facilitate knowing. Arendt maintains that the break with thinking 
was consummated by the introduction of process into making (Arendt 1958: 301). 
Before this break, contemplation was considered an inherent element in fabrication 
insofar as craftspeople were guided by the “idea” of what they wished to achieve, and 
retained the unique possibilities of action in the course of creation (Arendt 1958: 301-
302). Following this break, fabrication was “better” instructed through process, using 
tools and measurements to recreate the desired ideal. The ascendency of knowing 
over thinking, and work over action, was evident in the introduction of instruction as 
the basis for fabrication, as opposed to contemplation and interpretation. 
 
The ascendency of the ideals of homo faber also has a deleterious effect upon the 
realm of speech. Despite the freedom of human agency and the eternal possibility of 
action, the instrumental nature of knowledge means that speech is only valued insofar   46 
as it might command, instruct or resolve. As we have seen, Arendt values speech for 
its power to reveal and, in doing so, inspire action. The fundamental difference here 
can once again be seen as being the elemental difference between thinking and 
knowing. The difference between action and work lies in their prioritisation of 
contemplation – in the act (in the case of thinking, acting and speaking) or external to, 
and in some sense prior to, the act (as in knowing, working and instructing). 
Ramifications in the Public Realm 
The ramifications of the dominance of the ideals of homo faber for the public realm, 
and for the associated health of community in general, indicate how far we have 
deviated from Arendt’s ideal public realm. One of the most fundamental challenges to 
the dominance of the agonistic model of a public realm over those of animal laborans 
and homo faber is that the vast majority of enfranchised citizens are more intimate 
with the worlds of labour and work than they are with the world of action. Arendt’s 
visions of the “good life”, based as they are on the ramblings of antiquated 
philosophers and pieced together through Arendt’s own abstract thought, are neither 
accessible nor interesting to the vast majority of modern citizens. Indeed, the majority 
of citizens ‘will generally judge public activities in terms of their usefulness to 
supposedly higher ends – to make the world more useful and beautiful in the case of 
homo faber, to make life easier and longer in the case of animal laborans’ (Arendt 
1958: 108). Arendt argues that the position of action and speech in modern societies is 
‘implied when Adam Smith classifies all occupations which rest essentially on 
performance…together with “menial services”’. She contrasts this classification with 
the time of her ideal public realm when occupations such as play-acting and flute 
playing ‘furnished ancient thinking with examples for the highest and greatest 
activities of man’ (Arendt 1958: 207). Homo faber may value examples of such action 
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in the form of art
15, animal laborans may enjoy such action as entertainment, but 
neither animal laborans nor homo faber identifies the purpose of incorporating such 
action into the public realm. The failure to appropriate a public realm arises from the 
fact that there is no public space of appearance to inspire such an action. 
 
As a result of the lack of a forum for action and speech modern democracies 
experience a dominance of process and a dearth of meaning. Arendt argues that this 
manifests itself in an over-emphasis of the benefits of the productive capacities of 
animal laborans and homo faber. The rise of making and producing leads to a system 
of value based upon productive capacity in itself, devoid of any contemplation but 
based upon utility maximising calculations of capacity and demand. This system of 
value originated as the utilitarian desire to eliminate want – to stimulate production to 
the extent that all desires could be satisfied. This was the basis not only of Adam 
Smith’s faith in the invisible hand of the free market, but also the reasoning behind 
Marx’s belief that the productive capacities induced by the bourgeois era could usher 
in a utopian workers paradise where ‘the realm of freedom’ could supplant ‘the realm 
of necessity’ (Marx 1990: 873). However, Arendt argues that the great fallacy of 
Marxist thought was to assume that the free time allowed by liberation from the 
process of production and consumption would be spent nourishing higher activities. 
Instead, we find in the experience of a system without public space to inspire thought 
and action that animal laborans aspires to nothing more than consumption, and homo 
faber never aspires to anything more than production (Arendt 1958: 133).  
                                                 
15 As Kristeva notes, homo faber the artist distinguishes herself from the ideal artist through the 
purpose of the work. ‘In Arendt’s view, the artist, and the modern artist in particular, is the 
quintessential homo faber: a deeply mediocre form of humanity who embodies the modern tendency to 
regard contemporary works as opportunities for commercialisation and consumerism’ (Kristeva 2001a: 
94). 
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Arendt posits that the failure of higher productive capacities to truly emancipate 
humanity resides in the failure of the philosophies of homo faber and animal laborans 
to locate meaning externally to production and consumption. The dominance of 
instrumental reason leads to social worth being reduced to the ability to accumulate 
wealth and, with the advent of capital whose ‘chief function’ is ‘to generate more 
capital’, private property gains the ability to express the permanence ‘inherent in the 
commonly shared world’ (Arendt 1958: 69).  Thus in a society in which wealth and 
status is reckoned in terms of earning and spending power, value - both material and 
human - exists only insofar as the yardstick of consumption and production can 
measure it. Arendt argues that the possibilities for action in such a society are limited 
to the purchase and control of the reifications of the processes of production and 
consumption, and as a result any gains achieved from excess production can only be 
meaningfully invested through a corresponding increase in consumption (Arendt 
1958: 124-131). The permanence of material possessions provides homo faber with 
the only recourse to some form of immortality or meaning in the world. Without a 
public outlet for disclosing action, possession of material objects fulfils the role of 
public disclosure of identity. 
 
One consequence of such an existence is a waste economy, in which people, who 
understand production and consumption as their only standards of meaning, regard all 
objects as consumable goods. The objectification of all meaning, and the status of 
material goods as the sole recourse of man to immortality ‘harbours the great danger 
that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption or annihilation 
through consumption’ (Arendt 1958: 133).    49 
The tragedy is that in the moment homo faber seems to have found fulfilment in terms of his 
own activity, he begins to degrade the world of things, the end product of his own mind or 
hands; if man the user is the highest end, ‘the measure of all things’, then not only nature, 
treated by homo faber as the almost ‘worthless material’; upon which to work, but the 
‘valuable’ things themselves have become mere means, thereby losing their own intrinsic 
‘value’ (Arendt 1958: 155).  
Furthermore, when meaning is determined through instrumental value, the elimination 
of necessity only blurs the distinction between freedom and necessity (Arendt 1958: 
71). Arendt posits that Marx correctly foresaw that in a “socialised” world, humans 
would spend their time free from labouring enjoying  ‘those strictly private and 
essentially worldless activities that we now call “hobbies”’ (Arendt 1958: 117-118). 
According to Arendt, what Marx did not understand is that such liberation would only 
inhibit the opportunities for the thought, speech and action necessary to conceive of a 
system of value external to value in the world of things. Hobbies have non-
instrumental value only in an incredibly private setting and are reliant upon the 
productive and consumptive capacities of the public world. The elevation of labour 
did not serve Marx’s desired end of ushering in a new realm of understanding, but 
merely embedded the instrumental ideals which led to the initial ascendancy of labour 
and work over action. In such a world, everything is valued in terms of utility, and 
excess production only generates excess consumption
16. 
 
In the dominance of utility over both the private realm and the public realm, Arendt 
perceives “the rise of the social”. The dominance of instrumental thought gives rise to 
the situation in which nothing except questions of utility can legitimately appear in 
public. ‘Society’ Arendt argues, ‘is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence 
for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the 
                                                 
16 Hanna Pitkin argues that Arendt misrepresented Marx in The Human Condition, and that the 
worldlessness of homo faber can actually be seen in Marx’s prevalent concept of alienation (Pitkin 
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activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public’ (Arendt 
1958: 46). In such a situation, the public sphere serves as an extension of the private 
sphere, insofar as it is concerned with matters of the household such as economics on 
a communal or “social” level. This function of the public sphere is a drastic deviation 
from the original function delineated in city states of Classical Greece, where no 
activity concerned with “making a living” was permitted to enter the political realm 
(Arendt 1958: 37). Once again, Arendt derides this “social” public sphere because of 
its inability to foster critical thought. She cites economist Gunnar Myrdal’s conclusion 
that economics can be a science only if one assumes that one interest pervades society 
as a whole (Myrdal 1953: 194-195) and suggests that all modern political movements 
(such as Marxism and Liberalism) fall into the trap of proposing to meet the needs of 
such a household of society. Arendt argues that this occlusion of what ought to be 
debated by what utility deems should be debated elaborately insulates modern 
political institutions from critical thought. 
 
In the end, the most disturbing fact is that there is no public sphere that might 
stimulate critical thought and thus facilitate an escape from this situation. The logical 
political forum for a society numerically dominated by homo faber and animal 
laborans is a utilitarian democracy, insofar as it functions to provide the decisions 
conducive to the greatest utility; and indeed this model of democracy is not only 
present in modern societies, it is hegemonic in them. The result of the search for 
utility in government gives rise to an essentially uncritical public sphere. In 
accordance with the rise of the philosophy of homo faber, politics has been reduced 
from the role of normative contemplation to that of legitimating the state’s 
distribution of wealth and productive capacities. Animal laborans seeks to fulfil needs   51 
and wants in the life process, and homo faber seeks to achieve validation through the 
production of material to satisfy these needs. What is never acknowledged in the 
political realm is the need for a separate space for action, or even the legitimacy of 
any challenge to the current status quo.  
 
In modern society, philosophers have been reduced to validating their work according 
to the standards of utility established by the broader society. Truth has been 
established as being beyond philosophy’s grasp, and hence philosophers are either 
engaged in the epistemological task of an ‘over-all theory of science’ or they exist ‘as 
mouthpieces of the zeitgeist’ (Arendt 1958: 294). In both cases they exist in an 
observational capacity, not in a directive one and, hence, present no impetus for 
change. The numeric and ideological dominance of the ideals of homo faber and 
animal laborans gives rise to ‘the transformation of the public space of politics into a 
pseudospace of social interaction, in which individuals no longer “act” but “merely 
behave” as economic producers, consumers and urban city dwellers’ (Benhabib 1990: 
169). Political action, far from being a path toward what Arendt calls ‘disclosure’, has 
been reduced to the mockery and emptiness of marketing gurus susceptible to 
influence and corruption (Kristeva 2001a: 43). And, most importantly for Arendt, the 
fact that no space is generated to encourage the development of thinking, acting and 
speaking has cataclysmic outcomes. 
The reason why it may be wise to distrust the political judgment of scientists qua scientists is 
not primarily their lack of “character” - that they did not refuse to develop atomic weapons – 
or their naïveté – that they did not understand that once these weapons were developed they 
would be the last to be consulted about their use – but precisely the fact that they move in a 
world where speech has lost its power. And whatever men do or know or experience can make 
sense only to the extent that it can be spoken about. (Arendt 1958: 4) 
An understanding of the importance of thinking and acting in Arendt’s thought helps 
in identifying why she judges public space in terms of its conduciveness towards   52 
thought, speech and action. Her criticism of modern democratic systems is predicated 
on the understanding that, through a preconceived notion of the utilitarian purpose of 
public space, modern democracies marginalise free expression and reduce their 
potential as a place for disclosure and critical discussion. Because we have allowed 
issues of function and utility to dominate our public space, we are less likely to be 
thoughtful, critical and expressive in these spaces. This introduction to Arendt’s 
thought therefore serves to identify the importance of public space to the development 
of critical faculties, and to identify the absence of such space in modern democracies. 
Part 2: Habermas’s Problem with Modern Democracies 
The aim of this section is to clearly identify the basis of Habermas’s critique of 
modern democracies. In order to achieve this identification, it is my intention to 
outline Habermas’s work in the context of the aims of the Frankfurt School and 
indicate the foundations of Habermas’ unique contribution to critical theory in his 
theory of communicative action. With this paradigm in mind I intend to explore 
Habermas’ earlier work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere which 
contains Habermas’ most explicit attempt to deal with the issue of the problems of the 
public realm. Following a close analysis of Habermas’s description of the problem in 
terms of the function of the public sphere, I intend to then briefly couch the terms of 
this problem within the framework of Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action. 
Such an exploration of Habermas’s criticism of contemporary democracies identifies 
that he shares with Arendt an understanding that the major problem with 
contemporary democratic systems is that they fail to foster the critical engagement of 
individuals with the world around them. This commonality is at the basis of the   53 
complementary reading of Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories that 
underpins this thesis. 
 
I believe that a brief overview of the work of the Frankfurt School, from which 
Habermas emerged, helps to place Habermas’ work in an important context. Although 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action arises from a frustration with philosophies 
of consciousness, I still find that some grounding in the terms of instrumental aims 
and objectives might make his work more accessible in this instrumental world. 
Although Habermas is clearly reluctant to couch his theory of communicative action 
in these terms, I am confident that The Theory of Communicative Action is, in itself, 
Habermas’s realisation of the goals initially set by the critical theorists of the 
Frankfurt School. As such, an introduction to the thought of some of the members of 
the Frankfurt School serves as a good introduction to Habermas. 
 
Habermas’s most direct engagement with the problems and potentials of the public 
sphere is in his The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas 1989), 
his second habitation dissertation following his PhD. Originally published in German 
in 1962, but not available in English until 1989, this work emerged at a very early 
stage in the development of Habermas’s theories
17. Nonetheless it contains an ethos 
and insight commensurate with his later work and, more importantly, deals directly 
with the practical problems with modern democracies without any of the obfuscation 
that occurs as a result of the heavy theoretical emphases of his later work. The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere also contains a tripartite delineation of 
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separate eras of the public realm, and I feel this similarity with Arendt’s work on the 
critical role of the public realm invites closer investigation.  
 
Following a detailed analysis of Habermas’s representation of the problem with 
modern democracies in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, I intend 
to revisit these themes within the framework established by Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action. This serves three purposes. First, it makes the difficult 
theoretical position of the theory of communicative action easier to comprehend by 
relating it to the practical situation I wish to address. Second, and relatedly, it 
introduces the theoretical language which will be used to discuss Habermas’s ongoing 
work in the next chapter. Third, it shows the continuity of Habermas’s work as critical 
theory, justifying my use of his older work to examine his ideas about democracy. 
  
The hope is that through this discussion of Habermas’s work I can present a clear 
picture of his critique of modern democracies. As with my discussion of Arendt’s 
work my goal here is not only to understand Habermas’s thought, but to highlight the 
validity of his concerns for the condition of modern democracies.  
Habermas’s Place in the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the direction and intent of Habermas’s 
work, it is useful to explore the philosophical tradition from which he emerged. The 
ideals of critical theory and the remarkable environment of the Frankfurt School 
clearly had a profound effect upon Habermas’s work, and a brief investigation of this 
background seems invaluable in placing his later work in context. The Institute of 
Social Research in Frankfurt Au Main was not only the place of the conception of   55 
“critical theory” it was also home to the most profound exponents of critical theory. 
Although Habermas eventually appears to depart from all previous work of the 
Frankfurt School, the writings of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert 
Marcuse all had profound effect on Habermas’s work and provided him with some of 
his inspiration. I shall briefly discuss each of these influences in an attempt to further 
locate Habermas’ place in critical theory.  
 
Critical theory emerged as an outgrowth of orthodox Marxism and was first 
delineated in opposition to classical theory in the work of Max Horkheimer. In his 
essay ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, Horkheimer delineated a new type of theory 
that would draw its material from the experience of human history. He opposed 
critical theory to the classical theory of Aristotle and Plato, which refused to be 
concerned with the mutable, mortal and ever changing world of things and instead 
occupied itself with grander theories of the cosmos (Horkheimer 1974). The aim of 
critical theory was to render judgement upon those things previously held by 
philosophers of the Platonic-Aristotlean tradition to be impermanent and, therefore, 
below the lofty purpose of contemplation (Theunissen 1999: 243-244). Through the 
elaboration of this distinction Horkheimer named a difference that had existed since 
Marx had turned Hegel on his head – the use of theory as a reconstructive force based 
upon a critique of the immanent conditions of existence. 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno were the first to delineate the scope of the Frankfurt School’s 
critical theory, and their initial challenge to the conditions of existence was to 
question the process of Enlightenment. In their work Dialectics of Enlightenment 
Horkheimer and Adorno depict the coexistence of reason and unreason in the   56 
developed world. They investigate the ways in which the process of Enlightenment 
could lead to the savage irrationality witnessed during the Second World War and 
conclude that Enlightenment has led only to repressive administered societies that 
contain their own contradictions through the continual endorsement of dehumanising 
myths. Within these sentiments resided a profound understanding of Enlightenment as 
a form of mass deception, where humanity clings to “reason” despite the many 
negative manifestations of this reliance (Horkheimer and Adorno 1987). Incredulity 
towards forms of rationality and a critique of reason based upon its human 
ramifications became the leitmotifs of Frankfurt School work, and is integral to 
Habermas’s work. 
 
Herbert Marcuse further explored the critique of reason established in Dialectics of 
Enlightenment. His major contribution to the Frankfurt School, and to the inspiration 
of Habermas, was to detail the kind of false consciousness that controlled the 
possibilities of reason in administered societies. In his work Eros and Civilization 
Marcuse suggests that society has produced surplus repression due to an initial 
triumph of control over desire (Marcuse 1974). In his later work One Dimensional 
Man he explains how industrial societies manipulate such control to generate “false 
needs” in order to integrate individuals into the processes of production and 
consumption (Marcuse 1964). He also argues that the unified, functional language of 
instrumental reason is fundamentally anti-critical and limits the possibilities of human 
progress (Marcuse 1974: 97). His contention that instrumental reason maintains the 
ideological dominance of the societies of control has much in common with Arendt’s 
critique; and the suggestion that instrumental reason rests upon its own, arguable, 
normative position is central to much of Habermas’ work.   57 
 
This quick examination of some of his precursors goes some way toward providing 
the background for Habermas’s distinct contribution to critical theory. Habermas 
accepts none of the work of the previous members of the Frankfurt School 
uncritically. He disagrees with Horkheimer and Adorno for their pessimism and 
rejects Marcuse’s understanding of the possibilities for overcoming societies of 
control
18. Nonetheless he has continued the tradition of criticising systems and 
structures for their effects upon reason, as opposed to the more traditional Marxist 
concerns with ownership and control of the means of production.  
Habermas’s Theoretical Progression 
It is hard to clearly differentiate Habermas’s work into categories of pre and post 
communicative action due to the gradual evolution of his theoretical position and the 
consistency of the spirit of his work. Nevertheless, there is an obvious break in 
objective between his later work and his earlier work, insofar as his emerging interest 
in the possibilities of communication occurred concurrently with a decline in his 
direct critique of particular social and political arrangements (Olafson 1990: 646). His 
earlier work is more obviously a product of the Frankfurt School, continuing the 
tradition of criticising dominant theories of the public realm, knowledge and science 
against a consciousness of what ought to be. His later work, while still an endeavour 
of critical theory, is different because Habermas seeks to avoid being drawn too 
significantly into criticism of actually existing conditions in an effort to avoid it being 
constructed as a “philosophy of consciousness”
19. His earlier work, therefore, 
                                                 
18 These discussions take place in (Habermas 1983b). 
19 In “philosophies of consciousness” Habermas detects the possibilities of emancipation are limited by 
the particularity of the consciousness they rely upon. As Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out, reason   58 
provides us with the greater insight into the problems Habermas saw in western 
societies of his time, as he was unafraid to posit his critical theories as solutions to 
these problems. 
 
Habermas’s earliest political writings suggest a thinker heavily influenced by 
Marcuse’s analysis of science. In his work Towards a Rational Society, and in 
particular the chapter ‘Science and Technology as Ideology’, Habermas generated his 
own critique of science. Taking the term “rationalisation” from Weber to mean ‘the 
extension of the areas of society subject to the criteria for rational decision making’ 
(Habermas 1971: 81), Habermas described the process of rationalisation as one of 
endorsing instrumental action in all aspects of everyday life.  He suggested that the 
progressive rationalization of society, due to the institutionalisation of scientific and 
technical development, meant that instrumental reason intruded upon normative and 
traditional areas of reason where it did not belong (Habermas 1971: 81). Although he 
disagreed with Marcuse about the possibilities of an emancipatory use of technology, 
he developed Marcuse’s argument that this institutionalisation of rationality inhibited 
the development of critical perspectives and, subsequently, human progress. 
 
Habermas developed his analysis of the manner in which reason shaped society in 
Knowledge and Human Interests, the work that first earned him widespread 
international recognition. In this work Habermas subjected the theory of knowledge to 
critical theory; an inherently self-reflexive undertaking that can be seen to introduce 
the first elements of the communicative theory to come. While Habermas criticised 
                                                                                                                                            
and philosophy can actually impede emancipation in these conditions (Horkheimer and Adorno 1987). 
Similarly, Arendt identifies that instrumentality has hamstrung the possibilities of emancipatory 
politics (Arendt 1958: 294).    59 
the positivist model of explanation and knowledge, he also came to the conclusion 
that all bases of knowledge within the social sciences ‘were inherently historical, and 
thus non-universal’ (Olafson 1990: 642). This critique included, quite necessarily, his 
own “philosophy of consciousness”, based as it was upon his own normative 
preconceptions about what it may take to improve the world. Habermas concludes 
that anyone unaware of this limitation fails to be sufficiently self-reflexive, which 
leads to an unfree existence that is dangerous because of an immoral lack of self-
examination and a theoretical tendency towards dogmatism (Habermas 1971: 208). 
From this moment of the recognition of the importance of self-reflexive realisation 
on, Habermas’s work is oriented less around the typical concerns of the Frankfurt 
School, and more by an attempt to re-establish critical theory within the 
communicative framework of all knowledge and debate
20. 
 
In subsequent writings Habermas continued to explore the crises of legitimation and 
the possibilities of communication until he articulated a new incarnation of critical 
theory in his work The Theory of Communicative Action. In this work he focused 
upon establishing the possibility of an emancipatory politics based upon the 
“metatheoretical” tool of critically assessing communicative practices. This critical 
assessment was not to be based upon a “philosophy of consciousness”, but rather was 
to be based upon the reason embodied in the conventions of language. Habermas 
asserted that communicative care could be enacted in order to ensure a greater degree 
of communicative integration in society, without imposing any normative force 
external to that community. Habermas thereby reinvented critical theory in an attempt 
                                                 
20 Habermas acknowledges this shift in (Habermas 1993b: 149). 
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to escape the instrumental abuse of philosophies of consciousness and to emphasise 
the importance of legitimate communication in its place.  
 
The conceptual shift Habermas made in his Theory of Communicative Action is very 
important for his subsequent work on the emancipatory potential of democracies. It is 
my intention to explore his theory of communicative action in the next chapter, which 
deals with Habermas and Arendt’s solutions to the critical deficit of liberal 
democracies. However, it is his early work The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere that provides us with the clearest expression of the problems Habermas 
saw in contemporary democracies. This work of orthodox critical theory shall form 
the basis of the following assessment of the important shortcomings of modern liberal 
democracies. 
Habermas’s Three Conceptions of the Public Sphere 
In his work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas sets out to 
delineate the inherent contradictions within liberal democracies and illustrate how 
these contradictions have transformed the ideal bourgeois public sphere into 
something far less critical than its original incarnation. Habermas’s interpretation of 
the development of the public realm is intimately intertwined with the transformation 
of the state and the economy. For Habermas the ideal form of public space - one that 
was both critical and empowered - existed for a transient moment before being 
undermined by concurrent changes in state and media interference in the public realm. 
The bourgeois public institutionalised a democratic principle without the necessary 
changes to civil society, resulting in a “structural change” in the public sphere that 
emphasised the contradictions within the initial democratic ideal. The upshot of   61 
Habermas’s investigation is to show that the bourgeois or liberal model of democracy 
is no longer feasible (Fraser 1992: 111). 
 
Structural Transformation provides us with an accessible way to grasp the concrete 
social-institutional foundations of Habermas’s work on contemporary democracies. 
This early work has come under attack for privileging the bourgeois public sphere 
over others, for not being critical enough of the bourgeois public sphere, and for an 
inadequate grasp of the effects of mass media on public opinion
21. Although he has 
defended the basic validity of his analysis against these claims, Habermas himself 
believes he was naïve to attempt to effect change through the inherited theoretical 
framework of Frankfurt School Critical Theory (Habermas 1985: 77-78). Despite 
these theoretical shortcomings, this work provides us with a good introduction to 
Habermas’s conception of the nature of an ideal democratic public and a unique, 
historical, account of the corruption of the public sphere of liberal democracies. While 
it may precede the theoretical cohesion of Habermas’s later work, it provides us with 
an invaluable insight into the existing problem with liberal democracies. 
 
Habermas’s ideal public sphere ‘cannot be abstracted from the unique developmental 
history of that “civil society”’ from which it emerged’ (Habermas 1989: xvii). In 
order to gain a thorough appreciation of the rise of the ideal bourgeois public sphere, 
and its subsequent transformation and decline, it is necessary to delineate three 
historical epochs of publicity. The first is the feudal public sphere, characterised by 
“representative publicness”. The second is the bourgeois public sphere, characterised 
by informed public debate and control of the state. The third is the modern public 
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sphere, where the inherent contradictions of the bourgeois public sphere manifest 
themselves in a “refeudalisation” of the public sphere and a return to representative 
publicness. Each of these epochs shall be examined in turn in order to illustrate the 
rise and fall of the ideal public sphere.   
The Feudal Public Sphere 
The feudal public sphere distinguished itself by its exclusivity. Using the courts and 
halls of medieval Europe as the template for the political fora of the time, Habermas 
argues that in the middle ages publicness was more a status attribute than a political 
right (Habermas 1989: 7). Those who maintained public stations did so in a 
representative capacity, as an embodiment of some sort of “higher” power, 
commensurate with the status of divinity at the time, ‘The feudal powers, the Church, 
the prince and the nobility’ were the bearers of the representative publicness 
(Habermas 1989: 11). These public figures served to represent virtue to the masses, to 
embody, and to some extent enact, the higher aspirations of the larger population.  
 
Publicness in the Feudal epoch rested precisely upon the lack of critical public 
interaction. Those who assumed public station did so due to their inheritance of a 
traditional role, and those who witnessed public station did so due to their traditional 
deference to such roles. Publicity was wedded to the staging of the event, in which 
personal attributes, such as insignia, dress and demeanour, were the important 
elements of a successful appearance (Habermas 1989: 8). These attributes brought 
acclaim and allegiance from the masses because, in effect, they were employed (or   63 
reified) for their enjoyment
22.  The means of education were controlled in this 
situation by the same authorities that maintained the tradition of representative 
publicness, and this ensured a certain continuity of tradition. Reading and literary 
production took place more as forms of conspicuous consumption by those holding 
office rather than as a serious critical engagement (Habermas 1989: 38). As can be 
seen in the transplantation of European monarchies throughout the middle ages, even 
cataclysmic political change manifested itself through the exchanging of symbols and 
personal attributes rather than through public engagement
23. The feudal public sphere 
distinguishes itself as being both exclusive and non-critical. 
 
According to Habermas, the eventual decline of the feudal public sphere was brought 
about by the gradual expansion of critical-rational discussion. This discussion, in turn, 
had been stimulated by the concurrent development of trade in both goods and news. 
As trade routes developed and market-driven calculations depended more and more 
upon “foreign” circumstances, so did the necessity of exchanging information about 
more distant events (Habermas 1989: 16). The increasing traffic of news of increasing 
numbers of “foreign” lands led quite naturally to a more varied and critical discussion 
of what up until this time had been considered beyond reproach. The strata of society 
whose profits depended upon trade found it increasingly beneficial not only to know 
about foreign affairs, but also to understand the ramifications of certain events. As a 
consequence rational-critical debate acquired utility and began to proliferate in the 
coffee houses and salons of the trading centres of Europe (Habermas 1989: 20-44). 
                                                 
22 The strength and loyalty of such fundamentally unengaged private citizens to public symbols 
indicates a normative proclivity of humanity, that is, a fundamental desire to show normative 
allegiance. This “creation of meaning” is central to Kant’s work ‘An Old Question Raised Again: Is the 
Human Race Constantly Progressing?’ discussed by Arendt in (Arendt 1982: 19) and in Habermas’s 
discussion of Weber (Habermas 1984: 187). This proclivity will be further examined in Chapter Three. 
23 The invitation to William of Orange to take up the English crown is a good example of this.   64 
The emergence of this critical thought was the rudimentary challenge to the feudal 
public sphere that contained the seed of its own succession. It makes an interesting 
vignette to understand that the increasing desire on behalf of elites to encounter 
difference led to the expanding trade routes that in turn contributed to the sharing of 
news and ideas. In Habermas’s opinion it was this proliferation of communication that 
formed the basis of the subsequently rational challenge to these same elites’ 
appropriation of public power.  
 
At the same time as trading publics began to find their critical voice, the associated 
increase in wealth from trade led to a mercantilist manufacturing class. The new 
bourgeoisie, empowered by critical discussion, began to place pressure on the public 
elites for political changes that would allow a greater share of wealth and power
24. 
What united this emerging class was that as a whole it was excluded from political 
participation; its members shared a common interest due to their equal exclusion, and 
also shared a common forum for dissent in civil society (Habermas 1989: 35). Due to 
its exclusion from state power, and its increasing self-awareness of its own critical-
rational abilities, the bourgeois civil society that emerged excelled at promoting 
critical engagement. Fuelled by the fervour ignited through both the power of critical 
engagement and the denial of a state forum for this engagement, coffee houses and 
salons were hotbeds of political discussion based upon the reading of critical works 
and public engagement. While Habermas undoubtedly admires the critical fervour of 
                                                 
24 It is interesting to note that Habermas places the entire impetus for control of the public sphere upon 
bourgeois shoulders, something he has been criticised for by (Fraser 1992) amongst others. This 
tendency can be seen as negligent from a historical point of view; failing to recognise various people’s 
rebellions such as the Diggers’ Rebellion at St. George’s Hill in 1649 and the rebellion led by John Ball 
in 1381, to name two English examples. However, we can see these rebellions may be understood to 
have failed because they were not generated through the power generated by critical public discussion; 
as far as determining the impetus for the successful bourgeois attempt at gaining power, Habermas’s 
analysis is still valid. 
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this bourgeois class, he equally emphasises that the political will of the class emerged 
out of a frustration with the structural limitations of the feudal public sphere. 
The Bourgeois Public Sphere 
The bourgeois public sphere distinguished itself by being a forum for critical debate, 
having its right to a political presence asserted in the name of a more rational society. 
A notable example of this ethos can be seen in Kant’s essay ‘Answering the Question: 
What is Enlightenment?’ (Kant 1985).  Here Kant argues that Enlightenment, ‘man’s 
emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’, depends upon public freedom and, 
more crucially, ‘the public use of reason’ (Kant 1985: 54-55). In this declaration 
Habermas detects the emergence of a new approach to politics in which it becomes a 
battleground for reason and morality; ‘Kant’s publicity held good as the one principle 
that could guarantee the convergence of politics and morality. He conceived of “the 
public sphere” at once as the principle of the legal order and as the method of 
enlightenment’ (Habermas 1989: 104). Enlightenment discourses such as Kant’s 
highlighted the irrational injustices of the feudal political system and the utopian 
possibilities of human political freedom. The growth of the general reading public, the 
emergence of a bourgeois class that coveted political power and the development of 
rational arguments for the emancipatory potential of a critical public realm all 
contributed to the eventual downfall of the feudal public sphere.  
 
The rise of the bourgeois public sphere occurred concurrently with a rise in the belief 
in the ability of society to politically organise itself through rational debate. Kant’s 
‘What is Enlightenment?’ clearly envisioned that the public use of reason could be 
used to create an “enlightened” public realm. While he saw this public realm to be 
comprised of learned and well read individuals under feudal conditions (Kant 1985: 
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55), Kant imagined that following the establishment of the critical public sphere, 
‘Men will of their own accord gradually work their way out of barbarism so long as 
artificial measures are not adopted to keep them in it’ (Kant 1985: 59). Elsewhere, he 
presented his conception of the form that the state should take in order to facilitate the 
vigorous growth of enlightenment; a state both republican and pacifist (Kant 1957: 
128). These conceptions were tempered by the debate between other bourgeois 
notables of the time about exactly what form the political public realm should take.  
 
The institutionalisation of the bourgeois public sphere involved establishing the fora 
of bourgeois debate on a political level. Into the constitutions of the new democracies 
went safeguards for the freedom of communication and assembly, a division between 
executive and legislative power to emulate the division between reason ordering and 
will acting, and an extension of the franchise to involve more “critical” voices. The 
impetus for freedom of communication and the right of assembly arose from the spirit 
of enlightenment, and the fresh memories of the political submission of the 
bourgeoisie. The division between legislative and executive powers served to institute 
a degree of critical reflection in the process of public debate. And the extension of the 
franchise to include all property owners ensured a political public that was constituted 
by educated and critical citizens (Habermas 1989: 71-85). Politics was to be 
conducted as a form of critical conversation about what was right and good amongst 
all those able to participate meaningfully in this conversation. For a moment, ‘It 
became possible to recognise society in the relationships and organisations created for 
sustaining life and to bring these into public relevance by bringing them forward as 
interests for public discussion and/or the action of the state’ (Calhoun 1992: 9). At 
this time, following the decline of the feudal public sphere, but before the ossification   67 
and corruption of the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas’s ideal bourgeois public 
sphere existed. 
The Refeudalisation of the Public Sphere 
The reign of an enlightening, bourgeois public sphere was always to be transient due 
to its inherent contradictions. The political task of the bourgeois public sphere was the 
regulation of a civil society that was critical and capable of contributing to political 
development. However, ‘The social precondition for this “developed” bourgeois 
public sphere was a market that, tending to be liberalized, made affairs in the sphere 
of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of private people left to 
themselves’. This had the effect of emphasising existing power differences, and 
‘completed the privatisation of civil society’ (Habermas 1989: 74). With further 
control of the market placed in the hands of the bourgeois political realm, ‘the 
positive meaning of “private” emerged precisely in reference to the concept of free 
power of control over property that functioned in a capitalist fashion’ (Habermas 
1989: 74). The bourgeoisie had supposed a certain equality in private access to the 
public realm that in reality simply did not exist. As a result the public realm came to 
be dominated by bourgeois ideals and bourgeois laws, which led to the 
marginalisation of “common people” from both the political public sphere and civil 
society. 
 
An ambiguous commitment to political participation was one of the inherent 
contradictions of the bourgeois public sphere that contributed to its structural 
transformation. On one hand, the enlightenment attainable by participation in the 
political public sphere was to be coveted by all and available to everyone; on the other 
hand, only those who owned property, and thus had certain guarantees of education 
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due to social position, were entitled to participate. With regard to the initial franchise, 
where the delineation of meaningful participation was denoted by property ownership, 
the constitutional constructions of the bourgeoisie were based upon high-minded 
ideals of civil rights that had no grounding in the reality of social existence, in which 
exclusion from civil society due to economic status within that society went hand in 
hand with exclusion from the political realm (Habermas 1989: 85). However, in 
employing a highly rationalised civil rights argument in order to overturn the 
legitimacy of feudal powers, the bourgeoisie were forced to concede that if “all men 
are created equal” then they should all receive equal opportunity to participate in their 
own governance, regardless of their wealth or status. Of course, this did not reduce 
the structural inequalities brought about by the bourgeois design and control of the 
political public sphere; but it did mean “the enlargement of the public” to include 
those previously disenfranchised by high material prerequisites for public 
participation. 
 
The expansion of the franchise was met with mixed reactions from the liberal political 
theorists of the time. Liberals such as Alexis De Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill 
appreciated the fact that the ideal public sphere would be all-inclusive; however, they 
also warned of the consequences of opening up democratic procedures. 
This was because the unreconciled interests which, with the broadening of the public, flooded 
the public sphere were represented in a divided public opinion and turned public opinion (in 
the form of the currently dominant opinion) into a coercive force, whereas it had once been 
supposed to dissolve any kind of coercion into the compulsion of reason. (Habermas 1989: 
133) 
The threat of public opinion, as a compulsion toward conformity rather than a critical 
force, undermined the critical capacity of the public sphere and caused liberals such as 
Mill to deplore ‘the yoke of public opinion’ that could stifle critical debate (Habermas   69 
1989: 133). The contradictions inherent in the bourgeois public sphere thus began to 
alter the form of that public sphere and take it away from its own ideal. 
 
The reason that non-bourgeois involvement in the public sphere led to coercion, as 
opposed to critical debate, can be located in the associated loss in interest in 
maintaining society as a private sphere. Fundamental to the allocation of the vote to 
property owners was the premise that this property provided the basis for private 
autonomy and that, because of this general interest, their involvement in public debate 
would be critical (Habermas 1989: 135). The expansion of the franchise to include 
non-property owners, however, meant that the public realm was now dominated by a 
majority who were deprived of private property and sought to secure publicity in 
order to address the material imbalances this created (Habermas 1989: 127). The 
public realm was opened up to a public it was not structurally created for. The 
previously held notion of an objective general interest was thereby replaced and the 
purpose of the public sphere shifted from rational-critical debate to negotiation 
(Calhoun 1992: 22). 
 
The expansion of the franchise thus led to a new use for public debate. Marx had held 
high hopes that given access to the public sphere the masses would transform it into 
‘what, according to liberal pretence, it had always claimed to be’, a universal forum 
for expression and discussion (Habermas 1989: 177). However, Habermas points out 
that ‘the occupation of the political public sphere by the unpropertied masses led to an 
interlocking of state and society which removed from the public sphere its former 
basis without supplying a new one’ (Habermas 1989: 177).  The unifying private 
interests of the constituents of the bourgeois public had been overwhelmed by a self   70 
interested, non-critical and widely divergent public. The public realm became the 
staging point for expressions of private interest, and negotiating material interests 
became the role of the public forum.  
 
The new role of the public realm as a space for the mediation of private interests 
resulted in the emergence of welfare state mass democracy. The dominance of 
competing interests resulted in the private affairs of citizens being the central public 
concern, and the most legitimate justification of statehood came in the form of state 
care of the private affairs of its citizens (Habermas 1989: 158). At the same time the 
financial demands of the welfare state made economic prosperity the predetermined 
goal of the polis. Here society and the state became intertwined. In the formal political 
realm, publicity, in the sense of critical scrutiny of the state, gave way to public 
relations, mass-mediated staged displays and the manufacture and manipulation of 
public opinion (Fraser 1992: 113). Meanwhile private organisations began to assume 
increasing public power as powerbrokers in the political realm (Calhoun 1992: 21). 
The public sphere became the realm of private affairs, and the private sphere assumed 
a disproportionate public relevance, thus completing the structural transformation of 
the public sphere. 
 
The outcome of this structural transformation, for Habermas, is a “refeudalisation” of 
the public sphere. Habermas points out that in modern democratic society ‘rational-
critical debate has a tendency to be replaced by consumption, and the web of public 
communication unravels into acts of individuated reception, however uniform in 
mode’ (Habermas 1989: 161). Rather than presenting us with the opportunity to 
engage in critical debate, the elevation of private issues to the centre of public debate   71 
makes us regard the public realm as consumers. Publicness becomes a place for the 
representation of images and symbols. The people are engaged insofar as they 
anonymously tabulate their allegiance, but the ability to set public agendas falls once 
again to the elites. This structural transformation has detrimental effects for modern 
liberal democracies. If we are treated in the public realm as consumers, rather than 
thinkers or actors, we make consumption the measure of public worth. 
Habermas on the Problem with Contemporary Liberal Democracies 
In this next section I shall continue to outline the problems confronted by liberal 
democracies following the structural transformation of the public sphere. In The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas goes on to discuss some of 
the dilemmas brought about by the “refeudalisation” of the public sphere; such as the 
private undermining of the public realm and the rise of mass culture as a culture of 
consumption, as opposed to rational-critical debate. These criticisms are integral to 
his later attempts to reformulate a type of democracy that would be able to reinstitute 
a critical public realm.  
 
The last section concluded with a description of the refeudalisation of the public 
sphere that followed its structural transformation. The key to this notion of 
refeudalisation is the return to a “representative publicity” to which the public 
responds with conspicuous consumption within the public realm, as opposed to 
critical engagement with it. ‘The sounding board of an educated stratum tutored in the 
public use of reason’, which once provided the basis for the rise of bourgeois 
democracy, ‘has been shattered’ (Habermas 1989: 175). In its place exists a public 
that ‘is split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use nonpublicly   72 
and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but non-critical’ 
(Habermas 1989: 175). As Habermas points out, this form of publicity is a complete 
contradiction of the original intention of the bourgeois democrats, as it lacks 
communication amongst members of a public and manifests a public sphere where 
private interests are displayed and contested publicly. 
 
The result of this refeudalisation is an intertwining of state and society that blurs the 
notions of public and private. As the public sphere became the battleground of diverse 
private interests the state assumed the function of social guarantor, as opposed to the 
forum of social debate. The role of the state has “evolved” so that it ensures that every 
citizen can meet the basic requirements of bourgeois (material) existence (Habermas 
1989: 146-148). The result of this shift to welfare state democracy means that issues 
of private survival replace the normative element of public debate (envisioned as the 
raison d’etre of the bourgeois public sphere by thinkers such as Kant) as the central 
concern of the state. As a result: 
The public sphere becomes a setting for states and corporate actors to develop legitimacy not 
by responding appropriately to an independent and critical public but by seeking to instil in 
social actors motivations that conform to the needs of the overall system dominated by those 
states and corporate actors. (Calhoun 1992: 26) 
This removal of the critical function of the democratic state underpins Habermas’s 
problem with modern democracies. The remainder of this section will highlight the 
flaws of this structurally transformed democracy in the language of Habermas’s 
philosophy of consciousness before going on to briefly reiterate the problem through 
the language of Habermas’s communicative action. 
 
As evidenced in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas’s 
main criticism of modern liberal democracies is that they allow great advantage to   73 
certain groups under the guise of equal participation. The possibility of a truly critical 
public sphere is frustrated by the fact that certain groups hold disproportionate power 
over the formation and manipulation of public opinion. This is a manifestation of one 
of the initial contradictions of the bourgeois public sphere; formal equality in civil 
society and public life does not translate to equality in the actually existing world. To 
put it bluntly, the average individual has less chance of influencing public opinion 
than the owner of a newspaper. As the public sphere becomes a forum for private 
issues, as opposed to public ones, public fora become a field for business advertising, 
and as a result ‘private people as owners of property [have] a direct effect on private 
people as the public’ (Habermas 1989: 189). The bourgeois democratic ethos involves 
gestures toward the ideal of a civil society of free and equal participation. However, 
the structural transformation of the public sphere exaggerates the distinction between 
those who have expressive access to publicity and the masses who, without expressive 
access, can only involve themselves publicly as consumers.  
 
Habermas argues that the undue influence of certain groups over the public realm of 
the contemporary liberal public sphere was facilitated by bourgeois control of the 
mass media. “News” originated from the needs of bourgeois business interests and the 
notion that the mass media should serve the interest of the propertied class was 
enshrined in the new public realms of bourgeois democracy. 
Ever since the marketing of the editorial section became interdependent with that of the 
advertising section, the press (until then an institution of private people insofar as they 
constituted a public) became an institution of certain participants in the public sphere in their 
capacity as private individuals; that is, it became the gate through which privileged private 
interests invaded the public sphere. (Habermas 1989: 185) 
The dominance of business interests in the mass media rendered control of the content 
of the media to the bourgeois class. The result was that the material dominance of the 
bourgeoisie was translated into their practical dominance of the public sphere.   74 
 
The commercialised nature of the mass media has inevitably had a qualitative effect 
on the kind of deliberation available to the public. Habermas cites an early study of 
American media which shows that even in the early penny press sales were 
maximised by the purposeful exclusion of political content that might alienate 
potential readers (and buyers) (Bleyer 1927: 184). The market demands ‘immediate 
reward news’ such as ‘tales of corruption, humour, accidents, disasters and social 
events, rather than “delayed reward news” of critical social issues’ (Habermas 1989: 
169-170). The content of media designed for consumption cannot be too challenging 
for its audience, or it runs the risk of losing both the audience and its advertising 
revenue. ‘Radio stations, publishers and associations have turned the staging of panel 
discussions into a flourishing secondary business’. Habermas notes, ‘Thus, discussion 
seems to be carefully cultivated and there seems to be no barrier to its proliferation. 
But surreptitiously it has changed in a specific way: it assumes the form of a 
consumer item’ (Habermas 1989: 164). The practical result of this is that civil society 
comes to be dominated by forms of media that are oriented towards consumption 
rather than towards rational critical debate. 
 
Of course, the proliferation of cultural goods that are consumption ready is only a 
negative thing for the public sphere if that consumption is decidedly uncritical. The 
premise of the ideal bourgeois public sphere was that its constituents would savour 
critical interaction as part of “living well”. Habermas argues that the structural 
transformation of the public sphere removes this requirement for participation in 
public debate and replaces it with consumption commensurate with the feudal notion 
of publicity, in which the expressive boundaries of participation are set prior to the 
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conversation (Habermas 1989: 164). As with the feudal era, those who maintain the 
contemporary public realm do so with a view to maintaining the status quo and, to 
that end, they purposefully alter publicity to be consumptive rather than critical. In the 
world of advertising publicity is coveted in order to generate consumption, and does 
so through the ‘reorientation of public opinion by the formation of new authorities or 
symbols which will have acceptance’ (Steinberg 1958: 92). It is the very absence of 
critical public debate that gives such ‘authorities and symbols’ their power and it is 
those with control over mediatised publics that benefit from being able to establish 
such symbols. We express our public spirit in a public world established by private 
corporations, where we are given the impression that we may actually make a 
difference in our own world
25.  At the same time we do not expect to affect the 
structure of the political public realm, where we ironically feel unqualified to debate 
issues of public importance; instead we may only take sides through consumption. 
 
Habermas argues that the exaggerated public influence of the bourgeoisie manifests 
itself not only in the realm of civil society, but also in the political public sphere. The 
structural transformation of the public sphere resulted in a change in the function of 
parliament from being a forum for critical debate to being a forum for the negotiation 
of social interests. The bourgeoisie had to make certain concessions to the numerical 
superiority of the newly enfranchised proletariat; hence the emergence of parliament 
as a forum for social bargaining resulted in a more equitable distribution of state 
wealth. However, the bourgeoisie retained the constitutionally guarded rights and 
democratic system that ensured their continual dominance of civil society. The result 
                                                 
25 ‘The awakened readiness of the consumers involves the false consciousness that as critically 
reflecting private people they contribute responsibly to public opinion’ (Habermas 1989: 194).   76 
of this compromise was welfare state mass democracy;  ‘making proletarian life 
bearable and ensuring the gap between the rich and the poor did not grow so big that 
the poor could not afford the products of the rich’  (Habermas 1989: 146). The 
emergence of welfare state mass democracy incorporated the proletarian class into a 
state whose civil society is dominated by the bourgeoisie. 
 
This emergence of welfare state democracy resulted in a fundamental shift in the 
purpose of parliament’s publicity. Parliamentarians were judged on their ability to 
represent their constituents’ private interests as opposed to their ability to participate 
in rational-critical debate (Habermas 1989: 180). Citizens, therefore, regarded the 
parliament as stakeholders, and adopted ‘a general attitude of demand’ (Habermas 
1989: 211). This attitude is inherently associated with bourgeois influence upon civil 
society. ‘Because private enterprises evoke in their customers the idea that in their 
consumption they act in their capacity as citizens, the state has to “address” its 
citizens like consumers’ (Habermas 1989: 195). Here they have to compete with 
private enterprise in presenting a consumable product. The ideal of providing a forum 
of debate is so remote that Habermas suggests the most effective political party would 
be one without members ‘but [which] mobilizes only in the event of an election in the 
same manner as an advertising agency with no other goal than to win that election’ 
(Habermas 1989: 200-211). The mercenary nature of this system can be seen in the 
fact that ‘“independent voters” who know and care the least, are nevertheless the 
target of election campaigns’ (Habermas 1989: 215). Welfare state mass democracy 
thereby completes the transformation of the public sphere from a realm of critical 
debate to a realm of consumption. 
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Following this exploration of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere it is 
easy to see that Habermas held a dim view of the critical capacities created by the 
structure of contemporary democracy. He stresses that if there is any hope for 
contemporary democracy it is in further incorporating democratic forms into societal 
organisation; but he remains pessimistic about the possibility of this in a society in 
which the mode of appropriation ‘removed the ground for a communication about 
what had been appropriated’ (Habermas 1989: 227 & 116). Moreover, Habermas 
could not foresee how the public could ‘set in motion a critical process of public 
communication through the very organisations that mediatize it’ when ‘the unresolved 
plurality of competing interests… makes it doubtful whether there could ever emerge 
a general interest of the kind to which a public opinion could refer to as a criterion’ 
(Habermas 1989: 232-234). Given the partisan appropriation of all conscious attempts 
at liberation, even philosophy had become cynical. 
 
Explaining his communicative turn in ‘Further Reflections on the Public Sphere’ 
Habermas explains that ‘the presumption that society as a whole can be conceived as 
an association writ large, directing itself via the media of law and political power, has 
become entirely implausible in view of the high level of complexity of functionally 
differentiated societies’ (Habermas 1992: 443). Due largely to the problems he 
initially uncovered in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas 
concluded that the state apparatus and economy cannot be transformed through 
contemporary democratic systems but, rather, that the impetus for transformation has 
to come from changes in the dominant mode of legitimate communication.  
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It was in light of this analysis that Habermas regrounded his critical theory in 
communicative action. In order to avoid the defunct (inherently bourgeois) norm and 
value orientations of traditional philosophies of history, Habermas attempts to ‘lay the 
normative foundations of critical theory at a deeper level’ through communicative 
action, which ‘intends to bring into the open the rational potential intrinsic in 
everyday communicative practices’ (Habermas 1992: 442). The development of the 
theory of communicative action is an attempt to redress the democratic imbalance on 
a metatheoretical level – that is, by employing everyday communicative practices to 
ensure the legitimacy of power. This approach avoids the search for a general interest 
or state to legislate change, but rather rests upon the inherent emancipative potential 
of reason. 
 
This liberating potential of reason is enacted through the practice of communicative 
action. Communicative action occurs when ‘actors seek to reach an understanding 
about the action situation and their plans of action in order to co-ordinate their action 
by way of agreement’ (Habermas 1984: 86). It is an open, honest and unrestrained 
dialogue through which people seek to coordinate their actions with the greatest 
possible legitimacy for all parties involved. Communicative action can be 
constructively compared to strategic action, which is action oriented to reaching a 
predetermined end.  
 
Within the language of communicative action, the problem with liberal democracies is 
that they suffer from a communicative imbalance. Liberal democracies exist as 
disempowering bureaucracies that expand the scope for engineering mass loyalty and 
make it easier to uncouple political decision making from concrete, identity forming   79 
contexts of life (Habermas 1987b: 325). They provide a refuge for the implementation 
of strategic action, as opposed to a forum for communicative action. As depicted in 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, liberal democracies give 
legitimacy to already entrenched power bases; in terms of communicative action they 
remove all sorts of policies from the sphere of public discussion and insulate them in 
existing hierarchies of money and power. The systematic mechanism of government 
replaces the traditional procedures of consensus formation, and strategic action 
replaces communicative action. 
 
This is a very brief introduction to the Theory of Communicative Action, but for the 
purposes of this chapter I wish only to suggest that the shift in languages did not 
involve a withdrawal of the arguments Habermas made in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere about the problem with contemporary 
democracies. Much of what Habermas discusses in The Theory of Communicative 
Action can be seen as a direct reiteration of the arguments made against contemporary 
democracy in Structural Transformation
26. The underlying ethos behind The Theory 
of Communicative Action is a complaint about the amount of critical access 
individuals have to the world around them, based upon disempowering bureaucracies 
and economies (Habermas 1987b: 325&480). This problem is a consistent theme 
                                                 
26 In ‘Further Reflections on the Public Sphere’, a commentary on Structural Transformation written 
some time after publishing his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas admits that his perception 
of the shift between culture debating and culture consuming public was a little simplistic, and that he 
might have been too pessimistic about the possibilities of welfare state education and the mass media 
(Habermas 1992). On the whole, however, he maintains that his understanding of the problem with 
contemporary democracies, as being that they fail to foster rational critical debate, remains as true and 
pertinent as ever. He concludes that the only revision necessary after his communicative shift was that 
there is cause for a little more optimism about the possibilities of democracy. I shall investigate these 
possibilities in the next chapter. 
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throughout Habermas’s work; it is the articulation of his response to the problem that 
has changed, and this shall be examined in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
The end of this exposition of the problems with democracy is an opportune moment to 
highlight the similarities in Arendt’s and Habermas’s analyses. Uniting the two 
theorists is a contempt for instrumental thought, a concern for the hegemonic effects 
of this thought on the public sphere, and a faith in the inherent emancipatory potential 
of human agency. 
 
Underpinning both theorists’ critical analyses is an allegation that the public forum of 
liberal democracies is dominated by instrumental thought, which has myopic effects 
upon the quality of democratic discussion. Whether instrumental thought lends itself 
to abuses because, as Arendt intimates, it entails a lack of critical thought or, as 
Habermas has suggested, because it disguises a bourgeois agenda, is a moot point. 
Both theorists argue that instrumental thought has to be rejected as the basis of public 
reason, so that we might address the myopic deficiencies of our democratic systems. 
 
Furthermore, both believe that instrumental thinking is dangerous if it comes to 
dominate the public realm. Arendt chooses to highlight the destructive and essentially 
alienating nature of the instrumental world; whereas Habermas emphasises the 
inequitable effects of the uncritical nature of existing power structures. Each theorist 
defines this situation as one in which the self regulating mechanisms of society are no 
longer adequate. For Arendt, philosophers, who may once have injected some critical 
thought into the public sphere, are now no more than “organs of the zeitgeist” who   81 
offer clarification rather than criticism. For Habermas, the very act of social criticism 
has been gentrified and appropriated by the dominant class and offers no real hope of 
social transformation.  
 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s assessments of modern democracy combine in such a way 
as to render a very disturbing picture of its failings. They suggest that we approach 
public space as animal laborans and homo faber. As animal laborans we have been 
largely excluded from the activity of political expression; politics is something done 
for us and should not distract us from the labour or work that is the subsequent 
measure of our worth. As homo faber the public space we are deemed able to use is 
dominated by the values and mores of economists; we are expected to engage with 
this space as a consumer, rather than an actor. Nowhere are citizens given the 
opportunity to act in public in such a way that might generate critical and engaging 
debate about political power.  
 
The result is that representative liberal democracies produce nations of Eichmanns. 
We simply do not think about what we are doing politically. As with the workers on 
Eichmann’s human de-ssembly line, we are purposefully employed in such a way as 
to inhibit us from thinking, for the greater good of public utility, progress, economic 
development and security. The validity of these goals is determined prior to a 
critical/thoughtful conversation about these goals, while the “public” fora, which are 
supposed to generate debate, are controlled by those who have a significant stake in 
keeping the line moving. The result is a social myopia and a democratic decision 
making process that suffers from a deficit of criticism. 
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Insofar as this chapter identifies that Habermas and Arendt share very similar 
perspectives about what is wrong with modern democracies it provides the basis for 
reading Habermas and Arendt’s democratic theories as largely complementary. It 
also, I hope, makes clear that there are problems with modern democracies; at least 
enough so as to justify the following exploration of how these problems might be 
rectified. 
 
In Habermas’s and Arendt’s work on contemporary democracies the dominance of the 
uncritical public sphere can only be undermined through human agency. Below the 
shallow resemblance of the tripartite description of types of public sphere that exists 
in both accounts there lies the remarkable similarity between what Habermas 
describes as communicative action and what Arendt describes as thinking. Both 
describe an honest, open conversation, devoid of strategic distortions, that inspires 
action. Each theorist is attempting, in their idiom, to reduce decision making to its 
most genuine or legitimate base and to facilitate the appropriation of this form of 
decision making in the public realm. This similarity in objectives shall underpin the 
next chapter, in which I shall investigate the solutions that Arendt and Habermas posit 
for the problem with democracy.   83 
Chapter Two: A Description of Habermas’s and 
Arendt’s Solutions to the Problem with Modern 
Democracies 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an outline of the models of an ideal democracy articulated by 
Habermas and Arendt. It is my contention that, while Habermas and Arendt represent 
the deliberative and agonistic schools of democratic theory respectively, they share an 
emphasis on the importance of immanent critical political engagement. The models 
they describe as preferable to the liberal representative model are based upon the 
notion that the personal exercise of political power is an identity forming and self 
validating activity. This congruence between their thought indicates a point of 
universal agreement between agonistic, deliberative and critical liberal democratic 
theories. This is that the failure to give all citizens access to public space results in a 
critical deficit in democratic systems. By examining Habermas’s and Arendt’s 
democratic theories closely, it is possible to identify the kind of critical alternatives to 
representative democracies they envision. 
  
Explaining Habermas’s ideal democratic system involves explaining his conceptual 
shift from orthodox critical theory to a critical theory oriented around discursive 
ethics. As introduced in the previous chapter, Habermas came to believe that broad 
theories of emancipation are an ineffective mechanism for social change. Instead, 
Habermas develops a communicative approach to critical theory. He seeks to 
understand the critical potential that is inherent in the social construction of meaning 
and to employ this critical potential in such a way as to generate culturally sensitive   84 
critical forces that are immanent to the individual. In this way he felt he could ensure 
the legitimacy of authority and counteract ‘the intrusion of imperatives rooted in 
structural properties of economic and political institutions into the capacities of 
individuals to understand and act politically’ (Peterson 1996: 126). Using John 
Austin’s work on the conventions of language, Habermas develops his theory of 
communicative action (Habermas 1984). The centrepiece of Habermas’s theory is an 
explanation of why an ideal form of communication can be understood to be the 
fundamental building block of reason and, therefore, of legitimate government. The 
discussion of Habermas’s work that follows is an attempt to explain Habermas’s 
Theory of Communicative Action in such a way as to render the problem with modern 
democracies understandable in terms of discourse ethics and to indicate how attention 
to communicative practices might harness the personal sovereignty necessary for a 
critical democratic system. Habermas presents communicative action as an ideal to be 
used to critically assess personal public interactions and the legitimacy of existing 
overarching public structures. 
 
In order to articulate Hannah Arendt’s vision of a truly democratic system, I initially 
describe Arendt’s understanding of what a truly democratic public space ought to do. 
The various roles of public space in generating power, reality, criticism, a space to 
disclose the self and a refuge against futility are examined in order to outline the 
inherent link Arendt sees between the overall quality of the public realm, and the 
overall quality of existence. The importance of public engagement for the well being 
of the individual is central to Arendt’s assertion that we should take care that public 
engagement is healthy and rewarding for both the individual and the public. On this 
basis she recommends public structures that emphasise the role of individual   85 
engagement and display, while retaining the critical function of plurality. This 
engagement with plurality is something that individuals invariably seek as they come 
to constitute themselves as part of the world. Arendt asserts, therefore, that a healthy 
public, or system of publics, leads to healthier people and societies. 
Part One: Habermas, Deliberative Democracy and the 
Importance of Being Earnest 
This elaboration of Habermas’s views as to how we might “solve the problem” of 
liberal democracies begins with an attempt to outline Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action. Understanding this theory is central to understanding the ways 
in which Habermas believes we might address the critical deficit of the refeudalised 
public sphere. The central presupposition of the theory of communicative action is 
that by caring for the other as we would our selves, it is possible to employ discursive 
conventions that make discussion as reasonable and reflexive as personal thought.  
Following this elaboration on communicative action, I turn my attention to how 
Habermas seeks to use the theory in order to promote a more critical and engaging 
democratic system. 
 
My overview of communicative action and the emancipatory potential of ideal speech 
not only establishes the mechanism that Habermas believes provides the basis of 
legitimate democratic reform, it also introduces us to the notion of examining political 
sovereignty in terms of an individual’s capacity to critically engage with power. As 
will be shown in the following chapter, such an analysis of power is particularly apt 
for coming to understand how sovereignty is exercised in contemporary society. 
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Answering the Question: What is Communicative Action?
27 
This exploration of Habermas’s response to the critical deficit of democracy will 
begin with a more thorough exploration of his theories concerning communicative 
action. Habermas wrote the Theory of Communicative Action in the hope that it may 
provide the foundation for an identification of the positive possibilities of democracy 
and reignite the possibilities of critical theory. In order to give the reader some 
understanding of what communicative action is, I will outline the illocutionary nature 
of communicative action in opposition to the perlocutionary nature of strategic action. 
I shall then use the tension between illocutionary and perlocutionary aims to introduce 
Habermas’s notion of lifeworld and system. This exploration serves to introduce the 
reader to the “building blocks” of Habermas’s democratic theory and to indicate that 
communicative action is a form of discourse designed to facilitate considered thought. 
 
The distinguishing feature of communicative action is that it is action oriented to 
achieving understanding, as opposed to strategic action which is action oriented to 
achieving results (Habermas 1984: 295)
28. In order to illustrate this difference, 
Habermas makes use of John Austin’s distinction between ‘illocutionary’ and 
‘perlocutionary’ speech acts (Austin 1962)
29. An illocutionary speech act is one in 
                                                 
27 As readers will recognise, this is a reference to Kant’s famous article ‘Answering the Question: What 
is Enlightenment?’(Kant 1985). Similarly The Theory of Communicative Action is an attempt to 
articulate the emancipatory potential of the public use of reason. The following is an attempt to 
articulate The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1984)  & (Habermas 1987b) focusing on 
elements relevant to a study of his theory of democracy. 
28 ‘I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions where all participants 
pursue illocutionary aims… On the other hand, I regard as linguistically mediated strategic action those 
interactions in which at least one of the participants wants his speech acts to produce perlocutionary 
effects on his opposite number’ (Habermas 1984: 295). 
29 Habermas’s use of Austin as opposed to other, possibly more Arendtian, speech theorists such as 
(Skinner, 1970) and (Pocock, 1962) is most likely due to Austin’s highly theoretical approach to 
understanding communication. Such use helps protect Habermas’s theory from charges of normativity, 
as discussed later in this thesis.   87 
which the speaker speaks in an effort to communicate something in earnest – an 
honest attempt to achieve understanding. A perlocutionary speech act is one in which 
the speaker speaks with a view to achieving a strategic ambition, where understanding 
is not as important as the success of a particular objective (Habermas 1984: 293). The 
difference between these modes of action lies in the discursive ambitions of those 
engaging in the discursive process; an ambition to achieve understanding gives rise to 
illocutionary acts, an ambition to achieve a predetermined strategic outcome gives rise 
to perlocutionary speech acts. Hence, communicative action occurs when every 
participant in a discussion has illocutionary aims.  
 
Habermas suggests that illocutionary speech constitutes the majority of day-to-day 
conversations. In such exchanges the actors seek to reach an understanding about their 
situation and to agree on a plan of action in order to coordinate their behaviour 
(Habermas 1984: 85-86). When two parties reach an agreement on a particular issue 
they generally assume the fundamental illocutionary attitude of communicative 
action. This allows the most readily justifiable and shared premises to form the basis 
for normative agreement and action orientation.  
 
The earnest engagement of illocutionary speech acts can be seen in contrast to 
perlocutionary speech acts where the statements of the speaker are designed to secure 
a strategic interest that is determined externally to the communicative process. In 
contrast to the communicative intent of illocutionary actors, strategic actors have a 
preconceived notion of the ends they desire and pursue these ends throughout their 
exchanges through perlocutionary acts. During communicative action aims can be 
stated openly, but they are subject to change as agents maintain their fundamental   88 
ambition to achieve understanding by reorienting themselves around each other’s 
validity claims (Brand 1990: 24). However, the aim of perlocutions is not to achieve 
understanding, but to effect strategic action determined as desirable prior to the 
process of communication. Rather than having a commitment to achieving 
understanding, perlocutionary actors have a commitment to a preconceived goal, and 
hence orient their validity claims around the successful achievement of that goal. In 
the case of strategic action, the act of communication is not undertaken in order to 
explore the possibilities of agreement, but rather in an effort to achieve a 
predetermined outcome.  
 
The aim of communicative action is sustainable reasonable dialogue, but this dialogue 
ceases if strategic actors use discussion merely to pursue their preconceived strategic 
orientations. The healthy development of illocutionary discussion is inhibited by the 
fact that strategic action is parasitic upon communicative exchanges, and the existence 
of a strategic actor in an exchange will prohibit the possibility of communicative 
action. A communicative exchange is one where the outcome is determined by the 
cooperative search for truth, the discussion ceases to be communicative if a 
preconceived notion of truth comes to dominate the discussion. The difference 
between illocutionary (communicative) action and perlocutionary (strategic) action 
thus comes to reflect the difference Arendt posits between considered thought and 
instrumental reason. 
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, Arendt defines thinking as an internal 
dialogue that does not rely on external notions of truth or process, whereas 
instrumental reason relies heavily upon a preconceived notion of truth against which   89 
all other voices are to be measured. This latter process, in which the preconceived 
status of knowledge limits the scope of analysis, emulates the effect of a strategic 
actor in communication. In each case there is a preconceived notion of truth, which is 
not available for discussion, through which all alternative positions are to be 
measured. On the other hand, communicative action resembles the process of thought, 
where each voice is treated in a way that must be reconciled with every other voice, 
so as not to create “disharmony”
30.  
 
Achieving understanding in public situations appears more challenging than achieving 
understanding through individual considered thought. There is a unity to the thinking 
processes of individuals that perseveres due to the “shared” experiences and norms of 
the person who undertakes the dialogue which is thought. The conversation that takes 
place between “me” and “myself” is one in which the experience and understandings 
of those conversing is identical. In order to replicate this unity, Habermas asserts there 
are certain conditions communicative actors must accept in order to achieve 
understanding. Most fundamentally those acting communicatively must be prepared 
to redeem any claims to truth that they make
31.  This serves the purpose of clarifying 
the positions of all who are involved in a discussion and facilitating appropriate 
criticism for ill-used or potentially hegemonic terms. Furthermore, as communicative 
exchanges are fundamentally oriented to facilitate understanding, communicative 
actors share a discourse in which they each determine to speak openly and in a way 
                                                 
30 Referring to Plato’s record of Socrates’ comment ‘I think it better, my good friend, that my lyre 
should be discordant and out of tune, and any chords I might train, and that the majority of mankind 
should disagree with and oppose me, rather than that I, being one, should be out of tune with myself’ 
(Gorgias 482c)  
31 In my view, the most tenuous presumption of Habermas’s theory is that any truly adversarial 
participants in such an exchange will generate the amount of care for the other required to meet these 
requirements. This shortcoming will be discussed in the section dealing with criticisms of Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action.   90 
that all participants can understand. This may involve redefining terms or positions to 
achieve universal consent, or recontextualising the debate in a way that enables all 
participants to understand what is being said. Insofar as communicative action is 
oriented to achieving understanding, the ultimate goal of discussion is to emulate the 
process of thought, and thereby give the widest critical consideration to the 
coordination of action. 
Communicative Paradigms: The Lifeworld and the System 
Habermas believes that language oriented to reaching understanding is the original 
mode of language use (Habermas 1984: 288). The fundamental purpose of 
communication is to exchange information in order to cooperatively coordinate 
action. When this type of communicative exchange occurs regularly and naturally it 
generates the web of meaning that constitutes the lifeworld.  The lifeworld can be 
understood, then, as the shared network of meaning that is the ‘correlate of the 
processes of reaching understanding’ (Habermas 1984: 70). When communicative 
action occurs naturally, it occurs because the actors are coming to an understanding 
within the context of commonly shared and unproblematic background convictions – 
a context Habermas refers to as the lifeworld. Within the lifeworld, communicative 
actors can orient their discussions around certain presuppositions that they take for 
granted, and these shared convictions provide the basis for a meaningful exchange. 
Thus the lifeworld enables the possibility of communicative action and it, in turn, 
reproduces itself only through ongoing communicative action
32. Due to the self 
constituting nature of communicative action, the shared understandings of the 
lifeworld possess a self constituted validity. 
                                                 
32 See (Habermas 1994a) and (Habermas 1987b: 119-52). 
Comment [TH11]: Essentially 
want to say ‘aim of CA is to 
facilitate mature reason’ might 
save this revelation for later, to be 
presented in terms of the 
deliberative democratic model   91 
 
Habermas juxtaposes the inherent communicative legitimacy of the lifeworld to the 
legitimising mechanisms of the other major component of this worldview - the 
system. The system is composed of rational institutions whose teleological ambitions 
are determined by the strategic functions of those institutions. While action 
coordination in the lifeworld is achieved through normative consensus based upon 
unproblematic and shared presuppositions, action coordination in the system tends to 
be coordinated through the strategic manipulation of instrumental goals. The lifeworld 
is the correlate of actors pursuing communicative action through illocutionary acts; 
the system is the correlate of actors pursuing strategic action through perlocutionary 
acts. 
 
The theory of communicative action is underpinned by two basic notions. The first is 
that there are several different forms of speech action that can be employed in 
communication. The two forms of action critical to our understanding of Habermas’s 
democratic theory are strategic action, which can be defined as action oriented 
towards realising goals, and communicative action, through which actors seek to 
reach an understanding (about the action situation and their plans of action) in order to 
agree on how to coordinate their action (Habermas 1984: 85-86). The second idea 
underpinning communicative action is that there is a distinction between system and 
lifeworld;  the lifeworld is the realm of personal relationships and is constituted by 
communicative action, while the system integrates society through functional or 
cybernetic feedback and is ordered on the basis of non-linguistic steering media, such 
as money and power (Calhoun 1992: 30; Habermas 1987b: 152). These concepts   92 
provide the basis for Habermas’s new approach to critical theory and provide the 
central idiom for his reframing of the problem with contemporary democracy.   
Rephrasing the Problem: The Colonisation of the Lifeworld by the System 
As indicated briefly in the last chapter, Habermas developed the theory of 
communicative action in an attempt to reaffirm democratic possibilities in a world 
dominated by capitalism and bureaucracy (Calhoun 1992: 32). This project has been 
described by Habermas as an attempt to ‘erect a democratic dam against the systemic 
colonization of the lifeworld’ (Habermas 1992: 444).  In the following interpretation 
of Habermas’s later work, the problem with modern liberal democracies will be 
reframed in terms of the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system.  
 
Habermas argues that the colonisation of the lifeworld was enabled by the crisis of 
legitimacy brought about by the failure of traditional value and belief systems to 
sustain themselves against the rise of instrumental reason.  This loss of a shared 
normative structure, combined with the rise of instrumental legitimacy, enabled the 
development of subsystems of rationality with independently constituted legitimacy. 
In Habermas’s analysis, these subsystems have become detached from the 
legitimating power of the lifeworld, yet continue to command authority due to their 
internal systemic legitimacy. The prevalence of systemic rationalities in domains of 
cultural reproduction (such as public space) causes systemic imperatives to pervade 
the rationality of the lifeworld. This “colonisation” of the lifeworld by the system 
distorts the inherent reason of the lifeworld and undermines the critical function of 
democratic fora. While this exploration is intended to elucidate these important 
elements of Habermas’s theoretical framework, it also makes further sense of   93 
Habermas’s criticism of contemporary democracies for a lack of critical interaction 
between people and the world around them. 
 
Such abstract concepts as “lifeworld” and “system” make it difficult to visualise what 
exactly is intended by the phrase “colonisation of the lifeworld by the system”. What I 
will be detailing here is the gradual replacement of communicative forms of action 
orientation by strategic forms of action orientation. This occurs partly as a corollary of 
the modern embrace of instrumentalism, as described by Arendt in the previous 
chapter, and partly as a result of the change in human socialisation under this 
condition. Although it will be expressed in a different idiom, as far as political 
institutions are concerned, the problem remains that there is not enough considered 
engagement in political fora. 
 
Habermas asserts that the lifeworld has been “uncoupled” from the system as a result 
of the epistemological ascendency of instrumental reason. He uses Max Weber’s 
description of the effects of the spread of occidental rationalism to illustrate the 
process of lifeworld rationalisation which leads to this “uncoupling”
33. As Weber 
notes, the consequence of the spread of instrumental rationality was to undermine 
archaic societies’ normative “mythological” notions of legitimacy by replacing them 
with instrumental forms of legitimation (Habermas 1987b: 114). Hence, following the 
invention of the telescope, it becomes illegitimate to argue that the universe revolves 
around the earth, as we know otherwise. 
                                                 
33 Weber emphasises the goal-rational orientation of occidental rationalism as witnessed in the 
Protestant work ethic and Calvinism in order to make this point (Weber 1958: 320-350). The previous 
section on Arendt discussed the instrumental dominance of modern thought; ‘We have leveled all 
human activities to securing the necessities of life and providing for their abundance’ (Arendt 1958: 
126)   94 
 
Prior to the rationalisation of the lifeworld, systemic imperatives were inseparable 
from the web of legitimation that forms the lifeworld. In “traditional” societies, the 
bases of systemic coordination are the traditions and social obligations that also shape 
those unproblematic convictions that form the lifeworld. However, following the 
displacement of holistic religious worldviews by occidental rationalism during the 
Enlightenment, the instrumental appropriation of previously communicative forms of 
coordination has shattered the normative consensus of the lifeworld. In place of that 
normative consensus new instrumental modes of legitimacy and action coordination 
have emerged. The holism of traditional worldviews has been replaced by the 
“objective truth” of rational enquiry, as the legitimating functions of these worldviews 
are questioned from an instrumental means-ends perspective.  
 
Prior to this “rationalisation” the validity of cognition, morality and aesthetics had 
been unified under the same normative understanding. For instance; to be thoughtless 
was also to be evil and ugly and to be good also meant to be thoughtful and beautiful. 
Following the triumph of instrumental rationality over this unifying normative 
conception, cognition, morality and aesthetics have been differentiated from each 
other and each has developed as an independent domain of legitimacy. In modernity, 
beauty has no rationally legitimate claim to be equal to goodness, just as no one can 
rationally state that ugly is the same thing as evil. This process of differentiation is 
described by Habermas as the rationalisation of the lifeworld
34. 
                                                 
34 Habermas emphasises that this rationalisation of the lifeworld should not be seen as systemic 
colonisation, but rather as a fundamental change in the nature of the lifeworld: ‘In a differentiated 
social system the lifeworld seems to shrink to a subsystem. This should not be read causally, as if the 
structures of the lifeworld changed in dependence on increases in systemic complexity. The opposite is   95 
 
Following the rationalisation of the lifeworld the system essentially “uncouples” itself 
from the lifeworld by systemically legitimating the validity of strategic goals without 
recourse to the shared understandings inherent in the communicative process. As the 
complexity of society grows, the lifeworld: 
gets cut down more and more to one subsystem among others. In the process, system 
mechanisms get further and further detached from the social structures through which social 
integration takes place. (Habermas 1987b: 154) 
In place of the normative cohesion of the lifeworld of archaic societies, in modern 
society the social system bursts out of the horizon of the lifeworld and escapes from 
the intuitive knowledge of everyday communicative practice (Habermas 1987b: 186). 
The activities of the system, or rather of the various subsystems that come to compose 
the system
35, no longer garner their validity from communicative consensus, but 
rather through their own independent strategic imperatives.  
 
In order to gain an appreciation of the ways in which the system can begin to 
encroach upon the lifeworld, it is important to understand how systemic imperatives 
are reconciled with the legitimacy constituted by the lifeworld. In archaic societies 
action was coordinated through a basic normative agreement that transcended 
“domains of rationality”, such as cognition, morality and aesthetics. Following the 
rationalisation of the lifeworld, however, there is no universal normative consensus 
through which the coordination of action can be assured. The undermining of 
consensus occurs concurrently with the new possibilities of individualisation; namely 
                                                                                                                                            
true: increases in complexity are dependent on the structural differentiation of the lifeworld (Habermas 
1987b: 173). 
35 The system can be broadly defined as the domain of subsystems which do not directly derive their 
legitimacy from the lifeworld. 
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the ability of individuals to develop a subjective and differentiated attitude with 
regard to the realms of cognition, morality and aesthetics. Due to this individuation, 
social integration becomes absurdly complex and, indeed, in Habermas’s view, 
impossible to orchestrate through normative unity. When systemic subsystems seek to 
coordinate action, each subsystem is typically unable to do so on a normative basis. 
Systemic action must be coordinated, therefore, through non-communicative “steering 
media” such as money and power. Thus: 
…in the wake of capitalist modernization money and power – more concretely, markets and 
administrations – take over the integrative functions which were formerly fulfilled by 
consensual values and norms, or even by processes of reaching understanding. (Habermas 
1993a: 171) 
In lieu of normative agreement, steering media present an avenue through which it is 
possible to continue to coordinate action despite the conflicting strategic interests of 
participants in communication. Money and power serve the role of steering media 
because their distribution can allow for the mediation of disputes over action without 
having to achieve consensus through communication. Quite simply, normative 
disagreement within and between systemic subsystems is compensated by the 
distribution of money or power. So we find in the system that money and power 
provide the incentive for action coordination in the place of the inherent coordinative 
power of normative consensus in the lifeworld. Rather than resort to the clumsy and 
possibly action-inhibitive mechanism of reaching consensus on normative issues, the 
use of “steering media” makes up for the normative deficit and allows for the smooth 
functioning of systemic operation. Given these terms, it is now possible to recast the 
problem with modern democracies as a result of the gradual replacement of discursive 
forms of action orientation with systemic forms of action orientation. 
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The colonisation of the system occurs not as a result of the rationalisation of the 
lifeworld, but rather as a myopic effect that exists following this rationalisation. The 
rationalisation is part of a process of freeing up the emancipatory potential of reason, 
and according to Habermas this emancipation should be celebrated. The problems of 
modernity occur because the systemic legitimation facilitated by steering media is, in 
the modern and postmodern era, progressively usurping the consensual 
communicative basis for the orientation of action. ‘The transfer of action coordination 
from ordinary language to steering media has the effect of uncoupling interaction 
from lifeworld contexts’ (Habermas 1987b: 263). Given the inherent vulnerability of 
communicative action to strategic action, the colonisation of the lifeworld can be seen 
as the inevitable result of the inequitable access to steering media. The ability to alter 
norms and values within the lifeworld is disproportionately possessed by those who 
have money and power. 
 
Money and power act as steering media insofar as they provide the universalisable 
counterweight for normative imbalance, but also insofar as those who can extensively 
utilise these media also control the steering capacity within any given society. For 
instance, in modern liberal democracies the institutions of property and contract 
govern the flow of money, while power is largely governed via the public-legal 
organisation of offices (Habermas 1987b: 270). The legitimacy of these “governors” 
is still anchored in the lifeworld, but the governors themselves operate within their 
own systemic realms of legitimacy. These systemic realms of legitimacy are insulated 
from real communicative engagement beyond their subsystem, and they are subject to 
the influence of steering media as a result. Because of the governors’ role in 
determining the distribution of steering media, systemic forms of legitimacy are taken 
Comment [TH12]:  Obviously 
democratic government is a 
perfect example of this, but I’m 
not sure if this is the best place to 
put an illustration  98 
to be universally “legitimate” and can then supplant the communicatively generated 
legitimacy of the lifeworld. 
 
As a result, in modern society we witness the development of expert cultures oriented 
around the peculiar specialisations required by the media through which their 
subsystems are steered. As individuals become more indoctrinated in systemic forms 
of legitimation they become “experts” in that particular system. Because of the 
normative detachment following the rationalisation of the lifeworld itself, the 
fundamental legitimacy of “expertise” in one domain is understood as being beyond 
the realm of critique of the other subsystems. Each subsystem develops its own 
functional language and system of legitimacy to the point that the increasing isolation 
of experts from the lifeworld leads to ‘an elitist splitting-off of expert cultures from 
contexts of communicative action in daily life’ (Habermas 1987b: 330). Without a 
unifying normative standard to be measured against, experts can come to know an 
incredible amount about their particular area of expertise without having to situate the 
legitimacy of this knowledge in the context of a shared lifeworld. The only functional 
purpose for the continued operation of an inter-system discourse is the 
communication of use value, which allows the knowledge of experts to be employed 
in instrumental ways when this suits the strategic interests and steering capacity of 
alternate subsystems. 
 
Due to the universal, non-communicative nature of steering media, those who hold a 
superior position in the distribution of money and power have a greater opportunity to 
implement their strategic goals irrespective of their lifeworld legitimacy. They can 
essentially “buy-out” normative disagreement through the judicious use of steering   99 
media. As the lifeworld shrinks to become one subsystem among many, it becomes 
susceptible to the possibility that its legitimacy is not as immediate and recognisable 
as that of other subsystems.  
 
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that perlocutionary acts are parasitic upon 
illocutionary acts. While it may be true that the original mode of communication was 
oriented towards reaching understanding, a communicatively oriented participant in 
an exchange will always be susceptible to strategic (perlocutionary) aims.  Simply 
put, if during a dialogue between two people one person trusts the aim of 
communication to be sharing an understanding while another is pursuing strategic 
interests the process of thoughtful discussion is never really engaged, and what is 
already “known” assumes precedence. The presence of a strategic actor in any 
communicative exchange automatically undermines the possibility of communicative 
action insofar as any strategic orientation in such a dialogue undermines the 
illocutionary objectives of all parties involved. The moment perlocutionary aims are 
introduced into an exchange, communicative action ceases, and the linguistic 
exchange becomes strategically mediated. We are presented, therefore, with a 
situation in which the ongoing reproduction of the lifeworld is susceptible to external 
and instrumental interference. When systemic forces achieve positions of control and 
distribution in regard to steering media, this can lead, either overtly or indirectly, to 
the infiltration of perlocutionary voices into previously communicative exchanges.   
 
When the increasing dominance of systemic expert cultures is considered in light of 
the fact that the rationalised lifeworld increasingly loses its structural possibilities for   100 
ideology formation, it is possible to see how the lifeworld itself can begin to be 
infiltrated by systemic forces. 
It is not the uncoupling of media-steered subsystems and of their organizational forms from 
the lifeworld that leads to one-sided rationalization or reification of everyday communicative 
practice, but only the penetration of forms of economic and administrative rationality into 
areas of action that resist being converted over to the media of money and power because they 
are specialized in cultural transmission, social integration and child rearing, and remain 
dependent on mutual understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action.(Habermas 
1987b: 330) 
As systemic knowledge permeates previously inaccessible realms of human conduct, 
we open ourselves up to greater levels of systemic colonisation through socialisation. 
The structurally differentiated and systemically colonised lifeworld, upon which 
modern states are fundamentally dependent, remains the only source of legitimation 
(Habermas 1987b: 359). The fact that language functions not only as a medium of 
reaching understanding, but also of socialisation and social integration in the process 
of identity formation (Habermas 1987b: 24) means that, in the process of 
socialisation, systemic imperatives have an opportunity to pervade, or colonise, the 
lifeworld. 
 
Public education is a relatively benign example of this occurrence, and a comparison 
of the archaic pedagogy of Ancient Athens with the public education system of the 
Enlightenment as depicted by Charles Dickens in Hard Times can be very helpful in 
identifying the ways in which education developed (as a result of systemic 
imperatives) to be less about thinking, and more about knowing. The Athenian mode 
of education was focused on what might be called human development; that is, 
developing all human capacities including honing aesthetic, athletic and mental 
abilities. The purpose of these activities was to enable reflection upon one’s life, and 
to facilitate comprehension in doing so. The education of modernity, however, as 
articulated by Dickens’ character Principal Gradgrind in Hard Times, is based upon   101 
reverence for facts and quantifiability. These skills provide the tools through which it 
is possible to become a useful member of an independent subsystem, but their 
centrality to education means that certain systemic presuppositions actually become 
presuppositions of the lifeworld. From this point on, the student is not expected to 
develop as a student, or as a human, but as a worker, as a potential tool in a 
functionary subsystem. In this way, as forms of administrative and economic 
rationality penetrate into areas that, in effect, constitute society the lifeworld opens 
itself up to systemic colonisation. 
 
What Habermas objects to in this process of lifeworld colonisation is essentially the 
same kind of instrumentality that Marcuse protests against in One Dimensional Man 
and Arendt criticises in The Human Condition. The criticism is that in advanced 
liberal democracies the voices of considered and human reason are being drowned out 
by the rationality of strategically oriented subsystems (Habermas 1992: 444).   What 
Habermas objects to is ‘the degree of autonomy that has been achieved by more or 
less automated social subsystems that, in the interest of efficiency, remove all sorts of 
policies from the sphere of public discussion where they could be assessed in the light 
of the desirability of the outcomes they actually produce’ (Olafson 1990: 65). The 
colonisation of the lifeworld describes the situation wherein these subsystems secure 
their freedom from lifeworld legitimacy and determine success according to their own 
strategic criteria. In doing so, the subsystems undermine the very possibility of critical 
discussion about their outcomes. 
 
If we now take a look back at the problem with liberal democracies that Habermas 
describes in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere it is possible to   102 
resituate that problem directly in terms of the colonisation of the lifeworld and the 
communicative disruption this process entails. In terms of communicative action, the 
critical success of the bourgeois public sphere can be seen as a result of the earnest 
discussion that naturally occurs between common constituents of a lifeworld. In The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas argues that the bourgeois 
public sphere was particularly open and discursive because it was constituted by 
property owners who enjoyed a comparable degree of education and financial security 
(Habermas 1989: 71-85, 135). Habermas might have phrased the same understanding 
in terms of the shared and unproblematic convictions of the bourgeois lifeworld that 
gave rise to communication oriented to reaching understanding. Of course, we can 
also see that strategic forces began to dominate the forum and truly communicative 
action effectively ceased when the disparate lifeworlds of the working classes were 
brought to the conversation.  
 
As far as the “refeudalisation” of the public sphere is concerned, this can be recast as 
the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system. Due to the fact that perlocutions 
parasitically elide illocutions, as long as no political space exists for communicative 
action, political debates can only be conducted along strategic lines. Hence the 
bourgeois forum designed for action coordination based upon the compulsion of 
reason becomes limited to reconciling systemic strategic interests, with no functional 
use for critical reason or input from the lifeworld. The only relationship that the 
modern democratic political forum has to the lifeworld occurs when the political 
subsystem is judged once every three or four years. This is a return to publicity as a 
form of production and consumption. The democratic process intrudes upon the 
citizen once every few years in order to tabulate a preference, and it reciprocally   103 
claims to possess legitimacy as a result. The fact that the political institution of 
representative liberal democracy claims, and is granted, this legitimacy despite any 
apparently real and direct relationship with its constituents illustrates the extent to 
which the lifeworld can be colonised by the system. 
 
In instrumental terms this means that there is no place for communicative action in the 
public sphere. Instead, we are given strategists operating within the legitimating 
mechanisms of their political party, court or electoral system, each of which is 
designed according to instrumental purposes in order to facilitate a preconceived kind 
of rationality, a certain kind of knowledge. The possibilities for coordinating action on 
a social level are surrendered to the culture of political experts, who continue to make 
themselves useful by ensuring their re-election above all else. When the sole purpose 
of government becomes to secure its position in the distribution of steering media, the 
space of critical freedom is lost and the machine runs itself. Hence we find Habermas 
argues, in sympathy with Arendt, that if we do not clear a space for freedom then we 
will be bound by the determinism of instrumental thought. 
 
As Habermas discovered following the publication of The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere even philosophy becomes instrumentalised in this scenario; it is 
interesting insofar as it is useful for preconceived ends. Habermas attempted to avoid 
playing out this act of critically analysing consciousness by developing his theory of 
communicative action. In his work following this theoretical development he depicts 
how communicative action – an ethics of discourse – might be used to turn back the 
tide of lifeworld colonisation.   104 
Deliberative Democracy 
Habermas suggests that the solution to the problem of systemic colonisation of the 
lifeworld lies in his conception of “deliberative democracy”. Despite his misgivings 
about the impact of the universal franchise on the quality of political debate, 
Habermas understands that the legitimation crisis facing the modern liberal political 
apparatus should be addressed through the critical capacity inherent in the notion of 
democracy. Put very simply, the appropriation of communicative action, as an 
inherently legitimate form of reason, challenges the authority of systemic rationality 
and provides an impetus for criticising the system. 
 
Habermas’s deliberative democracy distinguishes itself from other democratic 
theories through a focus on communicative practice; most notably he presents the 
ideal speech situation as a model for the ideal political forum. Habermas’s 
understanding of the fundamental inadequacies of theories of consciousness prevents 
him from identifying a specific concrete democratic structure that would serve equally 
well for all purposes. Rather, he describes ideal speech as an ideal against which to 
criticise actually existing democratic structures. Nonetheless, he has several ideas as 
to how communicative action might proliferate through existing democratic 
mechanisms such as state institutions and common law. This section of the chapter is 
an exploration of Habermas’s deliberative democratic solution to the problem with 
modern liberal democracies. 
 
Despite the threat of lifeworld colonisation, Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action reflects an optimism concerning the possibilities of democratic systems. In the 
communicative framework, the rationalisation of the lifeworld unleashes the   105 
emancipatory possibilities of communicative action. Following the rationalisation of 
the lifeworld, traditions lose their claim to authority and are set communicatively 
aflow; hence norms become abstract, positive and in need of justification (Habermas 
1979). It is a loss of the legitimacy of other normative forces, seen by different 
theorists as the “death of god”, the “linguistification of the sacred” or “an incredulity 
towards metanarratives”, which enables the rationality inherent in communication to 
provide the basis for action coordination (Habermas 1987b: 89). It is only at this point 
that societies have the tools to coordinate their actions via considered reason, and 
democracy can be a vehicle of legitimate political discussion. 
 
Habermas seeks to show that communicative action would pervade the discursive 
institutions of any democratic system that would be claimed to possess rational 
legitimacy. Habermas emphasises that this legitimacy is derived from the earnest 
rationality of illocutionary discussion and that this legitimacy arises from the open 
and rational character of the discussion. Legitimacy is granted, therefore, by what we 
have been describing as considered reason – that is the exposure of all arguments to 
counter-arguments based upon a motivation to achieve understanding
36. While 
Habermas evokes the timeless notion of the inherent legitimacy of communicative 
utterances to justify his position, the interplay of two (or more) voices in a dialogue 
committed to reaching an understanding is reminiscent of Arendt’s description of 
thinking (Habermas 1996b: (6)). For Habermas, the institution of communicative 
                                                 
36 In ‘Wahrheitstheorien’, cited in (H. Fahrenbach ed. Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, 1973), Habermas 
suggested that consensus in ideal speaking conditions can operate as the criterion of truth. His 
theoretical progression reflected in The Theory of Communicative Action includes the recognition that 
this consensus doesn’t necessarily indicate ‘truth’, but rather constitutes legitimacy for that particular 
communicative community. This realisation leaves open the possibility of culturally specific 
consensus. The strength of this realisation was so profound for Habermas that he subsequently refused 
to allow ‘Warheitstheorien’ to be translated. 
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action through discursive democratic practices is the basis for solving the problem 
with liberal democracies. 
The Ideal Speech Situation 
In order to produce the greatest degree of communicative reason during situations of 
action orientation, Habermas describes an “ideal speech situation” to which all 
political conversations should aspire. Habermas presents this idealisation in order to 
point out the fundamental principles of democratic legitimacy. 
 
The first specification Habermas makes about the ideal speech situation relates to who 
should contribute to the dialogue. The principles of participation can be best 
summarised by stating that everyone affected by the decision should be free to speak, 
and to speak freely (Habermas 1990: 86). These principles emphasise the liberal 
nature of Habermas’s ideal forum. The extension of the forum to all parties affected 
not only rests upon the notions of freedom and equal rights but also echoes John 
Stuart Mill’s passion for the consideration of marginalised voices in order to achieve 
the most well informed debate possible. Habermas emphasises that the broader the 
consideration that any decision undergoes, the more legitimate the outcome is likely 
to be (Rehg and Bohman 2002: 46).  
 
In order to establish a discussion in which communicative action would flourish, 
Habermas depicts a situation in which care and understanding tends to develop 
between participants. For instance, in an early piece ‘A Theory of Communicative 
Competence’, he suggests that the condition of ideal speech relies upon the ability of 
the ego to assume the subjectivity of alter ego and vice-versa; a condition he calls   107 
“intersubjectivity”. He argues that this takes place when there is complete symmetry 
among participants in a conversation.  
Pure intersubjectivity exists only when there is complete symmetry in the distribution of 
assertion and dispute, revelation and concealment, prescription and conformity among the 
partners of communication. (Habermas 1970: 371) 
Symmetry among participants would mean that the notion of shared purpose would 
eliminate the instrumental uses of perlocutionary acts, and thus encourage the 
proliferation of illocutionary acts. Such a discussion would result in communicative 
action; in which case the most rational, that is, fundamentally acceptable, action 
coordination would result. 
 
In speech situations that can not be fully symmetrical
37, Habermas argues that certain 
commitments be undertaken by participants in order to emulate the condition of pure 
intersubjectivity. Fundamentally, the participants need to be committed to 
coordinating action on the basis of understanding. To this end, the communicative 
process should exclude all force except for the force of the better argument, and 
should exclude all motives but the cooperative search for the “truth”. ‘From this 
perspective argumentation can be conceived as a reflexive continuation, with different 
means, of action oriented to reaching understanding’ (Habermas 1984: 25). As 
perlocutionary acts will fundamentally undermine the reasonable quality of 
conversation produced by this process, the sole goal of participants in conversation 
needs to be reaching understanding. 
 
In order to ensure that this understanding is achievable in non-symmetrical conditions, 
participants must be willing to rephrase their own arguments in a way that all 
                                                 
37 Such as when participants do not share a common lifeworld and thus do not share unproblematic 
convictions and understandings.   108 
participants can understand.  Normative claims of truth and rightness must be 
discursively redeemed (Habermas 1993a: 171).  In order to ensure that the debate 
takes shape based upon terms that are understood by all concerned parties, 
participants ‘should ascribe identical meanings to expressions and connect utterances 
with context-transcending validity claims’ (Habermas 1996a: 4). Participants must 
also endeavour to explain themselves in an idiom that can be understood by all. Such 
a process leads to each participant gaining a more intimate knowledge of the 
argument and communication community of which they are part, which, in the 
process, facilitates action coordination based upon understanding. 
 
The ideal speech situation is one in which all participants have the same 
understanding of language and seek the same goals. In typical situations in which this 
symmetry does not exist, the single goal of interlocutors must be to achieve 
understanding. In order to achieve this goal, they must be prepared to explain and 
examine their language and arguments in such a way as to make them intelligible to 
all other participants. Such a process gives rise to the most reasonable results in 
situations of action orientation. 
Domains of Application 
So how can these idealisations come to be implemented in a way that might mitigate 
the effects of the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system? This is the question 
Habermas seeks to address in his later work on democracy, most notably in Between 
Facts and Norms (Habermas 1996a). This work explores the tension between the 
administrative/instrumental  authority of the system (facts) and the moral/ethical 
authority of the lifeworld (norms).    109 
 
Communicative action can be seen to reconcile facts and norms by challenging 
systemic imperatives in both social and administrative fora. Habermas refrains from 
arguing for an ideal form of democratic citizenship, but bases his democratic theory 
on what is required to make democratic government internally legitimate according to 
his discourse theory. His later work pursues this goal by detailing his attempts to 
determine the ways in which the legal-rational institutions of modern liberal 
democracies can be imbued with communicative reason. At the same time he 
advocates communicative action and ideal speech as critical tools that enable a critical 
assessment of systemic imperatives on the level of personal engagement. 
 
Deliberative democracy does not involve a set of prescriptions for “correct” 
democratic citizenship, but rather presents a model of democratic decision making 
that ideally should proliferate through legal institutions, political institutions and the 
public sphere (Cooke 1997: 274). In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas presents 
law as the most reflexive and pervasive institutionalisation of those speech conditions 
he had come to realise as ideal. Habermas argues that courts of law act as a forum for 
allowing the voices of the lifeworld to compete against systemic forces in relatively 
ideal conditions. Working as an autonomous subsystem, law ‘translates ordinary 
language into specialized codes, regenerates social solidarity through universal(ized) 
norms, and institutionalizes radical democracy as equal rights’ (Love 2002: 321). 
However, because the validity of the courts relies directly upon the support of the 
communicative community, its very use value lies in its ability to coordinate actions 
through legitimacy constituted in the lifeworld. 
By meeting its need for legitimation with the help of the productive force of communication, 
law takes advantage of a permanent risk of dissensus to spur on legally institutionalized public 
discourses (Habermas 1996a: 462).   110 
With their specific rules about revelation, language and deliberation, the law courts of 
modern democracies represent the closest existing institutionalisation of the ideal 
speech situation. It is only in a court of law that participants in discourse are under an 
oath to speak honestly, openly and redeem any claims to truth that they make
38.  
Habermas argues that courts of law are constituted through the need for 
communication communities to emulate ideal speech so that the conditions of 
common life might be regulated impartially (Habermas 1996a: 306). 
 
Habermas indicated in The Theory of Communicative Action that the purpose of 
juridification had changed from constraining administrative systems to constraining 
economic systems (Habermas 1987b: 361)
39. By the time he wrote Between Facts and 
Norms it is clear that Habermas hopes juridification might help to constrain both 
systems. Insofar as law courts present the opportunity to oppose the steering capacity 
of money and power through recourse to what is commonly held to be legitimate, it 
follows that Habermas identifies positive law as an already constituted means to resist 
the colonisation of the lifeworld. An example of this can be found in the successful 
legal challenge against McDonalds for portraying their food as nutritious and for 
targeting children with their advertising
40. By making McDonalds redeem their claims 
to truth in a court of law, it was publicly shown that such claims were illegitimate, and 
hence inhibited their colonisation of the lifeworld. 
 
                                                 
38 These imperatives might exist in the system of democratic representation, but a cursory examination 
of the process of debate in modern liberal democracies indicates they are given scant regard in 
comparison to the strategic imperatives of the political subsystem. 
39 Habermas’s assessment of the role of law is ambivalent in The Theory of Communicative Action, 
where he suggests that the intrusion of juridification into decision making processes that otherwise 
would be coordinated through communicative action opens up these processes to the influence of 
steering media and thus represents a further colonisation of the lifeworld (Habermas 1987b: 361-364).  
40 A thorough account of this trial can be found at the website www.mcspotlight.org, or in the 
publication (Vidal 1997).   111 
Habermas does not maintain, however, that the existence of a functional judiciary 
precludes the need for a vibrant democracy. Indeed, he suggests the validity of the 
rule of law can only be established in the context of a vibrant and discursive political 
public sphere (Habermas 1996a: xlii). The point he makes is that without a vibrant 
and healthy public sphere, the lifeworld cannot be a source of valid norms. This is an 
outgrowth of the problems posed by the systemic colonisation of the lifeworld. If the 
lifeworld itself has been colonised, then the judicial system will not be regulated by a 
communicatively constituted lifeworld, but rather by the systemic imperatives that 
have managed to infiltrate the lifeworld through processes of socialisation. Hence, 
law cannot operate independently in controlling the colonisation of the lifeworld by 
the system; it also requires a discursive public sphere in order to maintain the internal 
legitimacy of the lifeworld. 
 
Habermas’s admiration of democracy is based upon its ability to reflect and enact the 
values of the lifeworld in the face of systemic pressures. The ultimate proof of a 
legitimate democratic system is provided when ‘all outcomes reached in conformity 
with the [democratic] procedure are reasonable’ (Habermas 1996a: 304). This is to 
say, the procedure must be designed so as to allow the force of reason to determine 
action coordination. This does not preclude broad participation, but does impose 
procedure in order to extract rational participation. Habermas avails himself of John 
Dewey’s position that: 
Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it is 
never merely majority rule… The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the 
more important thing. (Dewey 1954: 207f)
41 
                                                 
41 Quoted in (Habermas 1996a: 304).   112 
According to Habermas, the way to fix democracy is to implement discursive 
procedures that promote communicative action both in the political realm and 
concurrently in the informal processes of will-formation in the public sphere 
(Habermas 1996a: 376). In order to ensure a legitimate political system, therefore, 
both the political apparatus and civil society must be imbued with a discursive spirit 
that ensures that all political decisions are ratified in the face of divergent opinions. 
 
Habermas does not hold much hope for reforming the public sphere as a unifying 
template for discursive ethics. Rather he hopes the development of discursive ethics, 
as a self-reflexive search for understanding and reconciliation of identity with 
environment, will give rise to a critical civil society, which will in turn generate a 
legitimate democracy. In order to meet Habermas’s requirements of legitimate 
democracy, a vibrant public sphere must ‘not only detect and identify problems but 
also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible 
solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by 
the parliamentary complex’ (Habermas 1996a: 359).  
 
William Rehg and James Bohman have pointed out that Habermas presents four 
functional requirements for a democratic public sphere that elaborate on this 
statement (Rehg and Bohman 2002). First, the public sphere must be receptive to the 
problems of citizens in their everyday lives. Second, it must be rooted in robust civil 
society and an open, pluralist culture to ensure that problems are brought to the 
attention of the public. Third, the public sphere should act as a unifying conduit 
between different segments of civil society in order to ensure inclusivity and broad 
debate. Fourth, the public sphere should be free of communicative blockages or   113 
distortions so that the public sphere can place issues on the political agenda without 
being controlled or distorted by powerful social interests (Rehg and Bohman 2002: 
41-42). The first two conditions deal with detecting and identifying problems, both in 
the lifeworld of the individual and through the individual’s engagement in civil 
society. The second two conditions reflect the requirements of a public sphere that can 
thematise and dramatise problems so that they are dealt with publicly and reasonably 
by the political apparatus. The existence of this kind of public sphere would facilitate 
the critical consideration of political action and critical access to the political system. 
 
Habermas believes that liberal democratic systems tend to meet the first three of these 
conditions, but he is critical of the role of the mass media in achieving the fourth 
condition. The media obviously plays a central role in the healthy functioning of the 
public sphere and, according to his discourse ethics, Habermas advances a series of 
requirements the media should satisfy if it is to fulfil its role as the mouthpiece of a 
vibrant public sphere. He does this using the work of Michael Gurevitch and Jay G. 
Blumler, who identify the following services that the media ought to provide in 
democratic political systems: 
1.  Surveillance of the sociopolitical environment, reporting developments likely to impinge, 
positively or negatively, on the welfare of citizens; 
2.  Meaningful agenda-setting, identifying the key issues of the day, including the forces that 
have formed and may resolve them; 
3.  Platforms for an intelligible and illuminating advocacy by politicians and spokespersons of 
other causes and interest groups; 
4.  Dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between powerholders (actual and 
prospective) and mass publics; 
5.  Mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised power; 
6.  Incentives for citizens to learn, choose and become involved, rather than merely to follow and 
kibitz over the political process; 
7.  A principled resistance to the efforts of forces outside the media to subvert their 
independence, integrity and ability to serve the audience; 
8.  A sense of respect for the audience member, as potentially concerned and able to make sense 
of his or her political environment. (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990: 270) 
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These measures are designed to ensure that the communicative potential of the media 
is exploited to its fullest extent by bringing problems to public attention and by 
generating discussion free from the distortion of systemic influences. It is clear that 
Habermas hopes that an effective media might force public interlocutors to be more 
communicative and less strategic, so that public actors might pre-emptively redeem 
their claims to truth and present arguments in broadly understandable language.  
 
These prescriptions for media regulation are one of the few instances at which 
Habermas has concrete recommendations for facilitating deliberative democracy.  He 
restricts himself to an abstract contrasting of legitimate democratic function, that 
which is discursive and based upon the principles of communicative action, with the 
illegitimate democratic function, in which political participation is limited to the 
occasional experience of voting. As existing liberal democratic political apparatuses 
fall between these extremes, Habermas is ambivalent about the role of political parties 
(Munnichs 2002: 193). Ideally, political parties should provide a mediating forum for 
discursive interplay and serve as anchors between the political apparatus and the 
lifeworld. On the other hand, political parties may occupy the position of systemic 
subsystems existing for their own strategic imperatives and thereby reduce the 
possibility of truly communicative interaction. This ambivalence underlies much of 
Habermas’s application of his discursive ethics to the “real world” – and is essentially 
the same problem Habermas has with philosophies of consciousness. Every 
possibility for emancipation also contains a possibility for further entrapment; the 
only way out of this predicament is through recourse to the inherent validity of 
communicative action. 
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As a result of this awareness, Habermas’s work gives us scant indication as to how the 
civil society required to generate democracy’s critical capacities might come about, 
but we have an eloquent metatheoretical conception of how democratic legitimacy 
should be constituted. The great simplicity of Habermas’s theory is that it relies upon 
the rationality inherent in everyday communication. This communication is 
responsible for the reproduction of the lifeworld, and this is where social norms have 
the greatest communicative interaction with systemic forces. In the public sphere 
Habermas asserts that ‘the formation of rational opinions and decisions must rest on 
validity claims to truth, rightness and so forth, which can or at least could be justified 
before all competent persons with convincing reasons’ 
42. In both private and public 
scenarios the key to Habermas’s answer to the problem with modern democracies lies 
in appropriating the correct democratic procedure. The strength of his argument lies 
in his elegant and exhaustive exploration of what is required to make democratic 
procedures inherently legitimate.  
By singling out a procedure of decision-making, it seeks to make room for those involved, 
who must then find answers on their own to the moral-practical issues that come at them, or 
are imposed upon them, with objective historical force. (Habermas 1990: 211) 
Communicative action gives us a form of reason that is both culturally sensitive and 
immanently critical. Asking for claims to truth to be redeemed is both a reasonable 
and critical expectation that opens up the possibility for emancipation. 
 
We can see, then, that according to Habermas the emancipatory potential of 
democracy essentially rests upon his understanding that power is communicatively 
generated and sovereignty can, therefore, be seen as a correlate to critical access to 
decision making processes. According to Habermas, in order to fully cater to 
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contemporary notions of sovereignty, the institutions of democracy need to become 
more open, deliberative and inclusive. At the same time, he believes all institutions 
should aspire towards becoming more democratic. The ideal speech of 
communicative action provides an exemplar for all reasonable discussions to emulate, 
and as such serves as an emancipatory mechanism for reforming systemic institutions. 
Habermas’s theory thus forms the basis of the deliberative school of democratic 
theory.  
 
It is my contention that while there are notable differences between Habermas’s 
deliberative democracy and Arendt’s agonistic democracy, the complementary nature 
of their theories is more striking. In order to illustrate how Arendt’s agonistic theory 
can be seen to rectify several weaknesses in Habermas’s deliberative theory, I shall 
first indicate these weaknesses as identified by other democratic theorists. 
Objections to Habermas 
As the primary theorist of deliberative democracy, Habermas’s work has generated 
much criticism. My aim here is to review and assess only a few of these objections in 
order to illustrate the limits of Habermas’s work as an aid to theorising democracy. 
The most pertinent objection to Habermas’s work is that he gives no indication of the 
source of the impetus for procedural reform of decision making fora
43. This is not to 
deny his functional recognition of the institution of law as one currently existing 
forum to address the tension between systemic and lifeworld legitimacy in modern 
societies. Habermas has clearly indicated, however, that courts per se do not ensure 
the existence of a healthy, vibrant democratic society; rather the existence of a 
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healthy, democratic society is the prerequisite of a legitimate court of law. The hope 
that the critical use of ideal speech might proliferate through society on the basis of 
the consciousness aroused by The Theory of Communicative Action belies the 
difficulty involved in understanding Habermas’s theory, and his own cynicism about 
such attempts to develop an emancipatory consciousness. By failing to situate his 
solution to the problem with democracy in the idiom of the oppressed, Habermas fails 
to make his work since Communicative Action into practicable critical theory.  
 
As a result of this failure to illustrate how change may occur, his deliberative 
democratic model of democracy has been accused of being at best irrelevant, and at 
worst a re-justification of liberal ideals at the expense of meaningful critique
44. To 
Habermas’s critics his obscurity combined with his inaccessible language and 
argument contribute to a theory whose critical credentials are highly suspect. While I 
defend the value of Habermas’s work as an expression of an ideal, I recognise that 
these criticisms point out some deficiencies in Habermas’s theory as a tool for re-
conceiving democratic practices. The following discussion serves to outline the scope 
of Habermas’s deliberative democratic solution in response to these criticisms. 
 
The most pertinent criticism as far as the ambitions of this thesis is concerned, is that 
Habermas does very little to tell us how democracy might be “re-ordered” to ensure 
the flourishing of communicative action
45. The feeling is that, in lieu of a concrete 
change to the material conditions of the public sphere, all ideals concerning discourse 
are nothing but “pie in the sky” theorising. Indeed, if we accept the pertinence and 
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accuracy of Habermas’s earlier criticisms of the nature of the modern public sphere, 
such as those articulated in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
wouldn’t it be reasonable to conclude that political elites might ‘take advantage of a 
situation characterized by a “public in dormancy” in order to exacerbate privatistic 
tendencies?’ (Scheuerman 2002: 75). Without concrete changes to the way that the 
systemic structure works (or in terms of legitimacy, does not work) it is not clear as to 
how the ideal decision making procedures are meant to gain ascendency over more 
strategically oriented (and strategically supported) models of decision making. More 
to the point, since Habermas fails to articulate the ways in which these changes might 
occur (as he relies on the inherent strength and validity of communicative action as an 
idealisation) he is vulnerable to the charge that he is merely an apologist for the 
present regime. 
 
Chantal Mouffe is one author who has oriented her democratic theory around a 
critical reading of Habermas’s hopes for deliberative democracy. Her critical 
assessment is based on two interdependent arguments. First, she argues that no 
political forum can ever be truly “neutral” in the way that deliberative notions of 
politics suggest; hence Habermas’s communicative idealisation cannot purport to be a 
completely neutral way to arrive at decisions.  Echoing Habermas’s Frankfurt School 
predecessor, Herbert Marcuse, Mouffe claims that “objectivity” is always constituted 
through acts of power (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Although Habermas developed his 
theory of communicative action in order to eliminate social power in the face of 
reason – to produce “objectivity” through pure intersubjectivity- if power exists prior 
to the formulation of communicative action, is it not reasonable to suppose that power 
is embedded in the very structure of communicative action? As Mouffe claims ‘there   119 
cannot be genuinely universal discourses that would have managed to break free from 
the political and moral “grammar” of the society in which they are formulated’ 
(Mouffe 1997: 29).  
 
Mouffe argues that although Habermas may be right in diagnosing the need to 
formulate an alternative to liberal democracy and the instrumentalist conception of 
politics it fosters, the solution cannot be found through the appropriation of “ideal” 
discourse. Underpinning this belief is the understanding that there is no such thing as 
consensus without exclusion, because politics is constituted precisely through 
plurality and when incommensurabilities arise the resolution of action coordination 
cannot be neutral. As Wittgenstein notes: 
Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each 
man declares the other a fool and a heretic. I said I would “combat” the other man – but 
wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes 
persuasion. (Wittgenstein 1969: 81e) 
It is argued that “universalisable” arguments, those which should gain acceptance via 
Habermas’s communicative rationality, can often conceal widely shared prejudices 
and viewpoints, undermining the true sovereignty of the individual, and without the 
guarantee of truly reasonable (rather than merely populist) outcomes (Villa 2001: 
180). The attempt to focus critical attention upon democratic procedure is therefore 
seen as being normatively loaded and ignorant of the true plurality of the polis.  
 
Habermas has certainly been criticised from other quarters for concealing a normative 
ideal in his delineations of the role lifeworld and reason occupy in constituting 
legitimacy. A number of critics have suggested that Habermas’s delineation between 
lifeworld and system is, as Rosenthal puts it, ‘based upon a criterion of functionality   120 
that instrumentalizes his entire project’ (Rosenthal 1992: 7)
46. This charge resembles 
an earlier criticism brought forth by William Connolly who argues that Habermas 
fails to acknowledge the contestable character of the ideal of rationality to which he 
appeals as a basis for agreement (Connolly 1983). It is equally possible to argue that 
the requirements of ideal speech favour a particular kind of citizenship and will 
become oppressive if continually required from the citizen
47. The grounds for each of 
these objections are basically the same; that is, the assertion that the kind of neutrality 
that Habermas aims for is unachievable because the very act of situating the argument 
requires justifications and assumptions that are unavoidably normative.  
  
With this in mind Mouffe makes the associated argument that it is precisely the liberal 
emphasis on neutral procedure and principles that serves to obscure the more pressing 
problem with democracies in modern societies – the lack of a democratic ethos 
(Mouffe 2000b).  According to Mouffe, the supposed neutrality of Habermas’s 
discourse ethics re-enacts the false universalism of bourgeois citizenship, in which a 
forum of theoretical equality is supposed to exist among participants who are clearly 
not equal. Given the impossibility of establishing such an “ideal”, Mouffe insists that 
the priority of democratic thought must be to imagine ways to promote a democratic 
ethos that encourages people to engage in democratic practice, even as the structure of 
that democratic practice remains contestable (Mouffe 1997: 25). The aim of 
democratic politics must be to encourage people to engage democratically with each 
other. The challenge of politics is ‘to transform antagonism into agonism’ or rather ‘to 
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construct the “them” group in such a way that they are no longer perceived as an 
enemy to be destroyed but as an “adversary”’(Mouffe 2000b: 126).  
 
I would argue that Mouffe’s criticism of Habermas is based upon a misunderstanding 
of the intent of The Theory of Communicative Action and that this is, in turn, a result 
of a failure to acknowledge Habermas’s development as a critical theorist. Mouffe 
suggests that ‘according to the deliberative approach, the more democratic a society 
is, the less power would be constitutive of social relations’ (Mouffe 2000b: 125). This 
statement does not accurately describe Habermas’s theory, which does not serve to 
undermine the power constitutive of social relations but to ensure that such power is 
democratically constituted according to the internal legitimacy of communicative 
communities.  
 
The reason Mouffe misunderstands the applicability of Habermas’s deliberative 
democracy is, in my view, because that she does not recognise the level of abstraction 
at which Habermas wishes to work. Habermas explicitly seeks to ground authority in 
metatheoretical terms that are normatively “neutral” and therefore universalisable; 
working upon an understanding that authority is generated by consent upon 
legitimacy. Mouffe denies the possibility of this neutrality, however, citing Michael 
Oakeshott’s assertion that the authority of political institutions is not a question of 
consent but of the continuous acknowledgement by cives of their obligation to the 
pre-constituted conditions of res publica (Oakeshott 1975: 149-158). She interprets 
the political as inherently reified. Citizens are born into political communities and, 
therefore, are constituted by them in very important ways. This is why Mouffe seeks a 
democratic ethos that will encourage citizens to engage with each other politically.   122 
 
Habermas’s work on the procedural constraints on ideal discourse does not contain 
concrete prescriptions for the redesign of democracy, as to do so would be to limit the 
universality of such a theory. Habermas has always stressed that in order to remain 
universal his theory of communicative action should remain as non-specific as 
possible concerning the concrete changes that have to occur in order to turn his theory 
into practice. Habermas believes that the autonomy private individuals exercise in 
pursuing their notion of the good life is as important to the health of democracy as the 
opportunity to participate in processes of democratic will-formation (Cooke 1997: 
272). Habermas argues that some methodological objectification is needed in order to 
make the lifeworld concept serviceable for theoretical purposes (Habermas 1987b: 
135). However, if he was to start prescribing how discourse ethics should be applied, 
as opposed to continually arguing for the internal legitimacy of those ethics, he would 
return his own project to the realms of the philosophy of consciousness and open it up 
to be instrumentally explored and exhausted. Also, his project would then be 
susceptible to Mouffe’s critique that every concrete democratic form involves an 
element of hegemonic exclusion (Mouffe 2000a). In order to ensure the inherent 
legitimacy sustained by the lifeworld, Habermas avoids delineating the manner in 
which the lifeworld should constitute itself, outlining instead a model of ideal 
procedure that would function as a tool of universal criticism. In this way he hoped to 
ensure that his critical theory of society moved beyond the aporia introduced into this 
tradition by Horkheimer and Adorno's criticism of instrumental reason (Habermas 
1984: 386).  
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I believe Chantal Mouffe does have a valid point about the need for a democratic 
ethos in order to stimulate the potentials of democratic thought. Habermas 
acknowledges that ‘nothing will change without the intervening, effective, innovative 
energy of social movements, and without the utopian images and energies that 
motivate such movements’. ‘But’, he adds, ‘that does not mean that theory itself… 
must take the place of utopias’ (Habermas 2002: 243). Habermas’s intention with 
respect to communicative action is not to prescribe the solution to the problem with 
modern democracy, but to illustrate the most rational way to determine and judge the 
solutions with which we are dealing. To this end Habermas continues to insist ‘on the 
idealizing content of the inescapable pragmatic presuppositions of a praxis from 
which only the better argument is supposed to emerge’ (Habermas 2002: 251). The 
standards of ideal communication may not tell us how to order a democratic system, 
but they serve as a basis for the continual critical assessment of the legitimacy of 
public reason and, therefore, remain useful in thinking about how a critical democratic 
system might take shape.  
Part Two: Arendt’s Agonistic Polis 
The criticism that Habermas does not identify the possible sources of a democratic 
ethos leads us to consider Arendt’s solution to the problems with modern liberal 
democracies. While Habermas does not concern himself with the reasons that 
individuals should choose to approach public discourse with an orientation to achieve 
understanding, Arendt bases her vision of the role of the public realm upon a 
conception of the human need to understand and be understood. Due to her emphasis 
on the role of the polis as a forum for the fulfilment of a human need to publicly 
appear, Arendt’s work has often been used to elaborate the views of the “agonistic”   124 
school of critical democratic theory. Agonistic democracy emphasises the virtues of 
direct political participation as an expression of self. The ethos necessary to establish 
a polis arises directly from the human desire to have a common and “real” forum in 
which to act. Reality, in turn, is constituted in the process of public dialogue, display 
and storytelling. Arendt’s account of the solution to the critical deficit of modern 
liberal democracies therefore acts as a corrective for the motivational deficit of 
Habermas’s theory. The human functions that public space fulfils mean that we 
appropriate a public space regardless of the quality or “legitimacy” of that space. In 
order to explain this point, I shall describe the various functions of Arendt’s ideal 
polis in fulfilling certain needs. Although in the process Arendt loses the 
“metatheoretical” qualities of Habermas’s theory, she provides valuable insights into 
the human energies that provide the motivation for a democratic ethos.  
 
An exploration of Arendt’s ideal of agonistic politics serves to elucidate some of the 
similarities between her ideal political discourse and that of Habermas. In both cases, 
power is understood to be communicatively constituted and democratic virtue is 
judged upon the amount of critical interaction that individuals have with the world 
around them. Arendt’s emphasis on how people innately form publics in order to 
manifest meaning provides an interesting counterweight to Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action, which fails to articulate what might motivate people to form 
an ideal public. Through Arendt’s emphasis on the various roles publics serve in 
validating the self, it is possible to come to a better understanding of the ways in 
which corruptions of such publics are myopic. At the same time, Arendt’s emphasis 
that the self needs such publics in order to generate meaning highlights the 
emancipatory potential of an ideal public space. The human desire for meaning and   125 
reality, as can be constituted through public space, provides the central tenet of hope 
for those of us who wish to use democracy as an emancipatory idiom, and shall 
subsequently be explored in the following chapter. 
The Philosophy of Arendt’s Agonistic Politics 
In order to begin this exploration of the philosophy of Arendt’s agonistic politics, I 
feel it is useful to pick up our discussion of Arendt where we left it; with this 
quotation on the danger of a non-critical public sphere:  ‘whatever men do or know or 
experience can make sense only to the extent that it can be spoken about’ (Arendt 
1958: 4). This single line speaks volumes about Arendt’s understanding of politics. 
On the one hand, it indicates the importance of an audience for validating speech, 
through the exposure of action to the scrutiny of plurality. On the other hand, it 
indicates the importance of speech as a record of action. Arendt’s model of ideal 
democratic practice has been justified on the basis of its ability to critically coordinate 
action, on the basis of its normative contribution towards the “good life” and as refuge 
against the futility of human existence. While exploring each of these “functions” of 
Arendt’s polis, I will show that Arendt believes that public space constituted by free 
speech and action is desirable not only because it will generate and maintain critical 
thought but also because such a public space serves a human need for disclosure and 
engagement. 
The Critical Qualities of Arendt’s Ideal Polis 
I shall begin this description of Arendt’s agonistic politics with an investigation of a 
common thread that runs through Habermas’s and Arendt’s understanding of politics. 
Hannah Arendt’s understanding of power as being constituted through 
communication has much in common with Habermas’ conception of 
Comment [TH13]: By doing 
so I am revisiting a shared feature 
of Arendt and Habermas’s 
communicative theory – in order 
to facilitate the most rational 
conversation, participants should 
have as many things in common 
as possible. By outlining what we 
can agree on, we can concentrate 
more specifically and more 
earnestly, on those issues that 
divide us. Both theorists 
(Habermas in early discussions of 
the ideal speaking situation; 
Arendt in her meditations on the 
truth of thought, and later in her 
description of the way public 
should form, emphasise the need 
for commonality in debators. This 
does not undermine the 
reconciatory mechanisms of 
Habermas’s discourse ethics, 
which seek to trascend 
incomensurabilities.) 
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communicatively generated legitimacy. Both theorists identify that power is a 
manifestation of public existence and is constituted by communicatively generated 
legitimacy. This commonality leads them to share similar views on the possibilities of 
public space as a place to resolve tension and coordinate action. Both theorists believe 
in reconciling antagonistic positions through recourse to commonly shared 
understandings. They each justify this engagement in dialogue upon the basis of the 
broadening of the debate that takes place in such a process and the inherent validity of 
critical discourse that this enables. Where they diverge is in their estimation of where 
this discourse takes place and their views on the purpose it should serve. This 
difference resides in their fundamental philosophical positions of modernist and anti-
modernist
48, rationalist and phenomenologist; my position is that attention to the 
differences between Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories neglects the 
remarkable degree of similarity and complementarity between their visions of an ideal 
democracy. 
 
Habermas flags his general approval of Arendt’s understanding of the communicative 
concept of power in an admiring article in a memorial issue of Social Research, which 
was dedicated to her contribution to political theory (Habermas 1977)
49. In this piece 
Habermas contends that Arendt shares his understanding of power as that which 
‘corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert’ (Arendt 1970: 
41). This reflects Habermas’s own understanding of power as the ability to make a 
claim on the legitimacy constituted by shared understandings. Habermas also notes 
that Arendt similarly attempts ‘to derive the conditions of the public political sphere 
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from the structures of undistorted subjectivity that have to be fulfilled in order for 
power to be communicatively generated or expanded’ (Habermas 1983a: 183). In 
making this proclamation Habermas identifies two important resonances between his 
own work and that of Arendt. First, he recognises that Arendt shares his view that 
legitimate power is communicatively generated. Second, he acknowledges that 
Arendt’s political philosophy also reflects a desire to reconcile institutions of power 
with this communicative legitimacy through the public use of reason. 
 
The communications concept of power is based upon the notion that power is 
intersubjectively produced within a communicative community. That is to say, in the 
process of reasoning, the power of our convictions stands and falls according to the 
mutual acknowledgement that these convictions are acceptable to the wider 
community (Habermas 1983a: 173).  Arendt expresses this understanding of mutual 
acknowledgement as the basis of power throughout her work. As Habermas quotes 
Arendt: 
It is the people’s support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and this support is 
but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with… All 
political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay 
as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them.
50  
The communicative element of this notion of power is derived from the element of 
community that is central to it. Arendt argues that ‘when we taste or judge, we judge 
in our role as a “member of a community”’ (Arendt 1978b: 72). By this she means 
that we share communicative presuppositions (within what Habermas regards as the 
lifeworld) that entitle judgement to be received as relevant and appropriate. It is only 
within the common bonds of shared understanding that it is possible to manifest 
power: ‘While strength is the natural quality of the individual seen in isolation, power 
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springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they 
disperse’ (Arendt 1958: 200). According to Arendt, the public is constituted through 
people speaking and acting together, and in this fundamental way her theory of 
communicative power mirrors that of Habermas’s understanding of the inherent 
legitimacy and power of the lifeworld. 
 
Along with Habermas, Arendt also understands that the public serves a critical 
function, providing a forum for criticism and the refinement of subjects through 
discussion. This shared understanding is based upon the Socratic principle that when 
one seeks to determine what is real, the more opinions that are consulted, the more 
“real” the final estimation of reality will be
51. This element of Arendt’s thought can 
most adequately be summed up in the following statement:  
Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, 
so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can 
worldly reality truly and reliably appear. (Arendt 1958: 57) 
Just as Habermas argues that agreement under the conditions of ideal communication 
is the criterion for legitimacy, Arendt suggests that “reality” can only be accepted as 
that which appears in the same way to all members of a communicative public. This 
implies that the process of ascertaining “reality” requires exposure to publicity in 
order to prove its authenticity.  
 
Given the communicative constitution of power, both Habermas and Arendt seek to 
ground this power in the most fundamentally justifiable ways possible. Habermas, 
therefore, understands legitimate power as constituted by the shared assumptions and 
beliefs that unite the members of a lifeworld. Similarly, the legitimate power of 
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Arendt’s public debate is constituted by an ability to appeal to the shared assumptions 
and beliefs of the given public. She contends that this purpose is expressly served by 
narrative. Arendt suggests that the persistence of stories that are shared and 
understood by a plural public denotes the relevance and legitimacy of such stories for 
this public. The more commonly acceptable the story, the more it is told, the more 
legitimacy it has. Here, Arendt echoes narrative theorist Hayden White’s view that 
narratives have the ability to transcend difference by identifying commonality. Thus, 
far from being one code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing experience with 
meaning, narrative is a meta-code, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural 
messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted. (White 1987: 1) 
Whilst there are important differences in the aesthetic qualities of communicative 
action as constituting the lifeworld and narrative as bearing the legitimacy of a shared 
public understanding, in both views the bounds of legitimacy are taken to be 
constituted by the commonly identifiable and communicable norms of any discursive 
public (Benhabib 2002: 357). While narrative devices, such as rhetoric, can be 
employed strategically in order to command or instruct, the reflexive and discursive 
character of narrative implies that it is oriented to be understood. Similarly, the 
discursive element of Habermas’s ideal communication seems to suggest that the 
telling of stories is a good way to move towards understanding. Narrative provides an 
avenue to express the ‘context-transcending validity claims’ (Habermas 1996a: 4) that 
can form the basis of agreement. 
  
Authors such as Seyla Benhabib have sought to reconcile the democratic theories of 
Arendt and Habermas by placing particular emphasis on this “deliberative” aspect of 
Arendt’s thought. By emphasising Arendt’s understanding of communicative 
rationality and the associated importance of deliberative public political fora,   130 
Benhabib comes to regard the communicative function of the public sphere as the 
most important element of Arendt’s democratic thought
52. This resonance provides an 
opportunity to synthesise the two theories in interesting ways that shall be explored at 
the end of this chapter, but first I shall explore the other purposes of Arendt’s public 
realm that are in addition to its deliberative function. 
 
The congruence between Habermas’s and Arendt’s views concerning the function of 
the public sphere ends with their divergent attitudes with respect to the space allowed 
for critical thought. Habermas argues that the best form of critical discourse – that of 
communicative action, takes place in the “ideal speaking position” in which 
participants share unproblematic convictions and are determined to achieve 
understanding; an orientation that naturally tends to occur within the boundaries of a 
shared lifeworld. I would argue that Arendt sees these conditions as most readily 
sustained in the activity of thinking
53. In the dialogue between “me” and “myself” the 
conditions of ideal communication are achieved – each participant shares 
unproblematic convictions and each is determined due to their symmetrical interests, 
to reach a conclusion based upon understanding. For Habermas, strategic interests are 
eliminated in ideal speech through symmetry of position and the participants’ 
commitment to achieving understanding. For Arendt, strategic interests are eliminated 
by the conversation being conducted in private, away from the plural pressures of the 
public realm. Habermas sees the communicative ideal as inspiring a critical public; 
Arendt understands that a critical public inspires thought. 
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Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories converge because both theorists emphasise the 
importance of harnessing the critical potential of public speech and believe that the 
place of this speech is important (because of their shared assumptions about the 
communicative composition of legitimacy). The divergence in their theories lies in the 
way they believe that this critical function operates. For Habermas, the public forum 
generates critical discourse by scrutinising communicative processes.  For Arendt, the 
public forum generates critical discourse by providing a space for identity to appear. 
This serves a critical function not only by allowing critical “deliberative” discourse, 
but also because public engagement fulfils a private need for disclosure. Thus 
Arendt’s public sphere serves not only in a deliberative capacity but also in an 
aesthetic sense, by allowing a space for expression. 
The Aesthetic Qualities of Arendt’s Ideal Polis 
Much more than simply a forum for critical discussion, Arendt argues that public 
space provides and serves a public good by providing a forum for speech and action. 
This view is based upon Arendt’s assertions that being cries out for self-display and 
that happiness is based upon the possibilities of engaging in an agonistic struggle that 
validates the self. Hence Arendt argues that the public realm should provide a forum 
“for being to be”, which will foster an experience of the “good life” by encouraging 
an adversarial, yet not antagonistic, forum for the innate human ambition to achieve 
distinction
54. Arendt believes that the public realm must provide, therefore, a forum 
for the telling of stories – for speech and action; activities that disclose the agent in 
the act, and thereby invite understanding. 
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The Public as a Place to Reveal Identity 
Whereas Habermas understands the public sphere to serve, in a critical capacity, to 
produce reasonable outcomes, Arendt believes that an equally important function of 
the public sphere is to provide a space for a critical reception that facilitates the 
revelation of individual identity. She argues that because we are human beings, with 
human capacities, we have a desire to distinguish ourselves through these capacities. 
As she points out in The Life of the Mind, ‘Whatever can see wants to be seen, 
whatever can hear calls out to be heard, whatever can touch presents itself to be 
touched’ (Arendt 1978b: 29). As we have the capacity to display and engage, we seek 
to do so. While the private serves as the place to develop our private selves, the public 
gives us the opportunity to have these selves “revealed” in the light of plurality, 
serving an aesthetic purpose by providing a forum in which all people can achieve the 
distinction that humans crave.  
 
Arendt argues that the public forum is needed to provide an understanding of our 
selves because it is only in the light of public reception that identity can truly reveal 
itself. In the same manner that communication generates a deeper understanding of 
reason, through acting in public it is possible to come to identify and gain acclaim for 
who one really is. Arendt declares bluntly in The Human Condition ‘the essence of 
who somebody is cannot be reified by himself’ (Arendt 1958: 211); rather someone’s 
essence can only be grasped following their appearance before a relevant public 
(Arendt 1958: 193-194). This is because one cannot have an “objective” 
understanding of self when one is alone with one’s thoughts. Who someone is remains 
hidden from the person in their private existence but appears in public ‘clearly and 
unmistakably to others’ (Arendt 1958: 179). Identity is a private attribute, developed   133 
through one’s own reconciliation through thought, but publicity gives this identity 
meaning by receiving this essence in an intersubjective way. Arendt suggests that we 
seek to “know” and distinguish who we are through exposure to such a public. 
 
In order for the public to fulfil this function of facilitating recognition, it must provide 
a space for speech and action. These are the telling human qualities that require public 
reception in order to be validated. Unlike the work of homo faber, which is judged 
according to its end product, or the labour of animal laborans, which is not public at 
all, speech and action acquire their meaning only through public acclaim.  They are 
the only human capacities that are truly free; that is, they exist as a manifestation of 
private thought and are not produced ‘under bondage to one or another kind of 
master’ (Kateb 1977: 142)
55. People are driven to think, act and speak in Arendt’s 
public realm because they are given ‘an opportunity to engage in those activities of 
“expressing, discussing, and deciding” which in a positive sense are the activities of 
freedom’ (Arendt 1990: 235). Because being cries out to be, and can only be 
recognised through public acclaim, the public realm also serves the function of 
providing a forum for human expression as an activity of freedom. 
The Public as an Inclusive Forum 
Here we encounter an important element of Arendt’s thought; for the public realm is 
supposed to operate as a forum for reasonable resolution of difference at the same 
time as it exists as a forum for the expression and celebration of difference. Through 
her description of the agonal role of the Greek polis, Arendt suggests that this tension 
can only be contained within a space of common activity. What constitutes real 
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freedom and real equality can only be determined by what is shared in common and 
appears publicly (Herzog 2001: 174).  
 
Hence, speech and action stand as central components of Arendt’s public realm. 
Speech, with its capacity to organise and inspire thought and action through its public 
use, is ‘what makes man a political being’ (Arendt 1958: 3). While we are born with 
the capacity to act and think, it is our ability to relate through speech that enables the 
coordination and celebration of action
56.  
And whatever men do or know or experience can make sense only to the extent that it can be 
spoken about. There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great relevance to man 
in the singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a political being, whatever else he may be. 
Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they move and act in this world, can experience 
meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to 
themselves. (Arendt 1958: 4) 
As beings with the capacity to speak, we are able to represent our identities in public. 
Thus, another argument for the care and maintenance of the public realm arises from 
the fact that only within a space of common visible activity can real freedom and 
equality emerge (Herzog 2001: 175). 
 
Arendt’s thought is predicated on the idea that being, however it is created through 
the miracle of natality, will possess an urge to disclose its identity no matter what its 
position with respect to race, class or gender
57. Identity is necessarily pre-political; it 
may be constituted by recourse to private thought, but ‘everything that our birth 
mysteriously grants us has no [publicly real] legal or political status’ (Arendt 1978a: 
246). We can only attempt to reconcile our individuality with the political by 
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distinguishing ourselves in the eyes of the plural public. It is through this preservation 
of public space as a forum for general proclivities, such as speech and action, that 
Arendt seeks to assert public space as being conducive to adversarial but not 
antagonistic engagement. 
 
Arendt, therefore, rails against identity politics, the allocation of political power 
according to an identifying feature such as ethnicity or gender, which purports to 
override all the other elements of that individual’s existence. To act publicly on behalf 
of a notion of such a private identity is to suggest that all private identities ought to be 
equal and accepted as real prior to their appearance in the public realm. This 
undermines the role of publicity in defining that identity and prejudges the effect that 
this pre-constituted “identity” should have on the public
58.  By fixating upon a certain 
element of an individual’s character as defining their “identity”, such an approach to 
politics denies the true plurality of individuals, and refutes Arendt’s assertion that no 
one can truly “know” themselves prior to public appearance
59. To do so would lead to 
the public realm becoming antagonistic to those who are “different”. Part of the 
reason for having a public is to recognise that we are all different and have value 
because of our difference. 
 
Arendt believes that identity is endlessly plural and it is only through engaging this 
plurality in an equally open public space that individuals can reveal their essences in 
their many-faceted reality. She wants people to feel pride in ‘whatever we happen to 
be by accident of birth’ because of the uniqueness of that accident, and not because 
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that accident allows people to fulfil a role already established for them
60. This is of 
fundamental importance for those who argue that Arendt’s public realm serves her 
political theory primarily by providing a forum for the competitive expression of 
individuality
61. As we are all distinct, political expression by way of representation is 
a fundamental error, it denies the plurality that really exists in the world. 
The Public as a Space for Normative Debate 
Arendt’s public realm also serves its constituents by providing a forum for a 
conversation about the good
62. This occurs because the public conversation is 
confronted by the fact of natality, which is the continual production of unique 
individuals who seek to redeem their identities in the public realm. As transient 
faculties such as action and speech constitute the public realm, the reality of the 
public is constantly challenged and renewed by individuals wishing to express their 
particular understanding of being. It is the very publicness of action and speech that 
contributes to the flexible appearance of public order and fosters the greatest 
discussion of the good.  
The art of Politics teaches men to bring forth what is great and radiant, in the words of 
Democritus; as long as the polis is there to inspire men to dare the extraordinary, all things are 
safe; if it perishes, everything is lost... Greatness, therefore, or the specific meaning of each 
deed, can lie only in the performance itself and neither in its motivation nor its achievement. 
(Arendt 1958: 206) 
Appearance in public not only provides a forum for “being to be”, the public is also 
the most hospitable realm for those who wish to observe and judge (Kristeva 2001a: 
51-52). Because the public is formed through the faculties of speech and action, its 
validity can be assessed through the universal faculties of hearing and viewing. The 
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62 Arendt generates her argument for the virtue of such a conversation largely from her reading of 
Aristotle’s Politics.   137 
agonistic drive to show oneself measuring up against others privileges the faculty of 
storytelling that, through speech and metaphor, allows meaning to transcend the 
boundaries of the different private experiences of public participants. Memory and 
interpretation leave space for plurality in the process of telling and re-telling. This is 
why Arendt claims that ‘real stories, in distinction from those we invent, have no 
author’ (Arendt 1958: 185). If a story is acceptable to every listener in a gathering and 
no one need defend the reality it presents – it needs no author – it is viewed as a 
constant (despite the plurality of the public) and, therefore, claims the status of real. 
When such a reality is not accepted, stories do have authors who are prescribed 
defenders of the reality contained in these stories. The agonistic struggle of Arendt’s 
public realm consists in the struggle to get stories commonly accepted, something that 
can only occur following the public reconciliation of the story with the private 
understandings of the public’s constituents.  
 
This is not to deny that everybody views and hears differently, but rather to insist that 
because they do, appearance must be subjected to judgement. Arendt locates the 
source of democratic survival in the pluralism of this judgement (Horowitz 1999: 
275). So long as people are comparing the validity of speech and action, they are all 
capable of rendering judgement. By providing a forum for judgement, Arendt makes 
the ideal public realm an enticing place to express one’s humanity, not only through 
speaking, but also through judging. Hence, she argues that the glory of the public of 
the French revolution consisted not so much in the actions of the political leaders, but 
‘the acclaiming spectators’ (Arendt 1982: 61).  These spectators, who are 
acknowledged as playing a legitimate part in the public constitution of power, 
experienced the joy of being a part of the constitution of truly public power and   138 
sought to consolidate that experience through further political participation. 
Participating through the action of judgement opens up the possibilities of thought and 
speech and generates a public realm worthy of the name. 
 
Arendt seeks to reconcile the tension between the role of the public as a forum for the 
coordination of action and as a forum for individual distinction through her treatment 
of thought, speech and action as inalienably human abilities. Our shared ability to 
speak, act and think means that no one need be alienated by what they find in a public 
constituted through these faculties. Our experience of our private thoughts teaches us 
the benefits of deliberation, and we inherently understand that we can only manifest 
this debate publicly through the universal faculties of speech and action. As she states 
in The Human Condition, ‘Plurality is the condition of human action because we are 
all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else 
who ever lived, lives or will live’ (Arendt 1958: 8). As humans we share a basic 
intersubjectivity, we understand that we have the capacity to speak, act and think. 
Arendt suggests that we need share nothing in common but these faculties and that the 
concurrent human desire to display and self-display will ensure that we navigate the 
problems of plurality in a meaningful way. 
The Public as a Forum of Agonistic Engagement 
Given this aesthetic environment, the existence of plural private identities does not 
undermine the possibility for harmony within the public realm. Quite the opposite, it 
is the need for this plurality, to display and self-display in a way that can be spoken 
about and thereby “make sense”, that drives individuals to take part in public activity. 
In Arendt’s ideal polis, ‘the intrinsic tendency of people to create things of value is   139 
realized. By giving meaning to their lives and the lives of those close to them, people 
are able to resist the futility that threatens to swallow them up’ (Arendt 1968: 228-
229). Arendt believes, therefore, that a mutual respect for the public forum is born out 
of mutual understanding of the need for such a forum. We need a place where we can 
appear; hence it is provident to care for public space. 
[The] revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others 
and neither for nor against them – that is, in sheer human togetherness…. Because of its 
inherent tendency to disclose the agent together with the act, action needs for its full 
appearance the shining brightness we once called glory, and which is only possible in the 
public realm. Without the disclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its specific character 
and becomes one form of achievement among others. (Arendt 1958: 180) 
The solidarity necessary for citizens to constitute a public that is adversarial – rather 
than antagonistic – arises from the shared desire for distinction through the 
commitment to action and the telling of stories (Arendt 1990: 85-89,92). A personal 
concern for encountering reality manifests a public care for the other – in order to 
truly know anything, you must expose what you “know” to public scrutiny in order to 
ascertain what is real. Those who seek to justify a claim to reality, therefore, seek to 
make their public spheres as inclusive as possible. Theoretically only an infinitely 
inclusive public sphere can give you an “objective” appreciation of reality.  
 
The further advantage of combining plurality through the public realm is that it 
establishes a refuge for the immortality of glory and human greatness
63. The ideal 
public sphere distinguishes itself because of the speech and action, or the free actors, 
which continually constitute it. It is the polis, ‘the space of men’s free deeds and 
living words, which could endow life with splendour’ (Arendt 1990: 281). This forum 
stands in stark contrast to the public realm of homo faber, which can only distinguish 
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itself through an appeal to functionality. Rather, through the revelation of reality that 
occurs in a plural public sphere, it is possible to immortalise worthy participation. 
Paraphrasing Heraclitus, Arendt asserts that ‘the potential greatness of humans lies in 
their ability to contribute to the immortal’, that is, ‘to contribute to the immortal cycle 
of humanity’ by appearing in public and contributing to it (Arendt 1958: 19). Arendt 
implores us to live a life worth telling a story about; if we live well enough the story 
will be told again and again. 
 
The public realm provides a degree of permanence for speech and action by providing 
a forum for these otherwise transient capacities.  As we have previously seen, 
Arendt’s public realm operates in such a manner that only what is “real” can 
withstand the scrutiny of the plural public. More specifically, while only what 
deserves to be recognised as real becomes fully manifested in the public realm, every 
participant in the public is a part of the constitution of the real. Thus the agonistic 
drive for “being to be” is gratified by the existence of a public realm which ‘seems to 
assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least 
tangible and most ephemeral of man-made “products”, the deeds and stories which 
are their outcome, would become imperishable’ (Arendt 1958: 197-198). The polis 
serves as a guarantee, therefore, against the futility of individual life and incites 
participation through its promise to ‘absorb and make shine through the centuries 
whatever men may want to save from the natural ruin of time’ (Arendt 1958: 55 - 56). 
This kind of immortality provides the incentive for adversarial engagement that is not 
antagonistic; one wants to show oneself as remarkable in the public sphere, without 
undermining the validity of that public sphere in the process. 
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Due to their differing intentions, theorists tend to appropriate the separate functions of 
Arendt’s public realm in order to serve their purposes. There is no doubt that 
narrative, with the values that narrative transposes, serves a purpose by broadening 
deliberation. Similarly, the aesthetic of Arendt’s political action fulfils a basic human 
need for agonistic competition and individual distinction; as does developing a forum 
for immortality as a refuge against mortality. Seyla Benhabib has appropriated the 
deliberative elements of Arendt’s theory in her understanding that the immortal and 
aesthetic elements of her public realm serve Habermasian ends insofar as they 
encourage deliberation. However, such an emphasis neglects the pervasiveness of 
Arendt’s conception of identity formation, contemplation and judgement as part of 
what makes us human. Arendt’s intention is not just to resolve the tension created by 
difference, but to explore difference and celebrate it.  
The calamities of action arise from the human condition of plurality, which is the condition 
sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the public realm. Hence the attempt to do 
away with this plurality is always tantamount to the abolition of the public realm itself. 
(Arendt 1958: 220) 
I chose to appropriate the critical function of Arendt’s public realm for my own 
purposes in the first chapter. This critical function of Arendt’s public realm can be 
understood through a combination of her deliberative thought with that of Habermas, 
but it can also be understood in light of the aesthetic and agonistic roles of the public 
realm. I would argue that, in all of its interpretations, the ideal public realm acts as an 
incentive to think; whether this is in order to understand reality in a “reasonable way”, 
to live the good life, or to competitively engage. In this way it is possible to formulate 
Arendt’s theory as conveying an explanation as to why people may be motivated to 
try to come to decisions based upon public understanding. Public fora generate what 
constitutes “reality” and as such, the integrity of public fora is directly proportional to 
the integrity of the reality they constitute.    142 
The Construction of Arendt’s Ideal Polis 
Since I have identified the various functions of Arendt’s ideal public space, I can now 
turn my attention to the ways in which Arendt believes that this polis might be reified. 
In her work she prevaricates concerning the possibility of defining the ideal political 
institution because she does not wish to pre-empt the creativity of an active public. 
The ideal public realm can only reveal itself through its appropriateness for the 
particular plurality whose members seek to constitute a public. She tentatively 
suggests an “ideal” model of power distribution in On Revolution (Arendt 1990), 
which has subsequently led to criticisms of her democratic theory for being elitist. 
After exploring this area of Arendt’s thought, I intend to attempt to refute these 
charges of elitism by paying closer attention to her understanding of the possibilities 
of multiple publics. Following this I take up her admiration of Jefferson’s wards as an 
ideal public forum. Understanding her views in terms of her admiration for Jefferson 
helps us reconceptualise her ideas about concrete public participation in a way that is 
commensurate with her broad theoretical perspective on the role of the public sphere. 
 
Just as Habermas understands that engaging in philosophies of consciousness 
undermines their critical potential by locating them within a particular perspective, 
Arendt understands that advocating a particular kind of public sphere undermines the 
role that public appearance must play in creating that public sphere. Whereas 
Habermas’s answer is to identify the ways in which we can go about deliberating in 
order to ensure the legitimacy of the public sphere, Arendt’s answer is to suggest that 
the creation of public space depends upon the desire of individuals to constitute a 
space for appearance. While we have just analysed the various justifications Arendt   143 
puts forward for this act of creation, we now turn our attention to the structures 
Arendt believes might reflect her ideal.  
 
Arendt’s most explicit description of how the perfect public sphere might be 
structurally constituted takes place in her work On Revolution. Here she identifies a 
political system of tiered councils, each with its own internal deliberative mechanism, 
in which the members of each tier deliberatively elect their representative for the next 
highest council (Arendt 1990: 278). Arendt imagined that through this structure the 
public sphere would combine the virtue of public engagement with the positive 
functional attributes of an interconnected system of communication. This, in turn, 
would reconcile equality with authority by enabling a space for equality in each 
individual’s “tier” while bestowing the highest possible legitimacy (that is legitimacy 
open to discursive redemption) upon the authority that comes from the tier above and 
the authority generated by the tier below. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly for such a corporatist model of power distribution, this 
element of Arendt’s thought has led to the criticism that it lends itself to elitism. Such 
a criticism is often justified on the basis of her own admission that such a distribution 
of power resembles the shape of authoritarian government (Arendt 1990: 278), 
sometimes combined with readings of passages in The Human Condition in which she 
emphasises the lack of political abilities possessed by homo faber and animal 
laborans
64. Certainly, there are passages throughout her work which, when read in 
isolation, can be interpreted as reflecting the view that the political realm would be 
better off if it were only open to a certain type of person. It can seem that Arendt 
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derides the majority of the population as being too stupid to know what they really 
need and for undermining the possibility of real humans to achieve happiness in their 
pursuit of the satisfaction of their material interests. It is only those people who have 
managed to escape the realm of necessity who are fit to act politically and, as a result, 
‘the political way of life has never been …the way of life of the many’ (Arendt 1990: 
275)
65. Such a reading of Arendt’s work leads to the suspicion that the task of her 
corporatist structure of councils is not to generate authority from below but to imply 
and inculcate the authority of a political elite. 
 
I believe, however, that such a reading of Arendt’s political theory misinterprets the 
purpose of insulating politics from mass participation. In an extended passage on the 
subject in The Human Condition, Arendt argues that organising participation into 
decision making “tiers” maintains the vital role of personal engagement and 
appearance that public space should serve. ‘Large numbers of people, crowded 
together, develop an almost irresistible inclination towards despotism, be this the 
despotism of a person or majority rule’ (Arendt 1958: 43). We can see that the public 
sphere loses its aesthetic and immortalising functions without the immediate 
experience of personal involvement in political action. As a result unengaged 
participation encourages “knowing” rather than “thinking”. Following this broader 
understanding of the purpose of Arendt’s public sphere, it is important to insulate 
political action from the effects of people acting as part of an indistinguishable mass. 
Not because such insulation might provide an opportunity for the elite to rule, but in 
                                                 
65 Homo faber understands the rewards of an “escape the realm of necessity” only in terms of material 
wealth, an Arendtian reading is that the reward for escaping the realm of necessity is to engage in a 
truly public debate.   145 
order to ensure that everyone gets an opportunity to distinguish themselves (Isaac 
1998: 104). 
 
Arendt’s depiction in On Revolution of a tiered structure of publics shaped like a 
pyramid, therefore, is less an attempt to create a space of power for an elite with an 
affinity with the political than it is an attempt to make the political directly relevant 
for all individuals. Those who choose the former explanation of her motives tend to 
view her theory as an attempt to secure all power for good political actors. This 
position disregards the fact that her own “phenomenological essentialism” prohibits 
her from making such normative judgements (Benhabib 2002: 70). Indeed, one of the 
main arguments Arendt makes in The Human Condition is that under modern 
conditions a consensus about what constitutes a “good” political actor can only be 
based on a worldless notion of “good”; such a notion would be based on knowledge 
of the good rather than thinking about the good (Villa 1997: 199). The important 
function of the public realm is to counteract such worldlessness, and Arendt’s 
apparent endorsement of corporatist power structures has more to do with keeping the 
public relevant to individuals than it has to do with the pursuit of a particular 
repression of citizenship.  
 
In order to elaborate my view that this position springs from Arendt’s concerns over 
what is necessary for an engaging democratic practice, it is helpful to illustrate the 
importance of plurality to her thought. As part of her justification for advocating small 
publics, Arendt argues that ‘since the laws of statistics are perfectly valid where we 
deal with large numbers, it is obvious that every increase in population means an 
increased validity and a marked decrease of “deviation”’ (Arendt 1958: 43). Her fear   146 
in this context is that for every increase in the number of participants in a forum, there 
is a decrease in the likelihood that each individual can appear to be as remarkable and 
unique as they ought. At the same time, an extensive public sphere carries a greater 
weight of legitimacy and a greater likelihood that its conclusions will be seen as 
compelling, rather than subjectively acknowledged. Thus for Arendt, the ideal public 
space should be small enough to celebrate individual contribution and action. 
 
The plurality of any given public sphere is inevitable, and in a way the point of having 
such a public sphere is to extract that plurality in a way that allows every participant 
to make a unique contribution. The political has no business in determining which 
aspects of being manifest which political attitudes; to do so would to “know” what 
could be expected from each participant, and one of Arendt’s most emphatic and 
consistent ideas is that where “knowledge” is constituted prior to the space for speech 
and action ‘the space for freedom is lost’ (Arendt 1990: 264). For similar reasons, 
Arendt derides the mechanisms of voting as public participation, especially given the 
predilection for private interests to dominate voting behaviour prior to public scrutiny 
of these interests (Arendt 1990: 227,256). Rather, plurality is a given in any group of 
individuals, and the public realm must be small enough so that individuals are free to 
reveal these differences through their own speech and action. 
 
Arendt believes that the problem of ensuring that democratic polities remain 
meaningful for all participants can be solved through the dissemination of public 
space. As she wrote in The Crises of the Republic, ‘since the country is too big for us 
all to come together and determine our fate, we need a number of public spaces within 
it’ (Arendt 1972a: 232).  With this in mind, it is possible to understand the particular   147 
political virtue Arendt saw in Thomas Jefferson’s ward system and in other theories 
and practices of revolutionary councils
66. These models of democratic practice 
captured important elements of Arendt’s ideal conception of the ideal public sphere 
and have been championed by her as historically specific displays of the revolutionary 
potential of democracy.  
 
Thomas Jefferson’s ward system was an attempt to harness the political capacities of 
public citizens through their involvement in small community “wards”. He declared 
that a system of wards – polities roughly 24 square miles in size and each with their 
own school – would be ‘the most fundamental measure for securing good 
government, and for instilling the principles and exercise of good government into 
every fibre of every member of our commonwealth’
67. Arendt argues that Jefferson 
perceives that the great danger to the Unites States republic is ‘that the constitution 
had given all power to the citizens, without giving them the opportunity of being 
republicans and acting as citizens’ (Arendt 1990: 253). Arendt argues that Jefferson 
shares her understanding of the importance of personal involvement in politics: 
The basic assumption of the ward system, whether Jefferson knew it or not, was that no one 
could be called free without his experience in public freedom, and that no one could be called 
either happy or free without participating, and having a share, in public power. (Arendt 1990: 
255)
 68  
By making the domain of government that much smaller, along with giving each ward 
control of education, Jefferson advocates a polis that would demand the normative 
consideration of its citizens. Such a responsive polis would promote the benefits of 
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political involvement; which is a boon to both the healthy function of the polis, and 
the healthy existence of the individual. 
 
In On Revolution, Arendt suggests that the benefits of public participation have been 
apparent throughout all revolutionary movements. The personal and political benefits 
of participatory publics became apparent during the American Revolution, when local 
councils and militia constituted publics through their own activities and oratories. 
Arendt cites other examples of the awakening of political virtue, such as the French 
societies  revolutionaires, the Russian soviets, the French Resistance, the Israeli 
kibbutzim and the American Civil Rights Movement. Each of these movements 
succeeded politically, as forms of resistance, because they sought to open up space for 
free public action (Isaac 1994: 163). As a result Arendt sees such council systems as 
‘the single alternative that has ever appeared in history, and has reappeared time and 
time again’ (Arendt 1972a: 231). This continual appearance is evidence enough to 
Arendt that all that is required for a virtuous public realm is a place for people to 
speak and act about common concerns. 
 
In On Revolution Arendt makes the point that these exemplary publics are invariably 
constituted through the act of resistance to an illegitimate form of political power. 
People are forced to constitute their own public when they are confronted with a 
public existence they cannot reconcile with their private being. When people refuse to 
speak and act through the machinery of the state and instead choose to constitute their 
own forum, their own speech and their own action, by necessity they begin to 
constitute a new public realm. This public realm gains power simply because of its 
immediacy and responsiveness. Resisters ‘had become challengers, they had taken the   149 
initiative upon themselves, and therefore, without even noticing it, had begun to 
create the public space between themselves where freedom could appear’ (Arendt 
1968: 3-4). In the act of resistance, people are forced to devise new structures of 
politics based upon their own notions of legitimacy, and in doing so are not only 
forced to think about the ‘stability and durability of the new structure’ but also enjoy 
‘the exhilarating awareness of the human capacity of beginning’ (Arendt 1990: 223). 
Thus the very act of creation is part of the experience offered by the ideal public 
realm. 
 
Despite their approximation of the virtue of the agonal Greek polis, Arendt notes that 
modern revolutionary publics have never managed to survive their own founding
69. 
She notes disdainfully the capitulation of the thought of these spontaneous public 
realms in the face of political “knowledge” (Arendt 1990: 264). The founding of such 
a public in the modern period, although spurred on by a human need to oppose the 
prevailing public realm, is doomed by the modern conception that reality is 
constituted prior to the individual. With the dominance of this understanding, the 
tendency has been for councils to acquiesce in the face of more instrumentally 
legitimate power structures of administration. Throughout the modern period the 
victories won through agonistic, participatory democracies have been quickly 
exploited by experts who “knew” what needed to happen. Since ‘man has lost faith in 
himself as partner of his own thoughts’, Arendt understands that the moments in 
which he regains that faith are unique and rare moments – ‘islands in the sea or oases 
in the desert’ (Arendt 1990: 275). 
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Humanity in Dark Times - Thoughts about Lessing’ in (Arendt 1973). 
Comment [TH14]:  An 
example: ‘The wish of the 
working class’, we are told, ‘has 
been fulfilled. The factories will 
be managed by the councils of the 
workers’
1. This so-called wish of 
the working class sounds much 
rather like an attempt of the 
revolutionary party to counteract 
the councils’ political aspirations, 
to drive their members away from 
the political realm and back into 
the factories…the workers’ wish 
to run the factories themselves 
was a sign of the understandable, 
but politically irrelevant desire of 
individuals to rise into positions 
which up to then had been open 
only to the middle class. Arendt - 
OR p.274 
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This depiction of agonal politics as occurring only in moments of resistance has led 
various writers to conclude that Arendt’s ideal polis is a chimera, manifesting itself 
only through civil disobedience and resistance
70. However, I would suggest that 
Arendt’s aim in On Revolution is to acknowledge that freedom presents itself as 
resistance in the modern period. In an instrumental society, with an innate tendency 
towards totalitarianism, resistance remains as the irreducible aspect of political 
freedom. Arendt is never so pessimistic, however, as to suggest that this is a terminal 
condition. She even names the ever present hope of humanity - natality, which is the 
constant plurality and founding brought about through the fact of birth (Arendt 1958: 
247). It is the very act of creation, of beginning something that has never been begun 
before, that guarantees the occurrence of difference and ushers in the need for speech 
and action. The fact that something born new has to be reconciled with the world 
means the space for freedom continually appears. As George Kateb has noted, her 
interest in Jeffersonian wards was based upon Jefferson’s attempt to maintain the 
positive experience of founding – she wanted to ‘found a form that would 
institutionalize the practice of beginning or founding, and provide a way of having the 
revolutionary spirit survive the end of the revolution’ (Kateb 1977: 157). In modern 
politics, it is only in the activity of resistance or disobedience that the authority of 
political knowledge is abandoned long enough to reacquaint concern with stability 
with a spirit desirous of change within a common public (Arendt 1990: 223). In 
witnessing birth, however, we are continually forced to reconcile the old with the new 
– the more immediate our connection with this process, the more we are forced to 
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think. Our personal experience of birth gives us the capacity to conceptualise new 
political beginnings. 
 
Quite plainly, the smaller the public, the more the intimate experience of creation is 
shared among its constituents and the more immediate the experience of public 
activity as a result. Arendt’s work, therefore, ‘allows us to see possibilities for 
political action instantiating multiple, overlapping and sometimes conflicting public 
domains’ (Calhoun 1997: 239). This reading of Arendt draws attention to her 
depiction of political associations as fluid and subjectively constituted; indeed, ‘Ten 
people around a table are a political group provided their talk is about public business 
and they are part of a public network of councils’ (Arendt 1972b: 232-233). All that is 
truly needed for a political public is a space in which people come to understand each 
other through the free use of their speech and in which they find an outlet for action 
(Calhoun 1997: 237).  
 
This line of thought offers up the possibility of using Arendt’s political vision to 
correct the various modes of citizenship already engaged in by the modern democratic 
citizen. George Kateb argues that liberal democratic citizens are already engaged in 
various types of publics – through private relationships, participation with voluntary 
associations, daily life at work and through the possibilities for involvement presented 
by local government and political parties (Kateb 1977: 175). He argues that, ideally, 
all these engagements fulfil Arendt’s requirement of a place for free speech and action 
and at least aspire to some form of equality between participants (Kateb 1977: 176). 
With such a plethora of opportunities for participation already in existence, Kateb 
argues, surely Arendt’s theory can be applied as an institutional critique in order to   152 
make life ‘more political, and therefore more satisfying and more dignified’ (Kateb 
1977: 176). Kateb wishes to use Arendt’s standards for what public associations 
should be in order to critique and change the public situations encountered in civil 
society. Should we then assume that the structure of Arendt’s ideal public realm 
resembles a more democratically vigorous modern liberal democracy? 
 
Kateb’s ideas about how Arendt’s agonal vision might be implemented may go a long 
way to refining and improving the democratic credentials of any administrative 
organisation, but they do not do justice to the many roles Arendt’s publics serve
71. 
Providing a space of equality in which speech and action can appear serves the 
purpose of engaging participants and offering refuge from the futility of existence. 
However, it denies the role of the public in providing a space for “reality” to appear. 
For within the confines of a business, or a political party, a family, or municipal 
council, one can only encounter a public whose constituents are already somewhat 
constrained by the predefined roles these “publics” serve. As seen in her estimation of 
revolution, a large part of democratic participation is the act of founding a public, not 
as a means to an end but as a way of determining worthy ends through the collective 
perception of “reality”. By appropriating Arendt’s thought as a way of improving the 
democratic function of these essentially “private” institutions, Kateb re-enacts the 
fallacy of Saint Just: ‘The freedom of the people is in its private life; don’t disturb it. 
Let the government be a force only in order to protect this state of simplicity against 
force itself’
72. As Arendt notes, ‘these words indeed spell out the death sentence for 
all the organs of the people, and they express in rare unequivocality the end of all 
                                                 
71 Kateb actually makes the admission that ‘too much is left out’ in this appropriation of Arendt’s 
thought (Kateb 1977: 177). 
72 Saint-Just in ‘Fragments sur les institutions republicaines’, Oeuvres, vol.2, p.121.   153 
hopes for the revolution’ (Arendt 1990: 244). Nothing precludes the possibility of 
freedom more than predefined and exclusory notions of who should take part in 
public discourse and how they should do so. Without the constitution of the public by 
the public, as opposed to a public constituted by individuals acting in their private 
interests, the public cannot truly serve as a place for reality to appear. 
 
This is not to say that Arendt completely dismisses the possibilities of multiple 
publics, but it is important to understand that she places the possibilities of these 
semi-autonomous publics in the context of a broader and more inclusive public that 
still conforms to her idealisations of the public sphere. If we take into account her 
pessimistic assessment of the political ethos of modernity, it appears that multiple 
publics constituted in resistance to the modern democratic “public” might be the only 
way to rescue some of the virtues of her ideal polis
73. This by no means implies, 
however, that we are justified in abandoning the attempt to create a more inclusive 
overarching political public. It is of fundamental importance that Arendt bases her 
understanding of the possibility of reconciling multiple publics under one general 
public upon the ‘possibility of intersubjective dialogue and mutual understanding’ 
(Disch 1994: 40). The point of public appearance is to make oneself understood, both 
to oneself and to others. The crucial factor is not appearance before a fixed or 
universal public realm, but appearance before all publics in a way that constitutes a 
continuous identity. 
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In the condition of multiple publics, the single constant is the continuity of identity 
within the space of memory. In order for the publics to fulfil their functions of 
disclosing reality, constituting power and providing aesthetic gratification, the identity 
of the individual involved needs to be consistent. For example, an individual cannot 
appear in their capacity as a worker in one public, and appear differently as a citizen 
in another. To do so would be to privilege the private over the public and belie the 
purpose of public space in its role of disclosure. More to the point, it would deny the 
possibility of the individual to have a consistent identity and to live a life that can be 
told as a single, consistent, inspirational story. By serving as a constant, identity 
transcends the founding of new publics and serves to remind us that the condition of 
legitimate publicity is when the revelation of our identity (through both our acts and 
through stories told about us) makes sense in every public role we serve. As Calhoun 
has pointed out, ‘Such identities require a field of common knowledge within which 
to be comprehensible, but there is no reason that the field must have strong 
institutional boundaries (in the way that, for example, an electorate must)’ (Calhoun 
1997: 251). In Arendt’s thought identity comes to constitute the political, and in doing 
so gives rise to the many virtues of public activity. 
 
It is important to understand, then, that what is significant for Arendt is not so much 
the physical qualities of the public space for freedom but the existence of a place to 
allow stories to reveal themselves and judgements to be made. Storytelling and 
judgement remain as two of the most pervasive elements of Arendt’s thought, and I 
would suggest this is because they provide a bridge between understanding, thought 
and action. Storytelling serves this purpose in its capacity to render speech about 
action broadly consumable by reconciling detached and seemingly incongruous   155 
details about an individual in a way that transcends incommensurability. Judgement 
links understanding, thought and action in the manner in which it generates action 
through speech and does so in a way that can be spoken about. We can therefore come 
to understand that, for Arendt, proper democratic functioning does not depend on any 
specific structure or site of political engagement. Rather, ‘democracy is a project 
concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary citizens… with their 
possibilities for becoming political beings through the self discovery of common 
concerns and of modes of action for realizing them’ (Wolin 1996: 33)
74. 
Conclusion 
Arriving at the end of our investigation of Arendt and Habermas’s solutions to the 
problems of modern liberal democracy, we are left with largely consistent indications 
as to how we might expect to overcome these deficiencies. A public culture of critical 
engagement is central to Arendt’s and Habermas’s solutions to the critical deficit of 
democratic systems, and each suggests that the cultivation of “ideal” fora is integral to 
addressing the broad social problems brought about by the ascendency of 
instrumentalism and the decline of critical thought.  
 
As seen in the first chapter, both theorists identify a similar malaise in liberal 
democracies – being an inadequate critical impetus in the functioning of its 
institutions. However, they have somewhat different ideas about how this inadequacy 
ought to be rectified. Habermas tries to incorporate critical deliberation into the very 
procedure of communication. Arendt, on the other hand, seeks to inspire critical 
                                                 
74 For an elaboration of the congruencies between Arendt and Wolin’s political thought see (Wolin 
1960: 2,277).   156 
thought by creating a space for the celebration of the human faculties of thought, 
speech and action. Habermas’s approach is to try and make an irrefutable and always 
evocable connection between public power and the critique of that power. Arendt’s 
approach is to seek to institute publics that inspire thought and criticism through 
participation. What I hope I have emphasised is that these differences do not render 
Arendt and Habermas’s theories incompatible. 
 
Much ado has been made by democratic theorists about the bases and consequences 
of the subsequent differences between agonistic and deliberative democratic systems. 
My particular contribution in this thesis is to highlight the similarities between 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic projects, rather than the differences. I have 
argued that they share an understanding of the communicative composition of power, 
and of personal sovereignty as the ability to critically engage in this power. To be 
sure, Habermas emphasises the importance of making the mode of discourse critical, 
while Arendt emphasises the importance of keeping the space for discourse critical, 
but this does not render their projects to be exclusive of each other. Indeed, given 
their shared understanding of the communicative composition of power, it is easy to 
come to understand that critical engagement with the “space” for discourse and the 
“mode” of discourse comes to constitute the same thing - an individual’s expressive 
interaction with discursively constituted power. 
 
What reading Habermas and Arendt together does is provide us with a cohesive view 
of not only what ideal political discourse might involve, but also why we might 
expect people to seek to constitute an ideal forum.  Rather than being antagonistic, I 
argue that the two theorist’s democratic theories are highly complementary. The   157 
Arendtian notion of agonistic drive provides us with an idea of where the care 
necessary for communicative action might arise from. At the same time, Habermas’s 
notion of ideal speech outlines the conditions that can make discourse itself 
adversarial, yet not antagonistic. Even then, Arendt’s insistence on the inevitable 
plurality of identity and reality undermines Mouffe’s fear that any particular “ideal” 
political forum could become hegemonic. Read in this way, the democratic theories of 
Habermas and Arendt have much more to offer the theorist who wishes to understand 
what can be done to improve contemporary democratic systems. It is not that 
democracies need to become more critical or engaging, democracies need to be more 
critical  and engaging in order to fulfil the aspirations of either the agonistic or 
deliberative theorists.   
 
It is possible to synthesise Arendt’s and Habermas’s views concerning ideal 
democratic forms in order to reify a truly “ideal” democratic structure, but such an 
instrumental appropriation of their theories does not do justice to their awareness of 
the limitations of historical and cultural contingencies. For the sake of those who like 
instruments, such a synthesis would identify the need for a public sphere that is 
endlessly inclusive and plural. This global public sphere would provide the most 
coherent perception of reality, insofar as it was inclusive and plural, and would 
provide a space for immortality and agonistic engagement for all citizens. In order to 
ensure that all participants in the global public are fairly included, the global public 
would aspire to the conventions of ideal speech – ensuring that public communication 
is effective, active and revelatory. Such a public could then act as a model for smaller 
publics, as the engaging and critical virtues of such a public became clear. While this 
model would invariably be an improvement on the current state of democracy, it does   158 
not do justice to the non-instrumental nature of Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories. By 
instituting a preconceived notion of the good such a forum – any forum - has the 
potential to become a hegemonic force that, in turn, will need to be overcome in the 
process of critical political engagement. 
 
It is perhaps more instructive to explore another similarity between the emancipatory 
theories of Arendt and Habermas; each theorist identifies the creation of ideal publics 
as an essentially human ability. In the form of deliberative democracy or agonistic 
democracy the “space” available for discussion is not as pertinent as the proclivity of 
the identities involved to “become public”. As Arendt and Habermas both argue, all it 
really takes to form a public is a shared willingness into engage in debate in such a 
way as to coordinate action through consensus.  
 
Such a reading of Habermas and Arendt suggests that democratic emancipation may 
be a human inevitability. The democratic theory of Hannah Arendt provides us with 
an account of how public engagement is a necessary result of the human urge to 
disclose one’s unique identity. The democratic theory of Jurgen Habermas provides us 
with an account of how discussion can be conducted in order to ensure this disclosure 
translates effectively into action coordination, and how the rationalisation of the 
lifeworld is increasing such communicative integration. In the next chapter I shall 
investigate the factors that are inhibiting the development of an ideal democratic 
polis, despite the apparently human and historical proclivity towards a more 
emancipatory democratic system constituted by reality seeking identities.   159 
Chapter Three: Applying Habermas and Arendt to 
Contemporary Democracy - The Emergence of Homo 
spectaculorum 
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter Habermas and Arendt’s theories on democracy 
are highly complementary. On the one hand, Habermas provides Arendt’s agonistic 
actor with a set of discursive conditions that are conducive to meaningful 
communication in a plural public. On the other hand, Arendt provides Habermas’s 
communicative actor with the agonistic motive for engaging in that dialogue. Indeed, 
it is even possible to synthesise the two theories so as to suggest that the increasing 
rationalisation of the lifeworld will encourage a greater emphasis on communicative 
forms of legitimacy in the political public space. In this chapter I shall investigate 
why natality in a rationalised lifeworld is not leading to a more critical political 
system. 
 
In order to understand why political systems are not becoming increasingly critical, I 
shall explore the implications of Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories when 
applied to the material conditions of existing post-industrial societies. The argument I 
intend to develop here is that the effect of the internal colonisation of the lifeworld on 
natality is such that a new subjectivity is produced - that of homo spectaculorum. This 
new mode of being undermines the emancipatory force of agonism which is the basis 
of a positive synthesis of Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories.  
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In the last chapter I alluded to the idea that natality and the human desire for reality 
might create the impetus for the proliferation of communicative action within plural 
political fora. What I intend to do in this chapter is outline why I believe this impetus 
is not developing. At the heart of this belief is the view that natality in a colonised 
lifeworld gives rise to a new subjectivity that is disposed to display and recognition 
within a common context, but is not reality seeking, nor in need of a consistent 
identity that can be told as a coherent story. This new form of being interacts (or 
rather, does not interact) with the remnants of the political public sphere of homo 
faber so that the critical deficit of contemporary democracies is exacerbated, at the 
same time as the emancipatory potential of agonism is undermined. 
 
The previous chapter outlined the way in which a democratic politics, and more 
directly a democratic ethos, was of principal importance to Habermas’s and Arendt’s 
projects of human emancipation. The point was made that, while Habermas makes an 
eloquent argument about the emancipatory potential inherent in the legitimacy of 
communicative action, he fails to articulate why people would want to engage in this 
process of democratic legitimation. Arendt, however, insists that the human need for 
meaning and display impels people to manifest publics for this purpose. My argument 
is that Arendt does not account for the effects of lifeworld colonisation and 
rationalisation upon the way that agonism expresses itself in the contemporary world. 
Thus the condition of a colonised lifeworld undermines the emancipatory potential of 
the reconciliation between the natural and real world that is implicit in natality and 
moments of founding. 
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Arendt’s assumption is that we seek to engage our agonism as publicly as possible 
because it is only in a plural public that we can find out who we truly are. This 
assumption is based upon Arendt’s understanding of the human condition, in which 
we are born into a natural and plural world that can never condition us absolutely 
(Arendt 1958: 11). Arendt’s argument is that the space between the self and the 
natural cyclical world provides an opportunity for humans to come to distinguish 
themselves through public action. In this chapter I argue that such a public space does 
not currently exist. I suggest that “public” space as such has completely disappeared 
and in its place we have a series of private spaces each simulating the purpose of 
public space. The loss of public space has changed the constitution of subjectivity to 
such a degree that it undermines the reconciliation between identity and reality that 
Arendt views as the foundation for optimism about the persistence of a democratic 
ethos. 
 
Whilst Habermas and Arendt try to avoid inserting their own consciousness into their 
projects of emancipation, each relies on the hope that there is an innate human 
predisposition to seek freedom and legitimacy. Habermas suggests that the positive 
possibilities of democracy are founded upon the persistence of reason. Arendt 
believes that democracy will always spring up wherever human expression is 
repressed. She also contends that natality, the act of new humans being born, 
introduces a biological “moment of founding”. Habermas argues that the interaction 
of identity with the lifeworld means that reason must always be generated by a set of 
unproblematic and shared convictions. In coming to reason, or reconciling identity 
with the public world, we are forced into a critical conversation in which one side of 
this conversation is informed by our humanity. It is the persistence of our humanity   162 
that provides the eternal hopes for redressing the problems caused by the systemic 
colonisation of the lifeworld or the occlusion of the political by the social. Hence, 
whilst the systemic, social forces which contort our reality are historically derived and 
contingent, our humanity – our need to make sense of our selves within a public 
context – remains constant and provides an unending source of emancipatory acts. In 
this light Habermas and Arendt can be presented as eternal optimists, believing that 
our human nature is the very source of our own emancipation. 
 
In this chapter I raise some contemporary objections to Habermas’s and Arendt’s faith 
in the “persistence of humanity” by suggesting that the lifeworld has come to be 
colonised to such an extent that reality and identity have lost their emphatic meaning. 
In a situation in which the reality encountered publicly is no more or less real than the 
various realities encountered privately, the idea of forming identity in the context of a 
real world becomes obsolete. Similarly, when reality and identity can be seen to be 
fluid, the attempt to legitimate systemic rationality through recourse to one’s lifeworld 
is undermined as an emancipatory act. Without identities needing to critically engage 
with the construction of reality, the innate human force of emancipation that Arendt 
and Habermas rely on is undermined somewhat. This chapter is an attempt, therefore, 
to outline the ways in which the pursuit of reason and identity has been undermined as 
an emancipatory force. 
 
In this chapter I suggest that the loss of plural public space has undermined the level 
of concern for the integrity of reality and then reflect upon the negative consequences 
of this shift for political action. Most importantly it has led to a situation in which 
identity remains important to people but the degree to which they wish to reconcile 
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their identity with “reality” is in dramatic decline. The chapter is intended to show 
that the meaningfulness and relevance of the grand narratives which project an 
authentic account of existence have passed simply because, at this point, 
reconciliation with reality is an unimaginable prospect. Instead, people are happy 
because they express themselves in “public” and they feel free because they are 
engaged in the construction of the “reality” in which they exist. The integrity of this 
“reality” might suffer and it may be subject to manipulation by those who control 
publicity, but the experience of self within this “virtual” reality can be gratifying. In 
this analysis, I extend Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories to analyse the ways in which 
discursive conventions are shaped in arenas of cultural reproduction and of the 
thorough appropriation of public space by private interests. Unfortunately these 
analyses lead to the conclusion that these conditions undermine the possibility of the 
emergence of a public of the sort that Arendt and Habermas idealise. 
 
In Part One I describe the effect of systemic colonisation of the lifeworld as being a 
change in the predominant social subjectivity: from homo faber to homo 
spectaculorum. First, I shall provide a brief description of how contemporary public 
realms differ from the modern public realms described in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere and The Human Condition. I shall then go on to 
argue that this change has resulted in the loss of the public sphere as described in 
these works. For, as Arendt argues in On Revolution, the existence of a repressive 
public authority gives rise to rebellious publics which cater to the repressed agonism 
and political expression of individuals. My argument rests upon the contention that, as 
the public realm became dominated by the instrumentalism of homo faber, people 
found the market to be that forum which allowed them to express their agonism in 
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identity defining ways. While this argument reflects Arendt’s description of the 
“occlusion of the political by the social”, a crucial difference concerns the way in 
which the individual’s sense of identity and reality can be taken to have altered 
following the loss of any plural and communicative public space. Another difference 
is that this change is construed in terms of Habermas’s arguments about the effects of 
the colonisation of the lifeworld. 
 
By analysing Habermas’s understanding of fragmented consciousness in light of 
theories about the effect of lifeworld rationalisation on subjectivity, it is possible to 
understand how the individual, as a sovereign and consistent being who acts as a 
coherent political unit, has become obsolete as a way of conceptualising political 
agency. I shall argue that this change in subjectivity does not undermine the 
motivational component of generating meaning through shared contexts, which 
continues to be exploited by private interests that usurp the role of public space. 
However, I argue that this usurpation of agonism prohibits the development of reality 
in a truly plural, and subsequently real, public realm. An analysis of the effects of 
agency and steering media in privately controlled public spaces reveals disturbing 
aspects of the current critical capacities of political action. As the rest of the chapter 
shall indicate, the political symptoms of a public realm dominated by homo 
spectaculorum are similar to those of a public realm dominated by homo faber. 
However, the elision of public identity forming contexts by private identity forming 
contexts seems to indicate that homo spectaculorum’s emergence undermines 
Arendt’s belief in the emancipatory potential of natality and moments of founding. 
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In Part Two of this chapter I highlight the features of spaces in contemporary liberal 
democratic societies that encourage the “public” practice of display. The new fora for 
agonistic expression within the colonised lifeworld are domains in which the purpose 
and functions of public space are appropriated by private interests in order to obtain 
public power. Several of these domains will be examined in order to identify how 
they manipulate their agonistic appeal and to detail the way they usurp what would 
otherwise be public interaction. 
 
In Part Three I shall return to the resulting poverty of the political public sphere as a 
space for political engagement, presenting existing political institutions as obsolete 
due to their lack of agonistic appeal. I shall argue that the systemic exploitation of 
agonism leads to a splintering of publics, a lack of care about the lifeworld, a lack of 
care about a public that is reconciled with reality, and a lack of the care needed in 
order to approach the ideal of communicative action. For these reasons we find 
ourselves with a lack of critical debate about political decisions. Because of this we 
find ourselves returning to the subject of Chapter One, the problem with modern 
democracies, but here we deal with the prevailing material conditions that allow us to 
identify the limits that have emerged for being, resistance and reason. 
  
In this chapter I argue that the need for democratic reform has become more pressing 
than ever due to the rise of homo spectaculorum. Despite quantum leaps in the 
sophistication and reach of communication technologies, contemporary political fora 
are increasingly irrelevant and unresponsive to the lives of ordinary citizens. 
Communicative spaces are shrinking, whilst strategic actors are ubiquitous in what 
pass as “public” spaces. There should be little surprise either that citizens are less 
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convinced than ever that there are ways in which political processes might improve 
their lot or that postmodern philosophy has itself become cynical. Whether or not this 
cynicism is justified, the resultant apathy concerning political action is undermining 
the credibility and legitimacy of liberal democratic systems. 
  
The claimed benefit of the liberal democratic model is that public processes do not 
intrude upon the world-making processes of individuals, which means that politics 
tends to be peaceful and unobtrusive. Precisely because political decisions are reduced 
to being a product of detached processes of purely functional decision making, 
politics is unlikely to be a source of agonistic engagement. By keeping the expression 
of self within the economic realm, the liberal model undermines the possibility of 
violence and places the burden of social integration upon systems regulated by money 
and power. As seen in the last two chapters, this arrangement is not without its faults, 
including the resultant critical deficit of our contemporary democratic systems. The 
point of this chapter is to present the liberal understanding of humans as innately 
reasonable, impermeable and self-defining individuals as obsolete and, therefore, as 
an inappropriate way to conceptualise sovereignty when envisaging a new democratic 
system. In this chapter I shall be making the argument that the basic liberal premise of 
individuality has been fundamentally undermined by the current material conditions 
of late-industrial capitalism.  
 
In this chapter I apply Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories to the material conditions of 
contemporary democracy. By synthesising Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories I 
highlight the ways in which the constituents of contemporary democracies differ 
substantially from the conception of individuals that liberal democracy is premised 
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upon. As a result of this synthesis I introduce a new genus into Arendt’s tripartite 
description of political actors - to animal laborans, homo faber and political actors I 
add homo spectaculorum. Following an exploration of this synthesis I examine the 
conditions of public space that give rise to such a genus and explore the political 
ramifications of the public dominance of homo spectaculorum. Through this 
exploration of the continuing applicability of Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic 
theories I am able to draw attention to the plight of the critical capacities of 
contemporary democracies. 
Part One: Introducing Homo spectaculorum 
The term homo spectaculorum is one I use here to refer to the rise of a new 
subjectivity that emerges following the occlusion of the political by the social and the 
colonisation of the lifeworld by the system. Homo spectaculorum develops the human 
needs to display and to find meaning through engagement in a competitive 
environment, but homo spectaculorum’s desire for reality is undermined by the 
fabricated mode of existence generated by the public realm of homo faber. Because of 
this homo spectaculorum is a subjectivity produced through natality in a lifeworld 
already colonised by systemic forces. Following a brief introduction as to how Arendt 
and Habermas’s theories can be understood to account for the emergence of this new 
subjectivity, I shall highlight how the change in subjectivity can be witnessed as a 
move from instrumental rationality to “the society of the spectacle”. I shall then go on 
to outline homo spectaculorum as a product of what Habermas describes as 
“fragmented consciousness” and as a result of the usurpation of what Arendt describes 
as the inherent plurality of the real world by non-plural private publics. Finally, I shall 
outline the subjectivity of homo spectaculorum as I did for animal laborans and homo   168 
faber in the first chapter - by identifying its activities, its instruments and its 
proclivities. By establishing a theoretical image of homo spectaculorum it is then 
possible to identify how homo spectaculorum is engaged in public spaces and how 
this  form of subjectivity interacts with contemporary liberal democratic systems of 
government. 
 
My development of the concept of homo spectaculorum - meaning human of the 
spectacle - was influenced by Guy Debord’s description of contemporary society as 
The Society of the Spectacle (Debord 1995)
75. Whilst Arendt’s description of the 
public realm of homo faber resembles what Herbert Marcuse has described as ‘One 
Dimensional Society’ (Marcuse 1964), the argument I shall develop here is that this 
understanding of a public realm dominated by instrumentality is no longer adequate 
for an understanding of contemporary society. Whereas Arendt believed that the 
pervasive instrumentality of the public realm would contribute to its downfall, insofar 
as it restricted the possibilities of human expression, Debord described a situation in 
which the emancipatory potential exacted through instrumentalist repression has been 
undermined by a society that indulges its citizens in more reflexively spectacular and 
display-validating ways. Debord and others have explained this development from 
instrumental publics to “publics” of display as a shift necessary for capitalism’s 
continued expansion. We can more fully understand this development, however, in 
terms of the Habermasian language of lifeworld colonisation and in Arendtian terms 
in the need for humans to find meaning through their agonistic expression. Simply 
put, the infiltration of the commodity into the lifeworld becomes so thorough and 
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unproblematic that the commodity replaces ideology as the individual’s very basis for 
meaning.  
 
It is my contention that Arendt’s understanding of the emancipatory potential of natal 
actors seeking reality is undermined by this colonisation of social life. When Arendt’s 
human subjects are born into this context and start to create meaning, the colonised 
lifeworld forms the basis of individuals’ shared and unproblematic convictions and 
systemic forces thus come to constitute the boundaries for individuals’ agonistic 
engagement. This engagement, however, is not purely thoughtful or communicative, 
as its “original position” of thought is already strategically defined by the “public” it 
is constituted in. Furthermore, unlike the public realm of homo faber, this public 
realm caters to display and expression - albeit display and expression within the 
contexts defined by those who control public space. This new condition, in which the 
public realm engages within a predefined context, displaces Arendt’s emancipatory 
force of action and replaces it with an activity she calls behaviour. This brings about a 
subjectivity that is neither animal laborans (defined by its exclusion from public 
appearance),  homo faber (defined through its fabrication within a public realm 
dominated by instrumental value), nor properly human (defined through expressive 
public action), but that of homo spectaculorum - humans defined through their 
participation in a manufactured spectacle. 
The Plight of Agonism  
Understanding agonism is integral to understanding the rise of homo spectaculorum. 
Arendt believes that the reason that individuals wish to critically invest themselves in 
reality is that reality is plural, and thus neither reality nor the individual can be   170 
conditioned absolutely. In a plural reality, therefore, the opportunity remains for the 
individual to affect reality, and influence it in such a way as to leave a lasting imprint 
of being. Because of its plurality, reality remains open to the influence of an 
individual. Although she somewhat ambiguously suggests that the social as a totality 
has undermined the reality of true publicity, it is clear that Arendt believes that reality 
is somehow irrepressible even given this occlusion. The uncritically constructed 
reality of instrumentalism still has a dialectic relationship with public reality because, 
Arendt believes, the plural reality of the natural world continually undermines the 
coherence of the instrumental public (Arendt 1958: 300-301).  What has changed 
following the colonisation of the lifeworld is a fundamental perversion of reality, a 
result of the world-alienation this entails. For homo spectaculorum displays a 
complete lack of concern for reality. Following the public ascension of “knowing”, 
critical public spaces are shut down. Following the elimination of critical public 
space, reality, in an Arendtian sense, is driven to extinction. With the loss of a forum 
that can be claimed to allow for a critical and plural reality the positive element of 
Arendt’s emancipatory agonism is lost. There is no public space that is plural in 
which being can reveal itself in a purely expressive way. Display becomes a form of 
behaviour, as opposed to an opportunity for expression. 
 
The distinction between agonism invested in action and agonism invested in 
behaviour is fundamental to understanding the passive elements of homo 
spectaculorum’s display, so with the help of the work of John Stuart Mill, Frederick 
Nietzsche and Michel Foucault I shall now detail the difference between display as 
expression and display as behaviour. 
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The need to distinguish between display as expression and display as behaviour 
reflects the need to understand the emancipatory potential of agonism. The agonistic 
drive serves as a fundamental component of the faith Arendt has in natality. She 
believes that in the process of founding humans will tend to invest themselves in 
public and they will tend to do so critically, actively seeking to declare and defend 
one’s privately formed ideals in a communicative way. For Arendt, the benefit of a 
coherent and constant identity is that it is consistently seen as the same in public and, 
as a result, this identity is in the most profound sense real. An expressive display of 
self is, therefore, a contribution to the plurality of public space. Such an identity must 
be generated through private reflection but seeks an ideal public in order to engage 
with the world in a way that validates the self in the most real (critical) and amicable 
(engaged) way possible. However, a passive display of self (one that evidences 
behaviour as opposed to expression) does nothing more than reinforce the non-plural 
and non-critical elements of public appearance. 
 
The persistence of a coherent and constant identity is fundamental to Arendt’s 
political thought, hence her motivation to describe the ideal polis as a way to express 
and celebrate this identity. She urges people to be proud of ‘that untaught and natural 
feeling of identity with whatever we happen to be by accident of birth’ (Arendt 
1959b: 179). This cherishing of identity is a result of her high regard for natality as a 
critical force and her assumption that we are all the same yet different, ‘that is, 
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, 
lives or will live’ (Arendt 1958: 8). She believed, following Heidegger, that being has 
an urge to disclose itself; hence a “good” life is one that can be told as a consistent, 
inspirational narrative (Arendt 1973: 105). Such a life would bring forth the 
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uniqueness of one’s identity most emphatically in public space, and subsequently the 
ideal polis, with its critical and aesthetic functions, would gratify this urge in the most 
socially advantageous way.  
 
Arendt’s faith in a human urge to disclose their unique selves probably stems from her 
personal conviction that ‘a philosophy of life that does not arrive, as did Nietzsche, at 
the affirmation of “eternal recurrence” as the highest principle of all being, simply 
does not know what it is talking about’(Arendt 1958: 97)
76. Arendt passionately 
affirms the individual as that means by which we avoid the pitfalls of knowing and 
maintain the emancipatory moments of natality, critical engagement and founding. In 
the world of homo spectaculorum, however, public space has been completely 
occluded by private space. This means that, when we examine the role of public 
space, we find that expressive forms of display are shunned, excluded and defined as 
incommensurable. Instead we find the proliferation of display as behaviour, as an 
indication of allegiance and a way of establishing the reality of what is already 
known. 
 
This kind of display as behaviour has been more thoroughly explored in the political 
theories of John Stuart Mill and Frederick Nietzsche. Each of these theorists identifies 
a human tendency to accept and rely upon a non-critical reception of the reality of the 
world as it is.  In the tendency towards a passive reception of reality and the human 
predilection towards ressentiment, Mill and Nietzsche enable insight into the way in 
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which  homo spectaculorum seeks to find meaning following the loss of Arendt’s 
idealised critical public sphere. 
 
Like Arendt, John Stuart Mill argues that critical thought must in some sense be 
inspired by public life. In his principal work, On Liberty, he makes an eloquent 
argument for the necessity for individuals’ critical involvement in public decision-
making, arguing that such an involvement is beneficial for both the individual and the 
society in which the individual moves (Mill 1991). He argues that this critical 
involvement must be nurtured and encouraged through the public use of reason 
because without such a public individuals are naturally inclined to reject their own 
critical voices in favour of those of other people and because there is a fatal tendency 
on the parts of members of a society to stop thinking about things as soon as they 
become commonly accepted (Mill 1991: 49). As pointed out by Dana Villa, Mill 
made the point that  
we don’t merely accept this condition but we will it with our hearts and souls. Our acceptance 
of what is ‘unquestionable’ for our class, culture, or age, provides us with the orientation and 
support we yearn for in an otherwise contingent and disturbingly pluralistic world. (Villa 
2001: 80) 
We seek to orient our lives around something, and the more pervasive this reality is 
the more comfortable we are with our identity and security. We are “encumbered 
selves” in the sense that we cannot imagine ourselves as ourselves without some 
“unquestionable orientations”
77. In On Liberty Mill develops an elegant argument 
against the social tendency to know, outlining why such unquestionable orientations 
are dangerous for both society and the individual. Whilst Mill’s understanding of the 
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social benefits of individuality varies from that of Arendt
78, he expresses very similar 
ideas to Arendt insofar as he advocates a public space that encourages individuals to 
have critical access to their world as an essential part of the good life. Without such a 
space, he argues, there is a prolific tendency to know, rather than to think.  
 
Frederick Nietzsche also argues that the likelihood is greatest that people will 
embrace common values in lieu of critical engagement in both philosophy and in 
society in general. ‘Madness’, he famously declared, ‘is rare in individuals – but in 
groups, parties, nations, and ages it is the rule’ (Nietzsche 1986: aphorism 156). As 
Villa points out, Nietzsche contends that the collective need for obedience to authority 
has stunted our appreciation of our own moral and critical capacities (Villa 2001: 
134). Furthermore, Nietzsche argues that the “death of god”, which should have 
resulted in an increase in critical engagement, has led instead to the appropriation of 
weaker idols (Goodchild 1996: 22). The need for “orientation” is so pressing that it 
cannot be abandoned, it is forever assumed. In the place of an expressive and critical 
formulation of reality, Nietzsche identifies a process of increasing ressentiment: 
a ressentiment experienced by creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of 
action are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary vengeance. While every noble 
morality springs from a triumphant affirmation of its own demands, the slave morality says 
"no" from the very outset to what is "outside itself," "different from itself," and "not itself"; 
and this "no" is its creative deed. The volte face of the valuing standpoint—this inevitable 
gravitation to the objective instead of back to the subjective—is typical of ressentiment. 
(Nietzsche 1956: 170) 
In place of the critical and creative possibilities of individuality, Nietzsche perceives a 
devotion to a herd mentality brought about by the need for a common, and, in his 
view, base world in which people can display
79. Such a slave mentality can be seen in 
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humanity’s “flight” from its own senses and will to the comforting reality of material 
and knowledge. It can also be seen in the predilection that people have towards fear as 
opposed to self affirmation. Simply, Nietzsche argues that there is an inherent human 
weakness that leads one to locate self within an externally created context rather than 
to affirm a unique identity  
 
Hence we can see that while Mill and Nietzsche identify the need for recognition and 
display, both argue that for most people this engagement tends to be display as 
behaviour according to externally defined parameters and not as a critical and 
expressive display of self. As discussed in the first chapter, Arendt describes a 
propensity to know, rather than think, particularly where there is no public space 
conducive to thought. Arendt’s belief that agonism is an emancipatory force reflects 
her faith that humans are reality seeking individuals that tend towards a critical 
engagement with reality as opposed to the passive reception of reality which is 
expressed in display as behaviour. Arendt herself argues that critical engagement with 
the world is the exception rather than the rule (Arendt 1958: 108).  
 
Crucially, this does not undermine an individual’s desire to excel within the context of 
a commonly shared world (Arendt 1990: 119).  Indeed, as Nietzsche argued, the 
failure to have a real forum to act induces a mental predisposition to will such a forum 
and imagine one where it does not truly exist. People ‘deprived of the direct outlet of 
action, compensate by an imaginary vengeance’ (Nietzsche 1956: 170).  As one finds 
oneself more isolated in the world there is a tendency to grasp onto one’s illusions 
with greater ferocity.  
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The desire to display is, therefore, both the chief virtue and vice of humanity (Arendt 
1990: 119). As a virtue it engages with reality and inserts the plurality of a private self 
into that reality in a way that generates thought, action and distinction. As a vice it 
constitutes a form of behaviour that conforms to passively accepted contexts of 
meaning established prior to action. Michel Foucault is one theorist who, like Arendt, 
identifies the endless subjective plurality of the world as an opportunity for an 
expression of self. ‘From the ideal that the self is not given to us, I think there is only 
one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as works of art’ (Foucault 
1983: 237). Certainly, homines spectaculorum seek to develop their identities in such 
ways as to appear functional, desirable and spectacular, but insofar as the parameters 
of function, desirability and the spectacle are established prior to their engagement 
and yet still inform their action, the art they create is derivative rather than originating 
in the actor. 
Fragmented Publics, Fragmented Individuals 
In Arendtian terms, the loss of a plural public undermines the impetus for the 
expressive public action of individuals. This development can also be understood as a 
result of the internal colonisation of the lifeworld following the loss of a reality 
defining public.  It is my contention that the emergence of homo spectaculorum is a 
consequence of the change in reality that resulted from the process that Habermas 
identifies as the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system. That is to say, the 
Arendtian/Habermasian conception of the pursuit of a coherent life story as a source 
of communicative integration is undermined by the fragmented subjectivity of homo 
spectaculorum. I believe that the private usurpation of agonism was not fully 
anticipated by Arendt. Nonetheless, it must be understood as a symptom of what   177 
happens to personal existence and reality following the rise of instrumental 
rationalism and the decoupling of the system from the lifeworld. Habermas and 
Arendt see the rise of the social and the refeudalisation of the public sphere as the 
endpoint of their analysis. In this chapter these moments will be viewed as the 
beginning of an examination of the ways in which the privatisation of “public” space 
affects the emancipatory potentials of contemporary democracy. 
The Loss of a Plural Public: Homo Faber’s Abstraction from Reality 
As described in the first chapter, Arendt believes that homo faber’s obsession with 
instrumentality contributes to an impoverished public existence. In a public realm 
dominated by the values of homo faber we find a society obsessed with 
rationalisation, where utility is the equivalent of meaningfulness and human purpose 
is equated to production. Herbert Marcuse identifies this type of instrumentalist 
repression in his work One Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964). The chief 
characteristic of one-dimensional subjectivity is: 
the repression of all values, aspirations, and ideas which cannot be defined in terms of the 
operations and attitudes validated by the prevailing forms of rationality. The consequence is 
the weakening and even the disappearance of all genuinely radical critique, the integration of 
all opposition in the established condition. 
80 
Like Arendt, Marcuse criticises the thoughtlessness of a public realm dominated by 
instrumental rationality. Marcuse also makes the Arendtian argument that, in coming 
to dominate the public realm, instrumental rationality has concurrently come to 
generate its own reason and reality. What was public, or rather what could be publicly 
acknowledged, was regarded through a single instrumental rationality. This signifies 
the ‘absorption of ideology into reality’ such that the ideology of instrumentality 
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comes to define reality (Marcuse 1964: 11). Under the public dominance of homo 
faber instrumentality comes to represent that public’s “communistic fiction” or 
“invisible hand” that provides universal values and aspiration for citizens and in doing 
so marginalises all other forms of criticism (Arendt 1958: 44-45). 
 
In contrast, Arendt’s human and worldly publics are open to plurality and inherently 
multi-dimensional because: 
the conditions of human existence - life itself, natality and morality, worldliness, plurality, and 
the earth - can never ‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who we are for the 
simple reason that they never condition us absolutely. (Arendt 1958: 11) 
Marcuse indicates, however, that following the ascension of instrumental reason to 
the role of definer of publicity, reason comes to constitute reality, and thereby 
presents the possibility that we may be conditioned absolutely. Arendt recognises that 
the consciousness of homo faber dominates the modern public realm, and that this 
consciousness was the first to generate reality from the Archimedean point, beyond 
the earth and beyond the plurality of human existence (Arendt 1958: 11). Marcuse 
aptly describes the myopia produced by this situation in its nascent state - 
instrumentalism and engagement through material reality was the ideology that came 
to dominate the public realm, and as a result of its own inherent means-ends 
tendencies, to recreate society based upon an abstraction. One dimensional society, 
therefore, signals the emergence of reality as an abstract totality.  
 
Whereas Marcuse and Arendt are concerned with the public dominance of a particular 
form of reason, Habermas’s theoretical progression displays an increasing 
preoccupation with the loss of public ideology altogether. Marcuse is in agreement 
with Arendt on this particular point: instrumentality was the first step in   179 
rationalisation that detached public meaning from its determination in public. 
According to Arendt, this was a fundamental shift, as prior to the rise of 
instrumentality, reality had been determined as a result of plural, real, consistent 
identities agreeing on something. According to Marcuse the rise of instrumentality 
represented the dominance of single (instrumental) rationality over the public sphere. 
Habermas, however, described this conception as obsolete. He suggests that rather 
than a single public sphere and a single ideology that eventually would conflict with 
the limited productive imperatives of the lifeworld, contemporary society has 
developed a ‘functional equivalent to ideology formation’ that avoids the productive 
constraints generated by consistency of being (Habermas 1987b: 355). The use of the 
term “functional” implies the instrumental origins that underpin the development of 
homo spectaculorum; the use of the term “equivalent”, however, clearly implies that 
this is no longer an ideology in itself. In this formulation society has undermined its 
own rational and ideological foundations in order to remain productive. 
Habermas and the Fragmentation of Consciousness 
Habermas, therefore, provides us with a reasonable explanation for why private 
spaces have proliferated as meaning givers, while larger ideological “publics” seem to 
be in decline. Habermas believes that such a change began with the linguistification of 
the sacred, which in turn led to a compelling incredulity towards all traditional forms 
of legitimation. Whilst he is very rarely credited with having postmodern insights, his 
criticism of the subsequent fate of consciousness is an excellent introduction to the 
rise of the new subjectivity of homo spectaculorum. Furthermore, if we understand 
the “linguistification of the sacred” to refer to the process of pervasive rationalisation 
that Arendt believes is the consequence of the philosophical ascension of 
instrumentality, it is possible to identify how the public dominance of homo faber   180 
initially undermines the human subjectivity and then reasserts a spectacular 
subjectivity in its place. 
 
In a chapter of Communicative Action entitled ‘Linguistification of the Sacred’, 
Habermas describes a process of rationalisation whereby the effort to rationally 
understand myths leads to their deconstruction and incredulity with respect to their 
legitimacy. What he refers to as “linguistification” is an abandonment of traditional 
structures of legitimation for rationalised structures of legitimation. As seen in the 
second chapter, these new forms of legitimacy came to undermine and usurp the 
coherence of preceding forms of legitimacy and led to the differentiation between 
system and lifeworld. One outcome of this development is that individuals themselves 
become fragmented: 
To the degree that the Protestant ethic of the calling ceased to place its stamp on the private 
conduct of life, the methodical-rational way in which bourgeois strata led their lives was 
displaced by the utilitarian life-style of ‘specialists without spirit’ and the aesthetic-hedonistic 
life-style of ‘sensualists without heart’, that is, by two complementary ways of life that soon 
became mass phenomena. The two life-styles can be strikingly represented by different 
personality types, but they can also take hold of the same person. With this fragmentation of 
the person, individuals lose their ability to give their life histories a certain degree of 
consistent direction. (Habermas 1987b: 323) [my italics]  
The loss of meaning, in this instance the Protestant ethic of the calling, is profound in 
that it undermines the value of a consistent identity
81. Without a coherent and 
meaningful ideology around which to orient themselves, individuals seek meaning 
through various arenas of engagement. This represents the shift from instrumentality 
to spectacle. Instrumentality retains an orientation towards overall productivity by 
making productivity the source of all meaning. The spectacle maximises productivity 
by initially removing all universal meaningful orientations
82, and then caters to the 
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unrequited need for meaning in a way that indulges the human proclivity to display 
within a series of privately controlled “public” spaces. 
 
According to Habermas, therefore, the loss of a consistent public space does not 
undermine the need for the meaning and context providing faculties of public space. 
However, he argues that the drive for meaning providing contexts is distorted and 
channelled into fragments in order to avoid the conflict between lifeworld and system 
that a consistent identity might demand. This process was described in the previous 
chapter as the rationalisation of the lifeworld. 
If… the rationalized lifeworld more and more loses its structural possibilities for ideology 
formation, if the facts speak for an instrumentalizing of the lifeworld can hardly be interpreted 
away any longer and ousted from the horizon of the lifeworld, one would expect that the 
competition between forms of social and system integration would openly come to the fore. 
But the late capitalist societies fitting the description of ‘welfare-state pacification’ do not 
confirm this conjecture. They have evidently found some functional equivalent for ideology 
formation. In place of the positive task of meeting a certain need for interpretation by 
ideological means, we have the negative requirement of preventing holistic interpretations 
from coming into existence… Everyday consciousness is robbed of its power to synthesise, it 
becomes fragmented. (Habermas 1987b: 354-355) 
Here Habermas presents the profound idea that the reason that late-capitalist systems 
are able to avoid cataclysmic change is because of a change in the conditions of 
individual subjectivity. ‘In place of “false consciousness” we today have “fragmented 
consciousness” that blocks enlightenment by the mechanism of reification’ 
(Habermas 1987b: 355). Put simply, we are no longer taught to expect coherent public 
reason, but to expect subjective private satisfaction. As a result we resile from 
questioning the legitimacy of our interaction with the world and instead seek to 
approach the world as a source of sensation. 
The Emergence of the Spectacle 
Critical theorist Guy Debord is one writer who sensed this change in the role and 
function of public space. Writing just three years after the publication of One   182 
Dimensional Man, Debord argues that while instrumental reason may have been the 
bane of modern existence, contemporary problems stem from the subsequent 
usurpation of reason as a totality and the rise of the society of the spectacle (Debord 
1995). According to this analysis, it seems as though, according to typical postmodern 
irony, instrumental rationality itself has outlived its usefulness. Following on from the 
insights of Debord, Antonio Negri and Micheal Hardt suggest that the capitalist 
system relies upon the continual reinvention and abstraction of “reality”; the spectacle 
becomes a necessary preoccupation of the capitalist system. The system operates not 
by attempting to make everyone the same but by celebrating diversity. It ‘recognizes 
existing or potential differences, celebrates them, and manages them within a general 
economy of command’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 210). In Habermasian terms, those in 
control of steering media are able to strategically stimulate production and 
consumption beyond the natural imperatives of the lifeworld through this control.   
Debord argues that those in control of the steering media are tampering with reality 
through their ownership and control of public space. They are encompassing 
individuals in a space that gives them a sense of meaning and purpose in order to keep 
them productive and consumptive despite the lack of a meaningful reason for doing 
so.  
 
In The Society of the Spectacle Debord suggests that we are living in a reality in 
which ideology formation and reformation is integral to the continued survival of the 
capitalist system
83. As opposed to the cause of repression identified in One 
Dimensional Man, no “rationality” is allowed to dominate the public realm, as 
rationality, even instrumental rationality, has lost its use value. 
                                                 
83 A similar thesis was developed by Jean Baudrillard in (Baudrillard, 1994) 
Comment [TH15]: Clearly, 
instrumental rationality could be 
used to generate liberation, as 
Marcuse project intended, 
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The spectacle corresponds to the historical moment at which the commodity completes its 
colonisation of social life. It is not just that the relationship to commodities is now plain to see 
– commodities are now all that there is to see; the world we see is the world of the 
commodity. (Debord 1995: 29) 
Debord contends that the project of advanced capitalism is to ‘restructure society 
without community’ (Debord 1995: 137) so that a society of fragmented 
consciousnesses can be manipulated infinitely without challenge from the lifeworld. 
Where Debord deviates from Marcuse is to suggest that following this rationalisation, 
it becomes necessary for capital to invent new ways of developing a consumptive 
consciousness. From an Arendtian/Habermasian perspective, the degree to which our 
agonism is entertained without really being engaged reflects the degree of systemic 
corruption of the lifeworld or the occlusion of the political. In Marxist terms this is the 
condition of “total subsumption” through which social relations are derived primarily 
from the machinations of capital rather than encounters with reason or reality (Negri 
1989). 
 
In Arendtian terms, following the decline of public reality, a “public void” exists and 
the human desire for meaning creating contexts remains to be filled. In this situation, 
as Habermas and Arendt suggest through their analysis of the communicative 
composition of power, real political power is wielded by those who colonise the 
lifeworld. When homines spectaculorum come to asking the question “why?” the 
market is the only form of public space through which they can seek to provide an 
answer. Coke stands for freedom. Virgin stands for “power for the people”. Ideas 
have become commodified and the strategic goal of the market is limited to its own 
expansion. Even democracies, which were created to allow a full discussion of a 
political proposition, are now subject to the direction of a market that is anchored by 
concepts rather than material goods.    184 
 
Hence we can see that with the emergence of homo spectaculorum, the market 
proliferates as a meaning provider because it has most adequately and enthusiastically 
catered to the agonism of consumers by distancing them from reality and providing 
them with a spectacle in its place. By adjusting to the fragmented human imperatives 
of desire-satisfaction and emotional fulfilment the private public realms of the market 
have become far more engaging for homo spectaculorum, who nonetheless never 
encounters “reality”, in the Arendtian sense of the term, or what Habermas would 
consider a lifeworld of fundamental integrity. 
Defining Homo spectaculorum 
Having outlined the conditions that have led to the emergence of the subjectivity of 
homo spectaculorum, I shall now define homines spectaculorum in terms of their 
activity, their instruments and their relationship to the means of production. This is 
the first step in identifying the subjectivity of homo spectaculorum in the world and, 
consequently, in understanding the effect this subjectivity has on contemporary 
democracies. 
The Activity of Homo spectaculorum: Display as Behaviour 
Animal laborans labours, homo faber works, humans act and homo spectaculorum 
displays. The activity of display, being transient, subjective and requiring an audience 
to be meaningful appears to have more in common with Arendt’s idealisation of 
action than work or labour. There is an important distinction to be made, however, 
between display as expression and display as behaviour. The former, lauded by 
Arendt, involves an investment of self that is unique and is an earnest attempt to 
identify that uniqueness in the world. The latter involves an aspiration to be measured   185 
according to the standards of behaviour prescribed by someone else. As in the 
distinction between thinking and knowing, the former involves personal, private 
introspection; the latter involves conforming to a pattern that is established prior to 
the action situation.  
 
Homo spectaculorum can be defined, therefore, as a subjectivity that seeks to display 
identity but not in a way that critically engages with a truly plural public realm. Thus 
homo spectaculorum shares with homo faber an engagement with a facile reality and 
shares with animal laborans the inability to contribute to publicity (or reality) in any 
meaningful way. In order to explain this, I shall initially describe the futility of homo 
spectaculorum’s agonistic engagement in these terms before going on to illustrate 
some of the defining features of the private/public existence of homo spectaculorum. 
 
Animal laborans, whose activity is invested in labour, always engage their agonism in 
fora designed to appease agonism without actually contributing to public space in an 
enduring way. As mentioned in the first chapter, Arendt argues that the activity of 
labour leaves no public manifestation. As a result, animal laborans engages in 
agonism outside of work through hobbies and sports. Animal laborans’ agonism 
while at work is expressed through transitory contributions to their immediate 
environment – such as the traditions of labourers who have sung while working. 
Outside of employment animal laborans’ urge to display is engaged through 
expressive activities such as brass bands and involvement in sporting organisations. 
Here  animal laborans encounters visceral realms of appearance constructed 
purposefully in order to make engagement immediate and self  validating. Those 
whose daily activity is labour seek outlets everywhere through which to express 
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themselves through action, not because their labour reflects their personal 
contribution to the public realm, but because their labour does not do so. Homo 
spectaculorum shares with animal laborans the experience of being personally 
engaged, despite the fact that this engagement has no truly public manifestation. 
 
Unlike animal laborans, the work of homo faber manifests a public product, and 
therefore homo faber is far more likely to engage in work in an agonistic way. It is 
because of the tangible material qualities of the output of work, and its association 
with its creator, that work is so gratifying. The agonistic urges of workers, therefore, 
are much easier to engage in pursuit of preconceived ends. Indeed, clever employers 
learn how to extract and use this agonism in order to increase production by making 
the private space of work appear as the public space of reality
84. Those who excel at 
fabrication usually do so because they invest all their desire to display in the carefully 
constructed “public” of their workplace, rather than in anything approaching a real 
public. This engagement with agonism in the workplace is a reality constituting 
activity; in Habermasian language, the systemic rationality becomes the rationality of 
the lifeworld, and the result is homo faber, who is devoted to the pursuit of an end 
without ever thinking publicly about that end. The investment of agonism in 
essentially privately designed spaces is also emblematic of homo spectaculorum. 
 
Hence we find that the subjectivity of homo spectaculorum shares characteristics of 
homo faber and animal laborans. Despite the fact that homo spectaculorum shares 
with homo faber an obsession with production and fabrication, homo spectaculorum is 
                                                 
84 One of the interesting discoveries made during my research was how contemporary management 
techniques make use of the conventions of communicative action in order to endorse the strategic goals 
of the management team. By reconciling the employee with the “reason” behind the company ethos, 
action can be coordinated with less recourse to steering media such as money and power.   187 
more like animal laborans insofar as it neither produces or enjoys a public realm. The 
dominance of instrumental rationality - its commonality induced through the 
functionality of centralised production - generated a public realm, albeit a fatally 
uncritical one. Homo spectaculorum, like animal laborans, has no recourse to any 
truly public realm. Rather homo spectaculorum is manifested in and entertained by a 
series of private realms, each usurping the role of public meaning provider, but none 
forming a real plural or coherent public. While these private publics do provide a 
meaning and identity providing context for the individual, like the old public realm of 
homo faber, insofar as they do not invest this “public spirit” publicly, but rather 
exploit this spirit privately or strategically, they are not truly critical public realms of 
the type that Arendt and Habermas idealise. 
 
Thus we find that while agonism is a constant, each avenue of agonistic expression is 
usurped and appropriated by the private “public” institutions of homo spectaculorum. 
It is the loss of a public realm as a forum for critical, expressive action that has led to 
the creation of other “publics” (be they private, corporate or social) that do cater to the 
agonistic drives of the individuals who constitute them. As Mill’s and Nietzsche’s 
theories suggest, agonism need not be critical. In fact there seems to be a tendency for 
world reception to be passive. Arendt argues that this is why we need worthy public 
spaces to inspire critical agonism. Critical agonism leads to ruptures and innovations 
that further human interests, non-critical agonism keeps human beings passive and 
isolated and yet productive. 
The Instruments of Homo spectaculorum 
If the telescope is the object that redefined reality in terms of instrumentality, the 
screen is the object that redefines reality in terms of the spectacle. Both the telescope   188 
and screen offer the opportunity to engage reality according to a perspective external 
to the innate human senses and each seeks to present this perspective as real. 
Similarly, the flatness of the screen reflects the limited dimensionality of the 
perspective provided by the telescope. Both serve the role of meaning givers, despite 
the fact that both the telescope and the screen actually serve to occlude the reality that 
otherwise would be determined through critical and plural communication. 
 
Where the telescope and the screen differ is in the effect that they have on public 
space. For Arendt, the telescope offers a universal perspective that can be established 
as public reality. It’s “objectivity” becomes pervasive, and thus marginalises critical 
perspectives by undermining the plurality provided by subjectivity. The screen, on the 
other hand, displays a projection of reality with a view to occluding public space 
altogether. The screen itself is two-dimensional, limited to displaying what is 
projected upon it. What appears on that screen is for the producer to make, and, 
nominally, up to the viewer to choose. Through their choices as to what is displayed 
on the screen, reality can be tailored to suit the needs of individuals. The screen itself 
is not gratifying, but what is presented on it generally is placating, sympathetic and 
panders to an enlarged sense of the viewer’s importance. The individual, therefore, 
comes to feel as though it is through their personal choice that they are a participant in 
the construction of reality, thus satiating their need for display without the associated 
“difficulties” of truly public revelation or personal expression. 
 
The telescope presents the instrument as the purveyor of reality. The instrument’s 
objectivity is what gives it its status of public truth. The screen presents the spectacle 
as the purveyor of reality. The role of the screen is not to present a singular pervasive   189 
truth, but to prevent the observer from looking into the space behind the screen and 
finding a more compelling natural and plural reality there. Screens, televisions, 
computers, billboards, borders: all serve to inhibit our ability to see the world as it 
really is and advance our ability to see the world as the screen controller wants us to. 
This is emblematic of homo spectaculorum, who, deprived of any contact with reality 
as such, is ever more eager to engage and display within a mediatised reality that is 
particularly responsive to their choices. 
The Productive Activity of Homo spectaculorum 
The emergence of homo spectaculorum has seen a shift in the focus of production 
from creating products to creating meaning. The outcomes of Naomi Klein’s research 
in No Logo (Klein 2000) were predicted by Gilles Deleuze’s theoretical insight in his 
meditation ‘On Societies of Control’ (Deleuze 1992). Deleuze had suggested that the 
capitalist system was no longer involved in production, but had moved on to 
marketing the product – ‘the factory has given way to the corporation’ and ‘marketing 
has become the centre or the “soul” of the corporation’. Meanwhile, ‘We are taught 
that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world’ 
(Deleuze 1992: 6). Those in control of capital understand that meaning can be 
associated with products and consumption in order to stimulate the growth of 
production. By continually shifting identity markers and playing with reality, capital 
can continue to appropriate the productive drive of agonism. This is the world of 
consumerism, which can be seen as a direct outgrowth of the material orientation of 
the public realm dominated by homo faber (Giddens 1994: 169). In one sense the 
meaning provided by corporations fulfils the lack of public meaning generated 
through the public realm of homo faber; in another sense the common use of   190 
marketing to create meaning prevents the possibility that meaning will be found in a 
real and plural public. 
 
The notion that capitalism operates by continually redrawing the boundaries of social 
existence has been around since Marx suggested that ‘a precondition of production 
based on capital is…the production of a constantly widening sphere of circulation, 
whether the sphere itself is directly expanded or whether more points within it are 
created as points of production’ (Marx 1973a: 407). Following the expansion of 
capitalist production to the world market, the only scope for further expansion is in 
the reconfiguration of existing flows of desire and the conjuring of new ones. This 
reconfiguration necessitates the reconfiguration of forms of control; thus we find that 
the disciplinary control of homo faber, whose main feature is the dominance of a 
certain form of instrumental rationality for productive ends, is superseded by the 
spatial control of homo spectaculorum, characterised by the attempt to exploit and 
reconfigure meaning providing spaces in order to foster continual re-production and 
growth. 
 
The new role of production is reflected in the new tools of production. Digital 
technologies are for the corporation what machinery is for the factory: the basic 
technological instrument of production. Yet the fact that digital technologies do not 
manufacture in the same manner as industrial machinery speaks volumes for the 
difference between the productive activity of homo faber and homo spectaculorum. 
As Jameson pointed out, machines of the digital ensemble are tools of reproduction, 
rather than production (Jameson 1991: 37). As seen in the rise of branding and the 
development of a hyper-real economy, machines of the new economy are engaged in 
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‘the action of knowledge upon knowledge itself as the main source of productivity’ 
(Castells 1996: 16-17).  Production itself has lost its value and, as Deleuze 
proclaimed, has been farmed out to the less capital intensive areas of the global 
capitalist system to be coordinated at a distance (Deleuze 1992)
85. The crucial role 
that digital technologies play is the role of reproduction, that of processing 
information, mining the lifeworld for meaning to harness the exploitable flows of 
desire. This is not to say that land and capital do not play a role in the distribution of 
steering media, just that the creation of the spectacle is increasingly based upon the 
production and control of information
86. 
 
What has changed is not simply the product, but the means of production and, 
importantly, the relationship of the worker to the means of production. The machines 
of the digital ensemble are far more responsive to the isolated world of the 
contemporary worker than the factory and machines of production ever were to the 
workers of the classic industrial era. The mainstay of the digital economy is the 
personal computer, whose screen not only tends to isolate the individual from any sort 
of productive chain but also indulges the expressive capacities of the user by allowing 
for the personalisation of the work environment. The machines themselves are 
adjustable to personal tastes, from hardware that enables certain processes, to desktop 
settings that alter the aesthetic appearance of the “workstation”.  
 
But desktop computers represent only the thin end of the wedge as far as digital 
technology is concerned. Laptops, electronic personal assistants and mobile phones 
                                                 
85 This fluidity of capital is enabled by the rise of digital tehnologies, as explored in (Luke 1998: 137). 
86 The notion has been developed by (Beniger 1986: ; Toffler 1990) and (Lyotard 1984) amongst 
others. 
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represent a new set of tools of production that in combination ensure that the personal 
life of the individual remains functional regardless of what space they inhabit. In a 
very practical sense advances in information and communication technologies allow 
the user to always have access to a screen. The producers and distributors of these 
technologies claim that they challenge the notion that labour has to be alienating, at 
the same time changing the relationship of the worker to the means of production 
from antagonism to integration. This change reflects the shift from homo faber, a 
subjectivity confined by its instrumental sense of meaning, to homo spectaculorum, a 
subjectivity confined through a choice of illusions, all of which occlude the real.  
A Comment on Acting 
The role of acting in the society of homo spectaculorum provides a perfect example 
with which to illustrate the ways in which the private publics of homo spectaculorum 
differ from those of homo faber and Arendt’s idealised Greek public. Individuals 
whose work involves a major contribution to spectacular space get to express their 
agonism in a very spectacular way. That is to say the position of public actor becomes 
fetishised in the world of homo spectaculorum. Actors, who get to display publicly on 
the reality occluding and defining screens, are the idols of homo spectaculorum. But 
these are not the same actors that Arendt lauded. Under the conditions of late-
industrial capitalism, we find those professions that are oriented toward acting are 
being stripped of the acting individual’s personally expressive faculties. Life becomes 
scripted display, homines spectaculorum, like typical movie actors, use their 
rhetorical skills to display themselves as a character someone else has designed for 
them. Thus, politicians, elected to opine, critique and express, find that when they 
assume their positions of power they are asked to work to systemically generated   193 
scripts, rather than act and express. The crucial point is that the role and purpose of 
action are defined and scripted prior to the action situation. 
 
The fact that, as “actors”, homines spectaculorum do not display a unique, real and 
consistent identity does not undermine their worthiness for acclaim in the society of 
homo spectaculorum. The fact that they act, that they get to be seen, is enough to 
render them idols
87. This description of the role and status of actors brings us to a fine 
distinction that differentiates the instrumental and spectacular societies. Writing in 
1958 Arendt saw that: 
the position of action and speech in modern societies is implied when Adam Smith classifies 
all occupations which rest essentially on performance – such as the military profession, 
‘churchmen, lawyers, physicians and opera singers’ together with ‘menial services’. The 
lowest and most unproductive ‘labour’- It was precisely these occupations – healing, flute 
playing, play-acting – which furnished ancient thinking with examples for the highest and 
greatest activities of man. (Arendt 1958: 207) 
Here we see a marked difference from the position of action and speech in the society 
of homo spectaculorum. In contemporary society those occupations that rely upon 
performance - “churchmen, lawyers, physicians and opera singers” along with screen 
actors, sport stars, art producers, politicians - are among the most celebrated and well 
renumerated. Adam Smith understood that the end point of instrumentality is that all 
public value should be determined by its contribution to production. What has 
changed since then is that the very act of being public has become the rarest (and 
subsequently, the most valuable) commodity in the society of homo spectaculorum. 
Because screens everywhere obscure homo spectaculorum’s reality, what appears on 
those screens automatically becomes reality defining. Screen actors, who are seen 
more often by more people, therefore, receive the highest acclaim in the society of 
                                                 
87 Although there is little chance of immortality for homo spectaculorum - the acclaim of the spectacle 
is, by its very nature, transient.   194 
homo spectaculorum, despite the fact they produce nothing of material value. This 
may be seen as a move toward an agonistic public, however such actors expression is 
severely limited by their strategic environment. 
Homo spectaculorum and the Society of the Spectacle 
The preoccupation of the agonistic drive of homo spectaculorum within private and 
strategically arranged contexts is the condition of existence of the society of homo 
spectaculorum. While the public realm of homo faber is uncritical because it presents 
reason as a totality that is beyond criticism, the “public” realm of homo 
spectaculorum is uncritical because it occludes real publicity altogether. Whilst homo 
faber instrumentally defines reality, homo spectaculorum engages with private display 
in order to prevent a truly public reality from appearing at all. Habermas, through his 
depiction of the fragmentation of consciousness, identifies that this is a means for 
keeping individuals productive. As discussed earlier, after the dominance of 
instrumentality had served its purpose by stimulating production to eliminate want, 
capital had to come up with new ways to generate wants and continue to stimulate 
production. Instrumentalism may have been exhausted in this context, but the 
instrumental dominance of the public realm meant that unfulfilled agonism was a 
readily exploitable way to generate further production and consumption. 
 
It is by controlling the public, by infiltrating the lifeworld in which agonism may be 
strategically manipulated, that those with performative roles essentially function as 
the channels of cultural transmission that facilitate this colonisation of the lifeworld. 
Within the world of homo spectaculorum, publicity is the source of power. As 
mentioned previously, homo faber had already discovered that the productive 
potential of humans was best extracted by establishing work as a kind of reality   195 
defining public. Homo spectaculorum has since realised that peoples’ productive 
potential is maximised if every space they engage with is a reality defining space. 
Because none of these spaces can lay claim to having complete public integrity, 
ideology becomes fractured, and so does the individual. This allows fragmented 
individuals to retain their productivity regardless of the conflicts they experience 
between system and lifeworld. In a sense, the society of homo spectaculorum signals 
the complete occlusion of the lifeworld by a continuous series of meaning providing 
subsystems. 
 
As a result of the usurpation of public reason by rationality, and the subsequent 
decline of rationality as an ideological totality, the agonistic drive of homo 
spectaculorum is engaged by and in various spaces that seek to constitute themselves 
as meaning givers. Everywhere they go they are given an opportunity to express 
themselves – through what they wear, what they do, what they learn and where they 
live. They also always find themselves in a public space willing to present a reality 
that is viscerally engaging and satisfies their desire. This does not necessarily lead to a 
desire for this “public” to present some true reality, as all realities encountered by 
homo spectaculorum are virtual. As Habermas identifies, under these conditions the 
desire for a coherent and consistent identity is undermined, as there is no space for 
this identity to appear as it really is. The question “who are you really and what do 
you really believe in?” will not be asked in any earnest way but only to determine 
how these presumptions and desires might be made functional within the space they 
inhabit. This is the rise of a new form of control: personal sovereignty as the ability to 
change a personal environment according to shifts in flows of desire.  
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Homo faber devised a system of mirrors and lenses through which to apprehend 
reality; in doing so homo faber started to produce reality. The production of reality 
now requires smoke and mirrors as the spectacle obfuscates its connection with 
productive, material reality and reasserts the gratification of self in its place. What has 
happened with the society of homo spectaculorum is that desire is now stimulated so 
that production can never be satisfied. We are left in a society dominated by 
instruments we have been fooled into needing 
 
So here we see the subtle difference between “one dimensional” society as Marcuse 
describes it, and the emergence of the society of homo spectaculorum. Basically, the 
society of homo spectaculorum can be seen as the cultural manifestation of “One 
Dimensional Man” – what happens following the occlusion of the political by the 
social, or the systemic colonisation of the lifeworld. It can be seen to refer to the 
obliteration of truly public fora and their usurpation by private interests and the 
resultant change in subjectivity that result from this. As I shall now describe, the 
evidence of this change of subjectivity can be witnessed in the move from suburbia to 
gated communities, from the town square to the mall, from advertising to branding, 
and in the move from detached experts to appropriated experts. In each of these cases 
the change in subjectivity is one that can be reflected as a development from animal 
laborans and homo faber to homo spectaculorum. The useful public realm is 
superseded by the strategically designed public realm as a realm of personal 
engagement and expression. 
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Part Two: The “Public” Realms of Homo spectaculorum 
There is no better way to understand the emergence of homo spectaculorum than to 
look at what has happened to public space and those social institutions that seek to 
provide meaning. In this next section I intend to outline the way that the conditions of 
the public sphere have altered following the rise of instrumental rationality as public 
dialogue, and also to highlight how the detachment of the system has led to a 
perversion of the public realm beyond that produced by instrumental reason
88. In the 
first instance I am describing the occlusion of plural public space as a place to 
determine reality; in the second I am providing an account of the reproduction of 
meaning in order to stimulate production. In essence I am recounting the plight of 
agonism in a colonised lifeworld in order to illustrate how the emancipatory potential 
of encountering reality is undermined in the society of homo spectaculorum. In order 
to approach the issue of how agonism is usurped in late capitalist societies, I will 
indicate how the control of steering media translates to the control of discursive 
spaces, which in turn leads to political power. I hope to outline what I mean by 
suggesting that the public realm of homo faber has become controlled by the whims 
of homo spectaculorum; detailing how the loss of a real and identity forming public 
has resulted in a change in the expectations associated with publicness.  
 
The first step in this investigation is to analyse the ways that private interests have 
infiltrated what otherwise might be critical public spaces. This phenomenon has 
already been explored theoretically in the first chapter as Habermas’s refeudalisation 
of the public sphere and in Arendt’s occlusion of the public sphere by the social 
                                                 
88 In doing so I am covering a similar subject matter to that of Richard Sennett (Sennett, 1978). 
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sphere. This infiltration of public spaces takes place as a result of public power being 
in the hands of essentially private interests.  
 
Following the refeudalisation of the public sphere, normative power is exercised 
through representative publicity, rather than critical publicity. The common 
occurrence in the society of homo spectaculorum is one wherein publicity holds the 
normative benefits of appearing as public truth without actually having to conform to 
the public criticism that would allow for real endorsement of that claim. This kind of 
publicness is the medium of the society of homo spectaculorum. We can witness 
instances of this in contemporary versions of public space, the emergence of branding, 
and the employment of cultures of appropriated experts. Through describing the 
phenomena of the complete strategic colonisation of communicative space, I shall 
illustrate how each of these spaces placates the agonistic drive of homo 
spectaculorum. This serves to identify how the need for context is engaged in order to 
extract value and productivity from the individual - it shows what homo 
spectaculorum surrenders and what the meaning provider gains. The dominance of 
instrumental rationality is the precondition for this change in subjectivity, but the 
human need for meaning is more pressing than the validity of instrumental 
understandings. Everywhere we find strategic interests pretending to be public, 
without conforming to the democratic procedures that would make such a claim valid.   199 
Public Space: From Suburbia to Virtual Communities 
Agonism is the desire to measure oneself against a public world, so it is important to 
identify the form that the public world takes in post-industrial society
89. What one 
finds is a world dominated by private interests, in which public space has been 
usurped almost everywhere by private interests and recreated as “public” space. The 
effect of lifeworld colonisation on the nature of publicity goes beyond the mechanical 
issues associated with the marginalisation of critical voices. Following the decoupling 
of the lifeworld and the system, and the linguistification of the sacred, there is a void 
left available for ressentiment that private interests seek to exploit, and control over 
publicity is integral to this venture. The psyche must receive its orientations from 
somewhere, even if its functioning is irrational and disjointed. Indeed, as Nietzsche 
argues, the more disjointed the psyche, the greater the need for shared orientations.  
There are a plethora of private interests willing to provide these orientations. 
 
One example of the usurpation of public space by private interests can be seen in the 
rise of gated communities. The development of suburbia itself has often been 
criticised for encouraging uniformity and detachment from external influences; gated 
communities represent a spectacular manifestation of this one dimensional tendency. 
The general idea behind gated communities is to group together like-minded and 
comparably resourced people in the interests of harmony and security (Bickford 
2000). Whilst this seems to recreate the preconditions of Habermas’s ideal public 
sphere, in which interlocutors share a common lifeworld and common goals, in 
essence it is simply changing public space into private space, dominated by private 
                                                 
89 ‘Whatever occurs in this space of appearances is political by definition, even when it is not a direct 
product of action’ (Arendt 1958: 155). 
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concerns. As Evan MacKenzie has noted, the original impetus for the creation of 
gated communities arose not from a democratic utopian ideal, but derived from an 
economic rationale; gated communities allow for shared resources and the private 
development of infrastructure (McKenzie 1994: 80-84). The developments are 
politically organised on the basis of what is good for property values – this 
necessitates strategically determined limitations on personal expression and even 
restrictions on what kind of people may enter the “public” space (McKenzie 1994: 12-
18, 147-149). While it constitutes a public space, what this space is missing is the 
plurality which, according to Arendt’s understanding, is necessary for truth to reveal 
itself. Whether the gated community is rich or poor, it is basically a tool of 
segregation wherein public space loses its public nature and becomes a haven for 
collective  ressentiment as opposed to engagement with critical others (Bickford 
2000). By avoiding engagement with the real world, constituted by plurality, gated 
communities develop a systemic reality which is, in essence, virtual.  
The Internet as Public Space 
In search of a replacement for lost shared space, many democratic theorists have 
recently begun to turn their attention to what they believe to be the utopian 
possibilities of the internet as public space. Insofar as the internet provides 
entertainment through virtual engagement, while occluding public space with what is 
essentially a proliferation of private spaces, the internet is the quintessential public 
space of homo spectaculorum. As with gated communities, the internet seeks to cater 
to the individual’s needs for publicity in order to satisfy some of the conditions of a 
public forum. However, when we understand the internet as a public space that 
functions in the context of the systemic colonisation of the lifeworld, we find that the 
internet further panders to the detachment from reality that is encouraged by the 
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technology of the spectacle, and is emblematic of the “public” experience of homo 
spectaculorum. In order to explain this point, I shall initially examine the internet’s 
claim to be a public space before going on to identify the ways in which the internet 
entertains the agonism of those who engage with it, while surreptitiously denying the 
manifestation of this agonism in reality. In making these points it shall become clear 
that, insofar as it engages the individual without really publicly manifesting that 
engagement, the internet represents the superlative “public” space for homo 
spectaculorum. 
 
Recently bought up by commercial communications companies, the claim that the 
internet is a form of public space is immediately suspect
90, yet it is often understood 
as an open public forum. Much of the optimism concerning the internet as a new form 
of public space relates to its properties as an egalitarian medium for the distribution of 
information. The internet appears public, from this perspective, because the ability to 
publish on the internet is open to anyone with access to some space on the server. 
Insofar as the internet enables its users to simultaneously receive and compose the 
media that they are engaged with, there has been a suggestion that this space resists 
the coloniser/colonised dichotomy. As Mark Poster has put it: 
The magic of the internet is that it is a technology that puts cultural acts, symbolizations in all 
forms, in the hands of all participants; it radically decentralizes the positions of speech, 
publishing, filmmaking, radio and television broadcasting, in short the apparatuses of cultural 
production. (Poster 1997: 222) 
What is important here is the notion that one composes the media at the same time 
that one absorbs it. Unlike more traditional forms of mass public communication, 
such as broadcast and print media, the participant in the interaction is an active 
                                                 
90 ‘There aren’t any public parks or libraries in cyberspace– it has all been sold’ (McIntosh and Cates 
1998: 84).    202 
component in the composition of that media (Poster 1995). Such a perspective 
presents the possibility that the internet might bring about a new structural 
transformation of the public sphere, one that manifests a critical and agonistic 
relationship between self and world. 
 
The validity of this interpretation of the internet as a public sphere is undermined by 
the facile version of interaction with “reality” that the internet offers. From Arendt’s 
phenomenological perspective, the experience of the world in virtual space is always 
removed at least one degree from the reception of the senses. While the internet is 
actually composed of a multitude of servers linked in a network, its representation in 
the world is via a screen, generally a screen within the private setting of the household 
or work. This private nature of reception tends to undermine any otherwise public 
properties that the internet might have
91.  
 
Certainly, the internet provides a far more engaging and reflexive medium than 
newspapers and broadcast media. However, the internet is so personalised an 
experience precisely because nothing about it is public. One may move from one 
privately created space to another, but as one does nothing about one’s identity or 
reality remains constant. Apart from a few specifically constructed spaces, such as the 
discussion group known as the WELL, participation on the internet is anonymous, 
with no connection between your identity online and your identity in the real world
92.  
                                                 
91 Unlike Habermas’s salons and coffee houses, the proliferation of screens in contemporary 
“cybercafes” actually inhibit the engagement with the visceral public by engaging the user in a virtual 
reality that is not connected to any physical public. For a discussion of the relative merits of ‘cyber 
salons’ in Habermasian terms see (Dean 2001). 
92 Realising that the lack of identity was a flaw in using the internet as public space, the WELL 
community has made it mandatory to maintain a consistent identity whilst participating in WELL 
discussions, and has sought to reconcile online existence with real world existence through public   203 
The lack of coherent identities on the internet undermines its virtue as a “public” 
space since some of the principal purposes of public space are to allow identity to 
reveal itself and to create a space for recognition of self. The internet does not force 
us to gain a perspective on reality through plurality, but rather panders to our 
preconceived tastes and habitual choices. What we find, then, is that, in essence, the 
removal of public space from a real community removes the individual from direct 
participation in that community and those encounters with “the other” that this 
participation entails (Wilson 1997: 159).  The virtual reality of the online world 
creates an escape from the reality of community, and re-establishes community as a 
virtual one. The internet only allows the development of character, reputation and 
identity within the confines of a limited discussion group or web site. Whilst this can 
lead individuals to form the impression that they are engaged with the media, the 
falsity of such an impression is evident from the facile relationship this feeling of 
engagement has with reality. As with all “public” spaces of homo spectaculorum, 
personal engagement is represented but is not connected to public action. 
 
Like the other screens of homo spectaculorum, the internet is susceptible to the 
criticism that it is a strategically constructed space that reflects certain strategic 
interests. As Chantal Mouffe has suggested, the space and nature of political 
deliberation is inevitably normatively loaded (Mouffe 2000b). She makes two 
associated, and important, points in developing her analysis. The first is that any 
manifestation of “ideal” public communication must reflect, by the mere fact of its 
existence, a certain normative predisposition of power and knowledge. Second, as a 
                                                                                                                                            
meetings. While the WELL encapsulates most of the positive possibilities of the internet as public 
space, it is certainly the exception rather than the rule. See (Wilson 1997: 149)   204 
result of the inherent hegemony that political power reflects, the nature of ideal 
political communication should always be contested. It pays to remember that the 
internet is not public space when dealing with the internet as an ideal public forum. 
Rather, according to both Arendt’s and Habermas’s theories, it is a constructed space 
that represents certain strategic interests. 
 
This occlusion of real expression is also at the basis of a Habermasian critique of the 
public space produced by information and communication technologies. In 
Habermas’s analysis of the systemic colonisation of the lifeworld, colonisation occurs 
as we surrender areas of cultural reproduction to the influence of steering media, such 
as money and power. In the process, we bypass important critical opportunities to 
reflect on the communicative processes that come to constitute the lifeworld and 
surrender that lifeworld to strategic uses. The extent to which the internet acts as the 
meta-coloniser of the lifeworld is reflected in its manifestation on a screen. It appears 
public, it entertains notions of publicity, is intended to appear public and provides 
some of the functions of a public; but essentially it is governed by non-linguistic 
steering media, of which money and economic power are pre-eminent. 
 
The basis of criticisms of the influence of information and communication technology 
on the public sphere is that it places an instrument of systemic influence - a screen - 
between self and the lifeworld. Although the textual content of internet discussion is 
subjectively constituted, the forum through which that text is exchanged is not. This 
detachment operates in two senses, as the removal of context and the insertion of 
subtext. The removal of context leads to the loss of connection with offline “reality” 
that occurs when the effects on a screen that manifest the internet are accepted as   205 
constituting reality. Screens emulate public space because if they don’t they must 
compete with public space. For it is by serving the functional purposes of public space 
that the screen occludes the need for truly public space by suppressing this need, 
which otherwise might demand satisfaction. Thus, the internet undermines the 
existence of a real public by providing effects like those that might otherwise be 
derived from an actual public.  
 
Simon Cooper encapsulates this process of occlusion in a discussion of the political 
implications of “virtual reality”: 
Consistently in the discourse of VR there is a tendency to devalue the variety of concrete 
social and environmental settings that gives meaning to human activity. The assumption of 
autonomy, of the subject’s freedom to create comes only through removing the subject from 
these settings. The promise of a mode of being which takes place on this abstracted level ends 
up enforcing a process of reification rather than resisting or overcoming it. The fundamental 
alienation that VR offers severs the subject from the very possibility of experiences which 
might be more resistant to the process of commodification that s/he is partly trying to escape. 
(Cooper 1997: 102-103)  
Here we see how the insertion of a technological mediator in communication can 
automatically disengage the critical process of the interaction between identity and 
“reality”. Through its presentation of virtual realities as being as valid or validating as 
offline reality itself, the internet can be seen as yet another forum for the development 
of systemic control. 
 
Hence, while the internet may broaden our scope of experience, it does not make that 
experience any more real. As Michelle Wilson has pointed out, the experience of 
assuming an identity online provides some insight into people’s reactions and 
behaviour online but it is by no means the same as the embodied experience in the 
real world (Wilson 1997: 149). Actually, it can be argued that the ephemeral quality 
of internet undermines the very possibility of purposeful action. The internet as public   206 
space offers a peculiarly detached experience, and this detachment, while seemingly 
engaging, can be seen to produce facile experiences precisely because it has no 
connection with the limitations and constraints of the real world. As Jean Pierre 
Dupuy notes, ‘a world without constraints, without order, a world in which everything 
would be possible, would have no meaning’ (Dupuy 1980: 13). 
Virtual community is the illusion of community where there are no real people and no real 
communication. It is a term used by idealistic technophiles who fail to understand that 
authentic community cannot be engendered through technological means. (Wilbur 1997: 14) 
Without a tangible and personal commitment to care about the integrity of a public, 
virtual publics tend to lack the structure and conditions necessary to approximate ideal 
speech. 
Despite the fact that the internet does not really serve the role of a public space, many 
users feel that their engagement on the internet serves the role of personal expression 
and investment because it is such a responsive and personalised medium. Digital 
technology enables this to a far greater extent by enabling the targeting of 
advertisements by tracking an individual’s internet surfing and the automated 
compilation of a profile based upon the patterns that they generate. This kind of 
technology has been extended to the development of mobile phones that allow 
different advertisements to be received by users’ phones according to their location 
and anticipated tastes (Negroponte 1995: 164-165). The responsiveness of this 
technology to the individual, along with the “freedom” of internet discussion (insofar 
as it allows discussion without identity), all too easily leads to disenchantment with 
the real environment of political discourse (Cooper 1997). Hence we see the danger 
that the internet poses to Arendt’s conception of the purpose and practice of political 
discourse, which is supposed to harness identity and plurality in order to create a 
meaningful existence for the individual and a critical public for action coordination.   207 
The actual plurality of our community, for Arendt, is to provide the impetus for 
agonistic engagement and political action; when this plurality is “virtual” and, as a 
result, constructed and constrained by virtual limitations, it reduces the impetus to 
pursue “real” action. 
 
In its manifestation as a screen the internet co-opts its users by catering to their 
“public” needs while surreptitiously seeking to govern such needs
93. Whilst the 
potentials of the internet as a public sphere are certainly exciting
94, the actual status of 
the internet as a public sphere in the current political climate reflects the condition in 
which private strategic interests come to occlude what otherwise might be 
communicative spaces. The idea that the internet can even be thought of as a public 
sphere, despite the fact that it is fundamentally privately owned and privately 
experienced, is a symptom of the fact that homo spectaculorum has no reference 
points that would allow them to recognise a real public.  
The Market: From Commons to Commodities 
Arendt is a vocal proponent of the value of private space as a place to develop one’s 
uniqueness. However, she also argues that the desire to develop uniqueness has to be 
generated through the individual’s engagement with an expressive and plural public. 
If one were to search for the nearest thing to the agonistic meeting place of a Greek 
polis in contemporary liberal democracies the first port of call would be the shopping 
centre. It is here that homo spectaculorum is encouraged to engage in the activities of 
expressing, discussing and deciding that Arendt recognises as the activities of human 
                                                 
93 The functions the internet provides include communication, commerce, education, information 
archive and entertainment. 
94 For an optimistic appraisal see (Rheingold 1993). 
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freedom (Arendt 1990: 235). This freedom is confined by a crossroads of 
commerce
95, through which the public pass while conducting their business. It is the 
closest thing to what would be regarded in English towns as “the common”, or what 
in Spain would be “the plaza”. The fact that shopping centres have replaced the 
village green is a function of instrumental rationality – there is a greater quantifiable 
utility in the use of public space for commerce. The ways in which this usurpation of 
public space affects individual perceptions of reality, however, is more a function of 
the subsequent colonisation of the lifeworld. As a direct result of being “common” the 
shopping centre becomes a centre of agonistic engagement; a place where values are 
debated and instilled. To see how this instillation takes place, it pays to remember 
Habermas’s formulation of lifeworld colonisation occurring through systemic 
influence on areas of cultural transmission. 
 
If we accept the fact that shopping centres occupy the role of the modern “commons”, 
it is not hard to extrapolate from this that they therefore have an effect on the 
transmission of culture
96. Young adults “hang-out” at the mall because it is the public 
place, as they might once have met on the commons or in the plaza. They meet at the 
mall to engage with each other and to participate in their culture. Adults, intentionally 
or not, also receive impressions about “reality” from their experiences in shopping 
centres. Habermas and Arendt are critical of the fact that “public” spaces like these 
are not public at all, but are pervaded by an association of private interests that seek to 
strategically manipulate the “public” forum.  
                                                 
95 Quite literally, as many shopping centres are designed around a transept, similar to the design of 
medieval cathedrals and understood to convey a certain form of reverent publicness. For a detailed 
exploration of how shopping centres have usurped the role of churches as providers of meaning, see 
(Pahl 2004). 
96 For a specific study illustrating this see (Abaza 2001).   209 
 
According to their role in the society of homo spectaculorum these private interests 
invest considerable effort in making their space appear as public as possible. They 
invest in security, cleaners and environmental controls so that the mall has the 
requisite elements of safety and comfort to encourage a feeling of security and 
familiarity. They supply entertainment and information for free to encourage people 
to use the shopping space as a cultural hub. They provide all the inducements of 
publicity but the shopping centre is, in essence, designed by private interests for 
private interests.  
 
Some powerful examples of why shopping centres are not true public space can be 
found in security policies that prohibit beggars and buskers, pamphleteers and 
political dissidents from disrupting the flow of commerce. A study of the legal 
parameters for political action in United States shopping malls indicates that, while 
democratic rights to free speech are occasionally upheld due to the “public” nature of 
malls, the majority of cases concerning restrictions of free speech in malls are 
dismissed because malls are private property (Kohn 2001). Private property, it is 
argued, ‘does not lose its private character merely because the public is generally 
invited to use it for designated purposes’ (Kohn 2001: 74). As a result, the private 
owners are permitted to prohibit unprofitable, or even unwanted, “expressive 
conduct” within their shopping malls.  
 
So here we see how the public fora of homo spectaculorum in some ways emulate 
Arendt’s formulation of the public realm of animal laborans. That is, a public space 
distinguished by the absence of speech and action. This prohibition of public criticism   210 
is reminiscent of Arendt’s account of the initial bourgeois claim on political power. 
‘Society’, she claims, ‘assumed the disguise of an organization of property owners 
who, instead of claiming access to the public realm because of their wealth, demanded 
protection from it for the accumulation of more wealth’ (Arendt 1958: 68). Insofar as 
they contain the public space as a way of stifling critical expression, the property 
owners of the contemporary shopping centre recreate the public realm of animal 
laborans – mute and uncritical. 
 
However, the public realms of homo spectaculorum also share homo faber’s public 
purpose of creating meaning. Naomi Klein develops the argument that while 
curtailing criticism is a fortuitous by-product of the benefits of property ownership, 
the real reason that shop owners like malls is because malls allow them to fabricate 
and cultivate a consumer culture (Klein 2000). The shopping mall can be a place of 
silence and sterility, but it rarely is. More often the shopping mall is dominated by 
expression and spectacle – but specifically that expression deemed to suit the strategic 
interests of the property owners. Hence we find the shopping mall is, at least to some 
extent, a manifestation of the public realm designed by homo faber. It is humans as 
instrumentalisers who fabricate shopping malls and it is they who dictate the cultural 
transmission they deem necessary. To this end they create a culture that depends upon 
the agonistic interaction they offer within their fabricated world.  
 
As with employers who understand that the best way to get the most out of their 
employees is to validate their expressive conduct and channel it towards the purposes 
of their enterprise,  the shopping centre validates the person who purchases. 
Consumption is the only allowable way to effectively display in a shopping centre - 
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and incentives such as rewards programs, cross promotions and personally validating 
service are available to those who “buy in”. Thus we see how the public realms of 
homo spectaculorum share the characteristics of those of animal laborans and homo 
faber. On the one hand, they engage individuals within a reality they define, on the 
other hand, they channel this engagement into furthering their own private and 
strategic interests, undermining the communicative role that publics would otherwise 
serve. 
 
Before turning to a discussion of the ways in which private interests engage the 
agonism of citizens in the market, it is important to understand this use of space 
within the context of the role that publicity plays in cultural transmission. When a 
community of shop owners decides to redevelop as a mall they do so essentially 
because it gives them control over that environment; not only control over critical 
voices, as just mentioned, but also control over the temperature, cleanliness and 
presentation of that world. They essentially create a pseudo-public space - akin to a 
screen - which is regulated and designed with their interests in mind. This does not 
stop it being a “public” place for those who go there and indeed, as suggested earlier, 
they like to encourage this notion of publicity by catering to “public” needs. Their 
interest in publicity is, however, in no way earnest. Public space is something that 
cannot be earnestly bought, for it is one of the: 
areas of action that resist being converted over to the media of money and power because they 
are specialized in cultural transmission, social integration and child rearing, and remain 
dependent on mutual understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action. (Habermas 
1987b: 330) 
What the fabricators of shopping centres are hoping to exploit is this dependence on 
mutual understanding which, following the uncoupling of the system from the 
lifeworld, is the well-spring of competitive engagement. Thus, they seek to fabricate a 
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world of spectacular values they can imbue in their public and reap the subsequent 
profits. 
 
A steady stream of critical theorists have identified consumption’s role in placating 
the masses. From Adorno and Horkheimer to Hardt and Negri, the rise of the agonism 
of the market is seen as evidence of the advanced capitalist system undermining the 
possibility of revolutionary politics. These theorists argue that capital has developed 
new ways of containing revolutionary forces and that its chief means of doing so is 
through engaging the agonism of individuals as consumers. There is less incentive to 
engage in political citizenship in the face of active engagement with private, corporate 
and quasi-corporate interests and a greater incentive to let government remain an 
unresponsive and uncritical activity (Rose 2000: 327).  
 
The most pressing concern for Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theory is that 
modern liberal democracies do not prioritise democratic involvement as the best 
forum for agonism; rather the market is presented as the space for passionate 
engagement. As Habermas puts it: 
the liberal model hinges not on the democratic self-determination of deliberating citizens but 
on the constitutional framework for an economic society that is supposed to guarantee an 
essentially non-political common good by satisfying personal life plans and private 
expectations of happiness. (Habermas 1996a: 298) 
Were it that democratic deliberation formed the basis of a political society, we might 
find that markets spring up where such deliberation determines it to be felicitous. As a 
result of our recent instrumental history, we find that democratic engagement is the 
handmaiden of the market. In the liberal model described above, it is the “non-
political” nature of personal life plans and private expectations of happiness that is 
held to be suspect by Habermas and Arendt. Both of these theorists point out that 
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when “public” space becomes a place to represent private interests, some interests end 
up being better represented than others. It is possible to illustrate why they are so 
suspicious about this claim by investigating how private interests have invaded public 
space and how the market subsequently exploits the systemic colonisation of the 
lifeworld. 
 
The ability to command a “public space” - a screen - translates into the ability to 
establish a projection of reality, and the subsequent ability to become a culturally 
important identity marker. Arendt saw that in a world where identity is fluid ‘Men, 
their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their sameness, that is, their 
identity, by being related to the same chair and the same table’ (Arendt 1958: 137). 
The desire to use common markers as a source of meaning is ever more demanding in 
lieu of a meaningfully constructed public. Those who determine the capacities of 
markets are aware of this and for this reason have devised the phenomenon of 
branding. The rise and rise of branding within the system of consumption and 
production is a symptom of the fact that the market has become the agonistic theatre 
par excellence. 
Advertising: From Editorial Influence to Branding 
Branding describes the process of associating meaning with commodities. This has 
become the primary goal of marketing and represents an attempt by those in the 
corporate world to command ‘the most valuable real-estate in the world, a corner of 
the consumer’s mind’ (Brands 2004). Brands have come to colonise the lifeworld as 
individuals have come to relate to each other and themselves in terms of their material 
possessions and investments. Companies that used to concentrate on producing 
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products to meet these needs are now focusing on producing brands to meet these 
needs. In her examination of this process, No Logo, Naomi Klein has uncovered the 
surreptitious occupation of public space and personal engagement by brands (Klein 
2000). In a large part of this work Klein investigates the colonisation of public space 
by private interests, but her main point is that the intent of private interests in usurping 
this public space is to become normative governors, ‘chief communicators of all that 
is good and cherished in our culture’ (Klein 2000: 335). 
 
What might be perceived as the relatively benign occupation of public space by 
private interests proves pernicious when the strategic value of occupying this position 
is capitalised upon by the marketing sections of the consumer world. In trying to 
occupy a position of greater importance than the use value of their actual product, 
brand owners are trying to cash in on their position as meaning providers. As Phil 
Knight declared in his role as the chief executive officer of a footwear company: 
For years we thought of ourselves as a production-oriented company, meaning we put all our 
emphasis on designing and manufacturing the product. But now we understand that the most 
important thing we do is market the product.
97  
Marketers understand the value of maintaining the role of meaning providers as a 
means to increase sales. As Klein describes it, the process of branding involves 
developing meaningful normative constructions that are marketable to consumers - 
and this moves the role of the corporation from producing the product to producing 
the product’s meaning. Hence IBM does not sell computers, it sells business 
solutions. Polaroid does not sell cameras, it sells a social lubricant. Levis does not 
simply sell jeans, it sells a way of life (Klein 2000: 23-24). In this role the market 
                                                 
97 (Williagan 1992: 92) cited in (Klein 2000: 22) 
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consciously fulfils the role of meaning provider through its control over identity 
forming discursive spaces. The way marketers do so is once again by usurping public 
space, which are areas of cultural transmission, in order to have an undue effect on 
action coordination. As Hardt and Nergri described it in Empire: ‘Capitalism sets in 
motion a continuous cycle of private reappropriation of public goods: The 
expropriation of what is common’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 301). 
 
The most notable and obvious forms of the intrusion of the market into cultural 
transmission are through markets intertwining with the media. However, far beyond 
the practice of censoring content, which for Habermas began with the advent of the 
penny press, market forces now seek to saturate the private worlds of individuals in 
such a way that they come to constitute culture itself. As noted at the start of the 
second chapter, strategic action is parasitic upon communicative action. If we take 
consumers to be forever attempting to reach an understanding of the world, and accept 
the cultural transmissions they receive as objectively “real”, then they are subject to 
practising communication according to the predefined interests of strategic actors. As 
Frederick Olafson has noted, liars employ the conventions of communicative action in 
order to make their lies seem compelling. The only difference between the activity of 
lying and the activity of communicative action is an earnest commitment to truth, 
which is surrendered by the presence of a strategic actor (Olafson 1990: 653). The 
challenge of marketers seeking to brand effectively is to relate meaningfully to their 
target markers, and occupying positions of public importance is absolutely integral to 
fulfilling this role. By infiltrating the lifeworld, or occluding it, they may appear 
communicative while actually being strategic.     216 
In order to fulfil the role of meaning givers, marketers have had to play the role of 
philosophers. They become the ‘organs of the Zeitgeist’ (Arendt 1958: 294), 
projecting the good life and selling it. As a result marketers now do research into what 
people think, not to find out what they think about a product and how to improve it, 
but rather to find out how best to understand and motivate them through the shared 
preconceptions of their lifeworld. It is the market that seeks to engage and thematise 
the important issues of the public world in order to gain the emotional leverage 
needed to motivate individuals to buy. Hence, the role of the consumer expert has 
changed from data analysis and prediction to exploring concepts of validity through 
cultural studies, ethnographies and personal introspection (Wehner 2001).   
As a result advertising has become creative, poetic and, by Arendt’s definition, 
political
98. Advertising involves making value statements, redeeming claims to truth 
and appealing to the capacity for understanding within the target audience. When the 
workers of Debord’s society of the spectacle finish their dehumanising labour, they 
find at home in their private space ‘they are treated like grown-ups, with a great show 
of solicitude and politeness, in their new role as consumers’ (Debord 1995: 30). 
Brands are created in an effort to rhetorically engage the public. They are developed 
to ‘establish emotional ties’ with their customers so that the brand might ‘[weave] 
itself into the fabric of people’s lives’, providing a basis of reality and an opportunity 
for ‘emotional leverage’
99. For this reason, marketers seeking to brand are amongst 
the most fervent miners of lifeworld understandings, and do so in order to make their 
claims to legitimacy valid. 
                                                 
98 Referring to Arendt’s statement ‘Political phenomena emerge into their space from an opaque and 
impenetrable darkness, which is the human heart. Forever closed to “scientific” inquiry, it may yet be 
illuminated by the insight of poets’ (Arendt 1971: 418). 
99 Scott Bedbury, marketing vice-president of Starbucks quoted in The New York Times, 20 October 
1997 and (Peters 1997: 96). 
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The brand rationality has penetrated areas of cultural transmission, including child-
rearing: shoe manufacturers run anti-bullying campaigns in schools and department 
stores teach children how to shop for themselves (Monbiot 2001). Klein cites a 
specific example of a child being suspended from school ‘for wearing a Pepsi shirt on 
Coke day’ (Klein 2000: 95), an incident which is Orwellian in terms of its level of 
political control. Klein also cites the case of an American elementary school maths 
book which ‘was riddled with mentions and photographs of well known brand name 
products: Nike shoes, McDonalds, Gatorade’ which was defended on the basis that 
‘you’re trying to get into what people are familiar with, so that they can see, hey, 
mathematics is in the world out there’
100. Through their infiltration of areas of cultural 
transmission commodities come to constitute the world - commodities are presented 
as equally immortal as the reason contained within mathematics. Thus, in a manner 
that reflects Arendt’s description of the public realm of homo faber, the contemporary 
world of things comes to be the basic foundation of all other relations between 
humans. By colonising the lifeworld, through occluding what should be political 
space with the social, private interests commandeer publicity for their own ends. 
 
Once again, it pays to consider how the lifeworld itself is colonised through systemic 
rationality entering into areas of cultural transmission. The control of media through 
advertising, and the control of public space through privatisation are obvious ways to 
access processes of cultural transmission and become meaning providers, but these 
are not the only way to do so. As Klein points out, the tendency towards multinational 
and multimedia mergers have allowed brands to invade every aspect of modern life. 
Brands are cultural commanders. Their political power is witnessed in the way their 
                                                 
100 Quoting the book’s author, Patricia S. Wilson, cited in (Klein 2000: 175). 
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language infiltrates the everyday exchanges of the lifeworld, which in turn gives them 
an ability to constitute reality. Microsoft spellchecker will recognise “Coca Cola”, but 
not “reification”; it has “Subaru” in its dictionary, but not “commodification”, this is 
the reality of discursive control. In actuality, branding appears to be the most recent 
incarnation of reification, the act of regarding an abstract phenomenon as a material 
thing. It appeals to the individual’s need for an identity forming context, for a 
meaningful reality to relate to. It is a process employed in the public realm of homo 
spectaculorum, because such a public realm has an excess of material goods and 
production and a scarcity of real meaning. 
Expertise: from Appropriating Experts to Isolating Experts 
As Habermas describes it, the emergence of ‘specialists without spirit’ and 
‘sensualists without heart’ is one of the by-products of the linguistification of the 
sacred (Habermas 1987b: 323). This process contributes to the systemic colonisation 
of the lifeworld by allowing structures of legitimacy to become isolated and lose their 
groundings in the commonly shared lifeworld. Habermas contends that the everyday 
language of the lifeworld is the most powerful critical tool available to those seeking 
to address the colonisation of the lifeworld – the use of a shared vocabulary enables 
truth claims to be easily redeemed and reasonable argumentation to take place.  
 
The systemic development of expert cultures is the antithesis of this situation, as 
cultures of expertise operate within their own domains of legitimacy secured 
according to systemic imperatives. As Marx predicted, this specialisation has the 
immediate effect of alienating experts from their own humanity, their own lifeworld 
(Marx 1990: 481-2). The development of systems of experts not only serves to stifle 
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critical input from the lifeworld, it inhibits inter-systemic criticism and the 
development of holistic approaches to overarching social anomies. As Hardt and 
Negri point out, ‘The neutralization of the transcendental imagination is thus the first 
sense in which the political in the imperial domain is ontological’ (Hardt and Negri 
2000: 354). The current state of thought is one in which knowledge within a system is 
valued, as opposed to admiring general propensities for reason and wisdom. 
Functional knowledge in the world of homo spectaculorum, is knowledge at the level 
of the screen, not of the reality that lies behind it. 
 
The political nature of ontology can be further explained in terms of the way in which 
the role of public expertise has been privatised. In light of the previous discussion, 
one of the most obvious examples of the privatisation of experts can be witnessed as 
one of the facets of branding. In attempting to sell products, private interests often 
present “expert” opinions that validate their claims to truth. The use of this device has 
become prolific and, as identified by Naomi Wolf in The Beauty Myth, some of the 
best examples can be found in the beauty industry (Wolf 1991). In what is a seminal 
text on the function of branding, Wolf identifies the ways in which expertise is either 
simply purchased, or otherwise simulated, in order to endorse a product and an image. 
This device uses the leverage provided by the legitimacy of apparently public 
institutions in order to endorse private claims. The pseudo-scientific posturing of the 
beauty industry raises questions, such as: exactly what kind of qualifications does one 
need in order to graduate from the “Ponds Institute”? The private command over 
steering media, the money to purchase expertise (along with the concurrent condition 
that experts allow themselves to be bought rather than defend the integrity of their 
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character and research) or the power to imitate the spectacle of expertise, is one form 
of the commodification of knowledge. 
 
Indeed, the corruption of expertise is further engaged in the society of homo 
spectaculorum, in which appearance is more important than substance. For the 
manipulation of expertise by those with access to “public” fora is endemic. This can 
happen as a result of the use of steering media to “buy out” expertise, or through the 
abuse of control over a “public” that essentially has no critical mechanisms that 
cannot be purchased. An excellent example of this is identified by Klein, who 
describes how the dominant English pharmaceutical brand Boots commissioned a 
study to compare thyroid drugs and then withdrew the rights to publication when a 
competitor trialled in the study was found to be superior to and cheaper than their 
product (Klein 2000). Another example of the abuse of “public credentials” was 
uncovered by journalist George Monbiot who found that Monsanto, the agricultural 
production company, not only attempted to buy out critical experts, but also falsely 
created its own experts to publicly deride an article that was critical of their products 
and practices, causing the unprecedented retraction of the critical article (Monbiot 
2002). This case was particularly insidious, as Monsanto was found to have presented 
false identities as “experts” on an internet forum in order to generate a petition against 
the critical article. Monbiot points out that the development of massive and coherent 
private interests comes to dominate the public sphere by dominating every facet of 
resistance. Quite simply, in lieu of a truly public place to expose the truth, private 
interests run riot. 
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Academia has not been immune to the appropriation of expertise. This can be seen in 
systemic influence over the kind of expertise that has developed under the conditions 
of late-capitalism and it can also be witnessed in the postmodern attitude towards 
critical theory. As an instance of the first order, one only need witness the incredible 
growth and dominance of business schools in most contemporary academic 
institutions. As lamented by John Ralston Saul, this development reflects academia’s 
changed purpose from fostering critical thinkers to generating foot soldiers for the 
new economy; this is a direct consequence of the historical dominance of the public 
realm by homo faber (Ralston Saul 1997: 127). Beyond the dominance of utility in 
public institutions we witness the emergence of branded knowledge; with the 
proliferation of corporate teaching material, courses and educational programs. 
Through creating its own privately determined “public” knowledge ‘business stands 
as a guard dog at the gates of perception’
101. In the society of homo spectaculorum 
universities help to ensure the continuity of screens. The places of thought are 
everywhere replaced by places of knowledge and, once again, private interests 
establish the boundaries, purpose and utility of knowledge.  
 
Finally, those areas of the academy that were devoted to critical thought have 
themselves been hamstrung by the development of postmodern thinking. The 
postmodern approach to knowledge is perfectly suited to the world of screens, with 
the development of fetishistic specialisations and the dissolution of reality in a way 
that validates the continual reinvention of meaning; it is the best possible functional 
language for areas such as marketing and management in the information economy 
(Hardt and Negri 2000: 151-152, 159). As mentioned above, those areas of academia 
                                                 
101 See Ch.9 ‘Silent Science – The Corporate Takeover of the Universities’ in (Monbiot 2000a). 
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that specialise in the relationship of the system to the lifeworld and in the methods of 
cultural reproduction have been appropriated by the marketers. In the public realm 
dominated by the values of homo faber, novel theoretical insight into what drives the 
minds of consumers is invaluable market research and very little else. Meanwhile the 
possibility for transcendental and unifying theory, truly revolutionary critical theory, 
is hamstrung by the postmodern approach, which leads to the view that theories of 
change are self-defeating and misguided. Postmodernism, the theory that reality itself 
is a construct, undermines the plausibility that there is a reality behind the screen, and 
thus allows the screen to be taken as reality. 
 
Arendt, Habermas the Public Space of Homo spectaculorum 
The problem that Arendt and Habermas would have with the society dominated by 
homo spectaculorum is that there is no critical depth to any of its spaces. This is 
despite the fact that elements of the society of homo spectaculorum - such as 
incredulity towards instrumentality, the development of egalitarian communication 
structures and personally responsive technologies - seem to hold much promise for 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s vision of a critical and engaged democratic polis. 
 
Market forces certainly promote communication between vendors and consumers, in 
which the former investigates the shared assumptions of their lifeworlds and seeks to 
position their products in such a way as to make them appealing. As the advertising 
industry’s own experts assure us, the marketers’ only interest is in effective product 
distribution, in giving the people what they want (Sutherland 1993: 96-98). Indeed, as 
prominent Habermasian Thomas McCarthy has noted: 
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There may be some plausibility to characterizing the market as norm free, as the ethically 
neutralized system of action in which inducements interrelate as the basis of egocentric 
calculations of utility, in which subjectively uncoordinated individual decisions are integrated 
functionally. (McCarthy 1985: 34) 
After describing the ways in which the market functionally resembles an ideal 
speaking situation, McCarthy makes the point that, while claims that the market is an 
“ideal” forum may be spurious, they remain more plausible than the claim that any 
modern democracy is norm free, ethically neutral and functionally responsive 
(McCarthy 1985: 34). If advertising companies fulfil the role of philosophers, at least 
philosophy is taking place. Indeed, the organic intellectuals of capital are devising 
new ways to explore the political sensibilities of its subjects; they engage, question 
and respond far more effectively than the ossifying political system of homo faber. 
Furthermore, with the rise of personally enabling technologies, the market has 
extended the capacity of agents to affect the world. Thus the development of digital 
technologies is the latest stage in a technological process that results in the 
individual’s seamless integration with capital. While the market responds, the political 
system of homo faber becomes a ludicrous parody of its decaying and forgotten 
essence. Following the rise of the society of homo spectaculorum, and the consequent 
capture of the agonistic and subsequently political drives of the individual by the 
market, the really pertinent issue concerns whether anyone is able to care that the 
political, as Arendt identified it, has been occluded. 
 
In order to respond to this challenge, it is important to understand that what prevents 
the market of the society of homo spectaculorum from being or becoming the political 
theatre par excellence is the lack of the true and earnest publicness that would make   224 
the manifestations of the current public realm “real”
102. As discussed in the first 
chapter, the market is not a value free meeting place of ideas and it does not respond 
simply to consumer’s demands. The market has assumed a position of publicity 
despite the fact that it is not truly public; it represents private interests, and does so in 
such a way that some private interests are represented more effectively than others. 
The market does engage the agonistic drive of what otherwise might be political 
citizens, but it does not do so in the earnest and communicative fashion required by 
Habermas or Arendt. Rather, it is a massive system in which legitimacy is based 
directly upon the distribution of steering media. There is no obligation for participants 
in the market to care for others (at least in a manner that might make market activity 
communicative), and if instrumentally mining the lifeworld of its riches will strip that 
lifeworld of its sacredness, there is no mechanism in the market to prevent it from 
doing so. Finally, the market can not be made publicly accountable and does not 
approach anything like the inclusive and engaging democratic processes that it would 
need to embrace in order to meet Habermas’s and Arendt’s requirements for 
emancipatory democracy. The market may possess progressive features, insofar as it 
has encouraged and enabled the rationalisation of the lifeworld; however , because it 
cannot reconcile identity with reality, it does not possess the qualities of an ideal 
public space as is understood by Habermas and Arendt.  
 
As with all the “public” realms of homo spectaculorum, these screens serve to engage 
and satisfy the individual’s agonistic drive in such a way as to occlude the need for a 
real public space. So much of the virtue of public participation arises from the fact 
that public interaction is what provides a sense of the “real”. Without a common and 
                                                 
102 What is real is what appears as the same to all who behold it (Arendt 1958: 57).   225 
immanent public space in which to come to understand what is real, humans are left 
isolated and disempowered, and vulnerable to the ressentiment that the social sphere 
provides. 
Isolation is that impasse into which men are driven when the political sphere of their lives, 
where they act together in the pursuit of a common concern, is destroyed. Yet isolation, 
though destructive of power and the capacity for action, not only leaves intact but is required 
for all so-called productive activities of men. (Arendt 1967: 474)  
By removing the construction of self from the world of real experience, these screens 
can be seen as undermining the critical potential of public space by extending the 
lifeworld to such an extent that there can be no critical depth to any of it. Here we 
come in contact with a criticism that Arendt makes of the banality of evil. 
It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never ‘radical’, that it is only extreme, and that it 
possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole 
world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is ‘thought-defying,’ as I 
said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns 
itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its ‘banality’. Only the good 
has depth and can be radical. (Arendt 1978a: 250-251) 
In the flatness of the screen we witness the one dimensional origins of the society of 
homo spectaculorum and the threat that the screens of homo spectaculorum pose to 
human subjectivity. For these screens extend over everything, seemingly constituting 
a public which, precisely because of its lack of depth and real immanence, can never 
truly be public. 
Part Three: The Politics of the Spectacle - The Casualties of 
the Loss of Engagement with Reality 
The political symptoms of the dominance of homo spectaculorum are similar to those 
of homo faber. Certainly a failure to critically examine arguments is emblematic of 
the public spaces of both subjectivities. However, the subjectivity of homo 
spectaculorum differs fundamentally from that of homo faber in that the agonistic 
drive of homo spectaculorum is far more effectively harnessed through privatised   226 
“public” spaces than it is by the instrumentality of the ossified remnants of homo 
faber’s political public realm. Thus we find that the interaction of homo 
spectaculorum with modern democracies fails to generate either criticism or 
engagement with political decisions or processes. 
 
The emergence of homo spectaculorum results in a complete misfiring of the critical 
imperatives of the democratic system. While we still have a political public realm 
created by homo faber, society itself has become dominated not by a universal reason 
but by a series of fragmented systems which, as a totality, occlude the opportunities 
for truly public engagement. This is a result of the infestation of public space by a 
myriad of private interests, the development of a new impetus for (re)production and 
the fragmentation of subjectivity that results. The political system has remained 
focused on catering to the political demands of homo faber and animal laborans - 
keeping them safe and productive. Meanwhile, the capitalists have generated new and 
ingenious ways to cater to consumers’ agonistic desire. By harnessing the agonistic 
drive of contemporary citizens in order to strategically exploit this failure on the part 
of the political public space, those who strategically control discursive spaces occlude 
the drive to critically engage with political decisions. 
 
The political institutions of homo faber remain organised on the basis of the old 
liberal conception of the individual; however, following the structural transformation 
of the public sphere, these same institutions deny the opportunity for public 
expression to the individual. 
The establishment of basic political rights in the framework of mass democracy means, on one 
hand, a universalization of the role of citizen and, on the other hand, a segmenting of this role 
from the decision making process, a cleansing of political participation from any participatory 
content. (Habermas 1987b: 250)   227 
Insofar as citizens’ agonism is actually engaged in the “private” spaces they inhabit in 
an immediate, gratifying and functional way, the system of representative voting on 
“public” issues every four years becomes rather obsolete as an agonistic engagement.  
In the society of homo spectaculorum: 
citizenship is not primarily realised in a relation with the state, nor does it involve 
participation in a uniform public sphere; citizenship, rather, entails active engagement in a 
diversified and dispersed variety of private, corporate and quasi-corporate practices, of which 
working and shopping are paradigmatic. (Rose 2000: 327)  
Whilst the state seeks to compete with the market by entering into citizens’ 
consciousness as an element of consumption, it fails to foster the critical, expressive 
role that Habermas and Arendt believe is integral to a virtuous public space. The 
market has responded to the citizen’s need for agonistic engagement, whereas the 
political system remains unresponsive and devoid of plural criticism. In the context of 
a world pervaded by screens, the political system of representative liberal 
democracies shrinks, for the most part, to a relatively derived subsystem of power 
distribution. 
 
While the political symptom of the public realm dominated by homo faber was an 
exclusion of critical voices that could not phrase their arguments in terms of 
instrumental rationality, the political symptom of homo spectaculorum is a complete 
lack of association between the public realm of homo faber and meaningful political 
participation. Whilst homo faber could not care about anything that wasn’t 
quantifiable,  homo spectaculorum is motivated to care about more than pure 
instrumentality - but does not identify the ossified political system of homo faber as a 
meaningful place to do so. Indeed homo spectaculorum is asked to care about 
everything, as they are continually reminded that every space they engage in has 
meaning associated with it. 
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The Blurring of Public and Private Spaces 
This shift of meaning defining contexts into the private realm has undermined the 
quality of private space as Arendt understands it. For Arendt, the quality of the private 
realm depends upon the quality of the public realm.  
While [entirely public life] retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from 
some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real non-
subjective strength…The only efficient way to guarantee the darkness of what needs to be 
hidden against the light of publicity is private property, a privately owned place to hide in. 
(Arendt 1958: 71) 
The proliferation of screens and meaning providers in private contexts makes it very 
hard for homo spectaculorum to judge exactly what is private and what is public. 
Indeed, critical scrutiny of the “public” spaces homo spectaculorum inhabits reveals 
them to be private. Under this condition, the boundary between the real world and the 
perceived world is fractured, and the distinction between public and private becomes 
completely blurred.  
The spectacle erases the dividing line between self and world, in that the self, under siege by 
the presence/absence of the world, is eventually overwhelmed: it likewise erases the dividing 
line between true and false, repressing all directly lived truth beneath the real presence of the 
falsehood maintained by the organisation of appearances. The individual, though condemned 
to the passive acceptance of an everyday reality, is thus driven into a form of madness in 
which, by resorting to magical devices, he entertains the illusion that he is reacting to his fate. 
The recognition and consumption of commodities are at the core of this pseudo-response to a 
communication to which no response is possible. The need to imitate that the consumer 
experiences is indeed a truly infantile need, one determined by every aspect of his 
fundamental dispossession. (Debord 1990: 153) 
The dual effect of the proliferation of private spaces that usurp the role of public 
space is to politicise privacy and depoliticise the public. This is the condition that the 
market requires in order to remain a meaning giver. As suggested by Arendt and 
further examined at the beginning of the chapter, the banal rise of the instrumental 
public sphere paved the way for this occlusion of the political by the social. 
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In Habermasian terms, the transfer of world-defining roles to the market means 
simply that the steering media provided by administrative power are undermined 
while the steering media provided by money become more powerful. This is quite a 
distinct change from the “one dimensional” society dominated by the public realm of 
homo faber, in which all public legitimacy was constrained by a pervasive ideology 
established through public institutions. The ideologies that dominate public 
institutions in the “public” realm of homo spectaculorum are usually generated from 
the dominant private ideology of the times
103. Exactly how far the care of homo 
spectaculorum extends depends upon the screens s/he is surrounded by. There is 
nothing rational about this. Command of screens is generally open to those in control 
of steering media and thus they are the ones who get to manipulate publicity. 
Freedom and Steering Media 
The concept of spatial control as a device through which dominance is exercised can 
be seen as being closely related to Habermas’s notion of steering media. An 
individual’s ability to control money and power determines the extent to which their 
virtual world reflects their expressions, discussions and decisions. The “trick” is not 
that the working class escapes control, it is that their engaging worlds are less real and 
more likely to be constrained by someone else’s expression. Whilst people who have 
access to steering media can control their real environment to the extent that their 
control over steering media allows, those who do not exist in a strategically defined 
environment and seek to express their agonism through their strategically determined 
interactions. It is in this sense that we can understand Marcuse’s point that the only 
possibility of freedom in late capitalist society remains the fantasy of control over the 
                                                 
103 Such as widely facilitated by the “privatisation” of public institutions to allow such institutions to 
operate under greater market influence. 
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entire apparatus (Marcuse 1968: xxvi). We apportion engagement with the spectacle 
to everyone. The real  quality of that engagement becomes the commodifiable 
element, the greater control over steering media the more chance your expression will 
be effected in the “real” world. Even so, by Arendtian standards, this real world, along 
with all the “publics” that engage homo spectaculorum, is not real at all – it is a 
construction taking the place of reality.  
 
The effect of the interaction of modulation and steering media is that the wealthier 
you become, the further you can use the steering media to which you have access to 
assert your particular spectacle as reality. Greater control over money and power 
translates directly in more control over the screens that exist outside one’s immediate 
area. In current conditions we find that the majority of money and power is 
concentrated in the hands of very few people. They are not acting together, nor are 
they necessarily competitive - though they don’t necessarily have evil intentions. The 
control wielded over “public reality” that is currently available to people in power can 
be seen in the way Tony Blair managed to rationalise an invasion based upon a media 
dossier. The communicative, thoughtful process that Habermas and Arendt desire may 
be taken to have been avoided at two points in this case. In the first instance, critical 
decisions should be made on intelligence (information exposed to critical scrutiny 
within government), not speculation and the assembly of media reports. In the second 
instance, the BBC, a trusted news source, seems to have been reporting material 
without subjecting that material to critical scrutiny. One question that arises in this 
context concerns the kind of editing process that effects what we see on our screens. 
Those with access to governmental power and news media do not need to ensure the 
“reality” of what they report. Instead, they are aware that their position in regard to   231 
steering media allows them to delineate reality as such and in such a position they are 
unlikely to be subjected to critical scrutiny. 
 
On the other hand, the less access people have to money and power, the less “real” or 
public the extent of their modulation is likely to be. It is more likely that those who 
are deprived of steering media will control only their private environment; their home 
environment, their work space, perhaps their own body. Insofar as those with less 
access to money and power tend to receive their world-orientations passively from the 
environment, the virtual worlds they inhabit are defined by those who do establish the 
“public space” in which they engage. The less control people have over steering 
media, however, the less likely it is that they will have the ability to project their 
reality; rather they will move within spaces that are projected by others in order to 
make themselves a functional component of those spaces, without actually being 
given the power to constitute themselves as an act of unique expression. In the society 
of homo spectaculorum the ability to be noble and avoid ressentiment is the ability to 
live according to one’s own projection.  
Homo spectaculorum and Identity Politics 
The dominance of the political realm of homo faber in the time of the rise of homo 
spectaculorum also contributes to the rise of fundamentalisms, ethnic politics and the 
extreme detachment of individuals from the instrumental political subsystem. The 
purpose of public space, as conceived by Habermas and Arendt, is to bring 
individuals together in a forum that can coordinate public action in a fair and 
reasonable way and which is explicitly accepted and constituted by the participants. 
By failing to encourage the active involvement of citizens in the process of   232 
government, the political subsystem has bought about the decline of such a “public” 
space. The loss of such a space manifests itself as an extreme form of individualism, 
whereby individuals lose sense of their real public identities as a source of value 
orientation and, instead, seek to locate themselves within an existing set of 
orientations – opening them up for ressentiment in the process
104.  
 
Liberal democracies tend to orient participants through utilitarian notions about 
private loss and gain, and for this reason this subsystem is largely redundant as an 
avenue for political expression in an Arendtian or Habermasian sense. Thus we find 
that: 
deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many 
people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very 
often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. 
(Mouffe 2000a: 96) 
Everywhere citizens abandon the political public space as a space in which they might 
reasonably and equitably address their political concerns. As a result, they find their 
outlets of expression in more private fora that are not always conducive to considered 
or careful thought. Many instances of so-called “terrorism” are only extremely violent 
outcomes of this process of exclusion; terrorism often appears to be the action of 
people excluded from proper political participation.  
 
The failure of the public realm of homo faber to deal with the political expressiveness 
of homo spectaculorum is a direct result of the interaction of the unified political 
institutions of homo faber with the fragmented subjectivity of homo spectaculorum. 
Representative liberal democracies, very much based upon the notion of irreducible 
                                                 
104 Arendt discusses the thoughtlessness effected by the loss of public meaning in (Arendt 1967: 477 
esp. ) 
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and consistent individuals, still seek to affect power through discipline over distinct 
national territories. They operate in this way despite the fact that most citizens’ 
political engagement rarely conforms to that of national territories. The result is that, 
in attempting to address the concerns of individuals as private citizens, the national 
governments appropriate public power for private ends, determined through projected 
“publics” that are not primarily generated by authentically democratic processes.  
 
While the conditions that give rise to homo spectaculorum are not restricted to 
national borders, the political apparatus that purports to serve homo spectaculorum 
remains fixed to the nation-state. In their function as utilitarian “ends-meeting” 
government, the role of national governments is to provide the security that the 
spectacle demands. The reduction of government to the purposes of homo faber 
means that governments fail to cater to the political needs of homo spectaculorum. 
Rather, the role of government is confined to finding the solution to technical 
problems; such as how to secure a supply of oil necessary for continued economic 
growth or how to avoid international conventions on human rights and resource 
consumption in order to perpetuate systemic stability. The political subsystem ensures 
its continued survival by acting as an institutional guarantor of the reality established 
by those in control of steering media. 
 
In the process, the politics of representative democracies becomes a spectacle, and 
culture becomes even more spectacular. As we transmit and imbibe the spectacle 
globally, we continually appropriate wealth and power nationally, and the resulting 
dissonance between what we expect and what others perceive reflects an international 
conflict between system and lifeworld. Sustained by our national governmental   234 
systems we are continually advancing spectacular notions of legitimacy that are not 
reconcilable with the internationally constituted lifeworld. The conflict that this 
incommensurability generates represents the ultimate tension between the spectacular 
and the real and the resolution of this tension will determine the future human 
condition. I discuss the ways that this tension might resolve itself in the conclusion. In 
order to provide further evidence that this subjectivity is emerging, however, in the 
following section I shall examine some of the practical manifestations of the critical 
failings of homo spectaculorum. 
The Material Manifestations of the Society of Homo spectaculorum 
The Waste Economy 
I believe that the most startling cultural aberration caused by the shift of agonistic 
engagement from the political realm to the market is the thoughtlessness of the waste 
economy. By encountering our reality as strategically designed by private interests:  
we have found a way to act on the earth and within terrestrial nature as though we dispose of it 
from outside, from the Archimedean point. And even at the risk of endangering the natural life 
process we expose the earth to universal, cosmic forces alien to nature’s household. (Arendt 
1958: 262) 
Examples of the waste economy generated by the market’s position as agonistic 
forum abound, but one exemplar is the increasing use of sports utility vehicles for 
personal transport. Despite their relatively high impact on the environment, despite 
the increasing scarcity and cost of oil, indeed, despite the fact that wars are being 
fought over this resource, the demand for these awkward, dangerous and 
uneconomical vehicles is increasing. One explanation for this is that they are large 
and, for the purposes of display, a large vehicle can be considered superior; 
furthermore their “utility” panders to a constructed notion of the possibility of 
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freedom (Flint 2004)
105. The expansion of the ownership of such vehicles is a result of 
the fact that they make a statement about their owners that the owners find they 
cannot make anywhere else, such as in a truly public political forum. The consumer 
does not engage in all other forms of the spectacle just to become a rational utility 
maximiser precisely at the moment when the opportunity for personal expression 
presents itself.  
 
This drive to engage in the agonism of the market is causing a dramatic increase in 
consumption, despite the fact that this consumption seems to offer very little 
satisfaction. As Monbiot has pointed out, humanity has used more goods and services 
since 1950 than in the rest of human history, yet in the same period the incidence of 
depression has increased tenfold (Monbiot 2000b). Monbiot suggests that the inbuilt 
obsolescence of many consumer goods is a possible cause of this statistic, but an 
application of Habermas’s and Arendt’s ideas suggests a deeper root for the problem 
– the society of homo spectaculorum modulates desire in such a way that no product 
is ever likely to satisfy in the way that it is purported to do so at purchase
106. Not only 
are newer and better products conjured by the market at a startling rate, but the 
desirable features themselves can be reconstructed in order to change the meaning of 
a product and to require a new purchase. The fashion industry is the best example of 
this. As fashion changes, what one was wearing five years ago could not possibly be 
worn this year as it no longer has contemporary meaning. The dominant symptom of 
the society of homo spectaculorum is that everything becomes fashion and, therefore, 
                                                 
105 Advertisements for such vehicles seem to invariably depict a fantasy that command over such a 
vehicle translates to command over the environment around it. As Marcuse suggests and was discussed 
earlier, for homo spectaculorum freedom is seen as control over everything (see (Marcuse 1968)). 
106 The lack of true public space for disclosure is linked to this inability. The private public spaces of 
homo spectaculorum modulate themself in order to ensure that what is suitable behaviour at one 
moment is inappropriate in the next. 
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is redundant soon after it has been purchased. An obsession with objects has 
undermined the understanding that action is the source of happiness, hence the act of 
consuming itself becomes the source of happiness, and the obsolescence of 
commodities ensures that this activity must be engaged in continuously. The 
generation of the need for material goods, which are only public status markers, is 
what has led to an unsustainable increase in the consumption of resources. 
 
The competitive demand for resources between nations is one of the consequences of 
the sharp spike of consumption in the late capitalist period. Oil is the prime 
commodity and, as a map of conflict throughout the world indicates, the presence of 
oil without the wealth to defend it generates conflict. Even more catastrophic, though, 
is the jealous hoarding of wealth and political power by those in wealthy nations. At a 
time in human development which has been characterized as “post-scarcity”, those 
sovereign nations with wealth are spending massive amounts of money to ensure no-
one else can gain access to it.  
Homo spectaculorum and the International Order 
Despite some attempts by the United Nations to generate an international fraternity, 
no such engagement exists. Indeed, self-evident truths about all being equal are not 
even maintained to be true when national interest is at stake
107. It may be reasonable 
to identify a human as a human, and not differentiate further between people, but 
nationalism is the oldest usurper of such communicative engagement. For this reason 
we can understand that the United States refuses to endorse an international criminal 
                                                 
107 Referring to the first lines of the United States’ Declaration of Independence ‘We hold these truths 
to be self evident: That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain 
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. 
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court, such as might have been used to bring Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein 
to trial, on the basis that the United States does not wish to conform to the same 
norms as everyone else. It seems that the consciousness of homo spectaculorum does 
not need to reconcile the deaths of the thousands of people who were killed in the 
process of enforced regime change with their otherwise inalienable right to life. Other 
nations are taken to be competitors in order to ensure electoral and popular support, 
therefore, each must present the illusion to their citizens that their nation is stronger, 
wealthier and more successful than the others
108. Nations, therefore, engage in the 
society of homo spectaculorum, with the tangible result that the wealthier a nation 
becomes the more it spends on the defence of that wealth.  
 
One recent example of this is the planned militarisation of space. Members of the 
United States government intend to install a missile defence system that will protect 
the United States from the type of weapons it itself uses in its national interest. This 
system is predicted to cost in excess of US$270 Billion (Isaacs 2001), an expenditure 
that in itself is a form of display. In essence, this system of “defence” gives the United 
States government sovereign power, in the Weberian sense
109, over the entire globe. 
For Habermas and Arendt the development of such a weapons program should 
necessitate the establishment of concurrent deliberative mechanisms, yet those 
involved in international relations continue to act strategically rather than 
communicatively. From even the most pragmatic perspective, the failure to reconcile 
this coercive power with communicative power is likely to stimulate anti-American 
                                                 
108 ‘image-making [has become] global policy’ (Arendt 1972a: 21,18) . 
109 Max Weber identified state power as being achieved through the state’s monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence. From a Habermasian and Arendtian standpoint, power is communicative, hence the 
missile defence system is redundant considering the United States’ strategic dominance of the 
communicative institutions of international relations.   238 
sentiment and will certainly undermine the sovereignty of every other nation on earth. 
The absence of a public forum that will thematise and scrutinise the arguments for 
such a weapons platform in an engaging and critical way means that the platform is 
created for spectacular purposes beyond an instrumental interest in human survival. 
 
There may be progressive potential in this process of globalisation/centralisation. 
Homo spectaculorum is aware of national boundaries but does not feel confined or 
defined by them. This characteristic distinguishes homo spectaculorum from homo 
faber. While homo faber remains tied to the productive apparatus, the productive 
imperatives of homo spectaculorum encourage travel. As Habermas suggests in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, such population movement can be 
seen as conducive to the development of critical dialogues that lead to the 
development of a vibrant public sphere. Certainly, it is possible to argue that this 
change is leading to greater intersubjectivity on the part of homo spectaculorum
110 
and that this, in turn, is responsible for the political ascendency of international non-
governmental organisations, such as Medecins Sans Frontiers and Amnesty 
International, which specifically try to address human issues without regard to 
political boundaries. 
 
The political consciousness of homo spectaculorum, however, is restrained by its 
material conditions. Non-governmental organisations are serving as publics in lieu of 
a meaningful international public forum. While they are well intentioned, such 
organisations lack the legitimacy that comes from public office and are treated 
arbitrarily by institutions such as nation-states (Monbiot 2003: 82). While the society 
                                                 
110 This positive potential of homo spectaculorum will be assessed in the Conclusion to this thesis.   239 
of homo spectaculorum is increasingly responsive to global events, writers such as 
Clifford Bob note that this responsiveness is tailored by the spectacular imperatives of 
non-governmental organisations, rather than the demands of those requiring assistance 
(Bob 2002). Lacking a discursive international political forum, the international 
political expression of homo spectaculorum is clumsy and uncritical. 
 
As an example of the weaknesses of existing international political institutions, it is 
helpful to recount how the United Nations, a plural but not entirely discursive public 
organisation, stood in opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, due to its plural 
congregation of discursive participants who agreed that the invasion of Iraq was 
illegitimate, it had to stand against the invasion of Iraq. Nonetheless the invasion went 
ahead, initially as a reflection of the strength of the United States’ brute power and 
subsequently as a consequence of the strength of its propaganda. Only in societies 
dominated by homo spectaculorum, where there is a massive disassociation between 
“reality” and critical communicative power, could the invasion not only still take 
place but also gain popular support.  
  
It is reasonable to surmise that since the United Nations was created to prevent the 
emergence of totalitarianism, what negates the United Nations is in fact that very 
totalitarianism. Here we find the superposition of the negative aspects of Arendt’s and 
Habermas’s theories. Because the lifeworld is colonised and because we are lacking a 
public space where reality can reveal itself, the individual goes through a process of 
fragmentation of consciousness and loses trust in themselves as a partner of their own 
thoughts. They become isolated and, in isolation, seek to reground their sentiments 
through knowing.  In coming to know something in a colonised lifeworld without 
Deleted: z
Deleted: ,
Deleted: t
Deleted: ,
Deleted: …
Deleted: i
Deleted: z  240 
engaging in critique we come to support the system. We come to identify the interests 
of the system as our own and we lose the critical impetus with which to address social 
issues. 
 
In the society of homo spectaculorum, contemporary “terrorism” has to increase, as it 
constitutes the realm of otherness to capitalism. As depicted by the theorists of 
modulation, capital will tend to inculcate and then subsume. In the process we can 
expect to discover that “terrorism” has eventually become commodified, with the 
concurrent linguistification of the concept
111. This will give rise to some perverse 
ironies whereby terrorism actually gains power despite the fact that it has become 
reified as a particular type of fashion. This is the way in which capital will defeat 
terrorism, existing as it does now as a constructed notion. A communicative 
exploration of the term “terrorism” would expose the fact that “terrorists” are really 
opponents of United States hegemony that act violently, and such a reasoned 
exploration might begin to investigate what the justification for this opposition is. 
There is no need for this exploration in the society of homo spectaculorum; for the 
population accepts that terrorists are irrational monsters, the new “other” that were 
once communists, and at other times Jews. They can be blamed for the world’s ills, 
and they can be eradicated. 
 
This allusion to the holocaust brings us back to where we began – Arendt and 
thinking. The society of homo spectaculorum, although it differs somewhat from that 
of homo faber, shares the common failing to foster critical thought and, therefore, is 
                                                 
111 Given that terrorism is currently undefinable, it is in some sense still sacred and delinguistified. It 
currently serves as an evil idol that is normatively powerful only because it is never examined or 
explained as a concept. 
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subject to similar problems. The society of homo spectaculorum has catered to the 
public need for participation and interaction with public power by allowing this 
interaction to take place within the market; but the market itself does not promote the 
processes of thought and reason in the manner Habermas and Arendt assure us is vital 
to the integrity of the public sphere. Subsequently our reality, humanity and identity 
are all casualties of the rise of homo spectaculorum. 
Conclusion: The Loss of the Real Natural Public as a Source 
of Democratic Emancipation 
Hanna Pitkin has described how the opportunities for submersion in the unreal, or the 
virtually real, have exploded in the last thirty years (Pitkin 1998: 273). Thus the rise 
of the society of homo spectaculorum can be seen as an extension of Arendt’s 
uncritical social realm because it abstracts the real from the immanent public, and 
places a preconceived and uncritical social reality in its place. The internet and the 
associated “virtual realities” of homo spectaculorum have allowed people to become 
ever more isolated and insulated in their virtual worlds; while these virtual worlds 
have, at the same time, become more responsive and tangible. This lack of public 
reality spells the demise of reason and the ascent of desire. If we believe that the 
majority of the population of the demos have no pressing reason to be engaged with 
“reality” as such, then we may question whether it is necessary to advocate a 
democratic system of government at all. Indeed, without being preoccupied with 
consistency of reality and identity, it is possible to engage agonism in ever more 
spectacular and quantifiable ways. Indeed this is exactly what the market currently 
does. 
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Maintaining a consistent identity in contemporary society can be a most daunting 
challenge, and we are currently debating exactly how useful identity is considering it 
only ever produces dissonance
112. This is the fundamental failure of contemporary 
democracies and is particularly notable because, while capital and information have 
globalised, political communication has not. The self’s failure to disclose in the world 
leads to a heightened emphasis on self control, which for homo spectaculorum is an 
expression of power as “real” as any “public” engagement
113. Once people enter the 
engaging spaces of strategically designed public space they are necessarily made 
more aware of the effects of their own consciousness. Whether this consciousness is 
emancipatory (that is, intersubjective, expressive and noble) or oppressive (that is, 
isolated, colonised and enslaved), the awareness of the abstract relation between the 
self and the world is made more acute by immersion in the society of homo 
spectaculorum. 
 
This chapter was intended to highlight the reasons why, from Habermas’s and 
Arendt’s perspectives, liberal representative political systems are unable to engage 
with contemporary sovereignty. The harmony between capitalism and liberalism is 
predicated upon the primacy of the individual as a basic, irreducible and impermeable 
unit. This is important because it distinguishes liberal from agonistic and deliberative 
models of democratic function. The latter two are predicated on the idea that 
individuals are inseparable from the world in which they come into being. The liberal 
model, instead, is predicated on the notion that individuals exist prior to, and in some 
                                                 
112 Not least because average citizens are not given an opportunity to disclose their selves in relation to 
a real world in any meaningful way and are thus denied that element of being human. The dissonance 
between consistent and schizophrenic identities has been explored in (Deleuze and Guattari 1983) and 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987). 
113 Hence Foucault’s conclusion that since the world is not given to us ‘we should create ourselves as 
works of art’ (Foucault 1983: 237). 
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way separately from, the world in which they act. The centrality of this notion to 
liberal theories of meaning is one of the reasons that liberal democracy is so useful for 
expansive capitalism; for this understanding of individuality makes sense of the 
world-alienation generated by modernity and the formation of one’s world 
independent of the public is the perfect motivation for continued capitalist expansion. 
The notion of world-alienation also underlies the liberal conception of the primary 
purpose of the state – namely, to ensure that one’s liberty is not impinged upon by 
others. This conception of self, as somehow separate from the world, or, indeed, in 
need of its own world, can be viewed as assuming antagonism in light of the fact that 
we are still bound to the human condition of sharing one planet. 
 
In determining where homo spectaculorum is heading, one must draw conclusions 
about whether humanity needs to remain human. There is much evidence in the 
society of homo spectaculorum that the conscious seduction of consumerism is 
pervasive and that a widespread detachment from reality is here to stay. As Michael 
Heim notes ‘the final point of a virtual world is to dissolve the constraints of the 
anchored world so we can lift that anchor – not to drift aimlessly without point, but so 
we can explore anchorage in ever new places’ (Heim 1993: 7). This project of 
exploration is certainly one that can be geared to the satisfaction of desires that do not 
reflect the constraints of reality. 
 
The rise of homo spectaculorum - desiring beings who are quasi-rational and 
increasingly able to determine the objective qualities of their own experiences - 
suggests a tendency for the public processes of reality constitution to move into ever 
more virtual realms. At the same time as we experience reduced access to public 
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space that might constitute reality, we have increasing access to “virtual” realities. 
The question arises, then, as to whether we should we feel nostalgic for a reason or 
regard for reality that essentially enslaves us and restricts our enjoyment of those 
agonistic indulgences that seem to be the one indefatigable element of consciousness.  
 
Homo spectaculorum thus exacerbates the critical failings of democratic systems. The 
failure to reconcile our “public realms” with reality would suggest that the political 
has been occluded by the social, or that the lifeworld has been colonised by the 
system. The way in which this dissonance will resolve itself is hard to predict, but 
there is significant evidence that the “real” world cannot support the consumptive 
expression of our spectacular selves. If the material existence of late-capitalist 
societies was to be extended to the entire globe, the real world is likely to be 
threatened by environmental destruction. The problem is precisely that we have lost 
touch with the “real” world and, instead, engage in a world that has only a cursory 
resemblance to the one formed from the human condition. 
 
This is not to say that the existence of homo spectaculorum is not worth considering 
or exploring on the basis of an a priori assumption of the worth of human life. 
However, the tension between the detached public spaces of homo spectaculorum and 
homo faber and the real public space of humanity demands action. We might discover 
how to decouple the virtual public spaces of homo spectaculorum from the material 
productivity of homo faber, or we might let systemic rationality develop to the point 
that we can physically leave the earth and explore new realms of material, systemic 
existence. These alternatives emphasise the virtues of immersion in systemic 
rationality, they signal the emergence of a spectacular existence.   245 
 
Following the loss of a public forum in which to understand the real, and the 
subsequent emergence of control as control of the self, there is much to suggest that 
the world has also lost the means to chart a course back to “reality”. A commonly 
held reality can be restricting, denying people the opportunities to indulge a desire for 
some public good that appears increasingly illegitimate (as the public itself shrinks to 
one particularly perverse subsystem). Hence we can envisage a future in which there 
is no politics as such, just an incredibly deliberative and reflexive market that caters to 
isolated individuals in their screened environments. Such a future would promote the 
development of desire-satisfaction as opposed to reason-satisfaction. This future 
would represent the complete colonisation of the lifeworld, the loss of shared 
experience, and it would alter the human condition to such an extent that “human” 
traits may no longer be a suitable basis for political systems. Such a situation has been 
discussed by a number of political theorists, including Donna Harraway, whose 
‘Cyborg Manifesto’ details this scenario. 
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our 
ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and 
material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation. 
(Haraway 1991: 150) 
The reconceptualisation of the political following the concurrent developments of 
information and communication technologies and postmodern philosophy has tended 
to avoid engaging with the human search for the truth and moved towards imagining 
what might come from abandoning such a search. A reasonable and legitimate 
democratic government is one barely lamented casualty of such abandonment.   246 
Conclusion 
What follows includes a brief overview of the subject matter of this thesis and some 
discussion of its conclusions. Initially I shall summarise the main points of the thesis 
in such a way as to indicate the contribution this thesis makes to scholarship. In the 
latter parts of this conclusion I wish to discuss the emancipatory possibilities of 
agency and communicative acts available to homo spectaculorum. This discussion is 
included because the pessimism that results from observing the way that homo 
spectaculorum interacts with the political public realm of homo faber makes it 
difficult to identify the positive effects that derive from applying Habermas’s and 
Arendt’s theories to current conditions. Given that both Habermas and Arendt find 
ways to be hopeful with respect to the future, it seems proper, perhaps authentic, that I 
should conclude with some discussion of the sources of hope for homo 
spectaculorum.   
 
The first part of this chapter identifies how I have constructed the theories of 
Habermas and Arendt in order to highlight a particular problem with democracy and 
to make a contribution to critical theory. Part Two presents an overview of a positive 
interpretation of Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories in light of the rise of 
information and communication technologies. Part Three revisits the subject of 
Chapter Three, namely, why it is difficult to be positive about the possibilities of 
democracy in contemporary conditions. I finish by offering some ideas about the 
ways in which the flaws of contemporary democracies might be addressed.   247 
Part One: Using Habermas and Arendt to Construct a 
Critical Democratic Theory 
Part of the original contribution to knowledge of this thesis lies in the elaboration 
presented concerning the ways in which it is possible to read Habermas and Arendt as 
complementary theorists when thinking about how democracy might be redesigned. 
Another part of its contribution to scholarship is in its outlining of ways in which a 
synthesis of Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories can be applied to contemporary 
conditions. While in the thesis I suggest that synthesising Habermas’s and Arendt’s 
theories creates pessimism with respect to achieving true public spaces in 
contemporary material conditions, I believe the thesis also makes an important 
contribution by identifying the limitations and potentials of homines spectaculorum’s 
interactions with contemporary liberal democracies. I shall briefly summarise each of 
these claims in order to clarify what this research indicates and how it might be used. 
Habermas and Arendt as Complementary Theorists 
The areas of complementarity between Arendt and Habermas that I have sought to 
highlight derive primarily from their shared understanding of the communicative 
composition of power. This shared premise allows their theories to be read together as 
an effort to reconcile expressive agency with political power. I assert that their 
understanding of the role that public space plays in generating a critical interaction 
with reality, along with their similar depiction of the conditions of critical dialogue 
and the resulting immanence of political emancipation, combine to produce a 
synthesis that is a meaningful and practicable contribution to critical theory. In each 
of these instances the two theorists’ positions reconcile with each other in a way that 
is not only consistent but complementary.   248 
 
In the first chapter I sought to outline the similarities between Arendt’s and 
Habermas’s description of the problem with modern democracies, as identified in The 
Human Condition and The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. I 
suggested that, although they start their journey from different places and with 
different perspectives, they each believe that liberal democracies suffer from the lack 
of a forum that stimulates critical thought. I have used this commonality, in part, to 
justify my sympathetic reading of the two theorists, but also to justify the remainder 
of the project: looking into the ways in which Habermas and Arendt suggest that this 
critical deficit might be addressed. 
 
Whereas the first chapter provided an exploration the similarities between Arendt’s 
and Habermas’s diagnoses of the problems with modern democracies, the second 
chapter was an attempt to illustrate the point that their solutions are also highly 
complementary. As discussed in Chapter Two, the basic area of agreement between 
Habermas and Arendt is in their shared understanding of the communicative 
composition of legitimate power. This shared understanding is reflected in Arendt’s 
statements concerning the meaning of public life deriving from the plural engagement 
with (and composition of) reality (Arendt 1958: 57) and Habermas’s insistence that 
fundamental normative agreement must form the basis of action coordination prior to 
the influence of steering media. As a result of this understanding of the composition 
of power, I have pointed out how each theorist seeks to integrate personal agency with 
power in the most gratifying and expressive way. 
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Whereas other theorists have sought to distinguish Arendt’s and Habermas’s projects 
at this point, I have instead sought to emphasise how their ideas about expressive 
critical conduct actually complement each other. For instance, for those who 
emphasise that Habermas’s deliberative democracy presents a rationally hegemonic 
version of discourse that carries a necessary political violence of exclusion
114, 
Arendt’s notion of the inescapably plural nature of the public forum suggests that 
such hegemony is something of a practical impossibility. It becomes clear that Arendt 
and Habermas share this understanding when one realises that Habermas’s 
requirement that claims to truth be discursively redeemed is intended to draw out and 
celebrate this plurality, as opposed to exclude it
115. On the other hand, where Arendt’s 
agonistic democracy has been criticised for relying on a competitive expression of 
uniqueness that too easily ‘results in universal suspicion and resentment’ (O'Sullivan 
2000), Habermas’s conditions of ideal communication provide a reflexive theory that 
can ensure that agonism does not develop into antagonism. 
 
The similarity between Habermas’s and Arendt’s ideas here is based upon other 
shared preconceptions. Namely, both Arendt and Habermas believe that there is a 
fundamental intersubjectivity that is achievable and practicable between all human 
subjects; or rather, that there is something about being human which endows us with 
                                                 
114 Such as (Mouffe 2000b) as discussed in Chapter Two. 
115 Those who appropriate the Habermas’s deliberative democracy as rationally hegemonic 
misunderstand the purpose of communicative action. According to such a reading, Habermas’s theory 
of communicative action seems to suggest that we might find that an agreement would render further 
debate needless if we were all included in processes of decision making. Put this way, if we universally 
experienced an ideal speech situation and if every citizen of the earth could contribute and come to 
agreement about existence through the use of communicative action, the result of communication 
would then be reality defining and somewhat limiting of the possibilities of further thought, criticism 
and distinction. An Arendtian perspective on the inevitable plurality of the world, however, asserts that 
the natural world will always contribute the unexpected, local variances and other plural 
inconsistencies that would generate rupture and disagreement. Habermas himself is acutely aware of 
the local nature of legitimacy, hence his focus on local legitimacy as opposed to universal truth. 
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the ability to make meaning together. Arendt contends that there is a human need to 
make meaning, which gives rise to the construction of the public realm (Arendt 1958: 
180). Habermas, in turn, relies upon the human need for legitimation as a source of 
ongoing communicative interaction. In the process of public dialogue the critical 
faculties of communication and thought are stimulated, validating the self and the 
public realm in the process. Once again, the themes of validation and critical action 
can be developed concurrently through the intersection of Arendt’s description of 
thought and Habermas’s idealisation of communication. In each case the idea is to 
reduce contemplation and decision making down to the most legitimate or real basis. 
 
Arendt’s and Habermas’s democratic theories are also largely complementary insofar 
as they both present the possibility of human emancipation as something which is 
already imminent to the individual. What I hope to have derived from reading 
Habermas and Arendt in this way is that we understand that emancipatory acts - 
asking that claims to truth be discursively redeemed, and distinguishing oneself 
through public challenge and argument - are actually accessible to all of us, even 
homo spectaculorum. Indeed, homo spectaculorum may well have a greater 
propensity for redemption and distinction than either animal laborans or homo faber; 
although I have argued that the conditions which might encourage such an 
engagement are disappearing in contemporary publics. 
 
It has not been my intention to suggest that Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic 
theories are the same or interchangeable, but rather to identify how they complement 
each other in terms of increasing our understanding of the critical deficit of liberal 
democracies. This process of identification unearthed a common understanding of the 
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social nature of individuality, which stands in contrast to the liberal conception of the 
individual existing prior to and, in many senses, above, the society in which that 
individual is formed. By alerting us to the communicative composition of power and 
the importance of democratic interaction in making sure that individual sovereignty is 
both critical and engaged with the world, Arendt and Habermas present a common 
front against the premises of liberal democracy. For they both oppose a conception of 
individuals as existing outside of the communicative and public community of which 
they are part.  
 
While liberal democracy is based upon the existence of individual rights prior to the 
individual’s engagement with the world, Habermas and Arendt both emphasise the 
symbiotic connection between self (and rights) and world. Through their 
understanding of the communicative composition of power both theorists emphasise 
the identity forming aspects of the interaction between self and world. They therefore 
design their emancipatory projects around ensuring a critical interaction between self 
and world – notably involving thought and consideration – rather than a passive 
reception of self and world. They each identify chimerical moments in history in 
which the interaction between self and world was both critical and engaging as 
facilitated by democratic politics. They also identify the ways in which the critical and 
engaging elements of political fora have been usurped and replaced by more passive 
modes of reality reception.  
 
What I also hope to have shown in this thesis is that Habermas’s and Arendt’s 
theories are particularly cogent in light of the contemporary condition of public space. 
The first two chapters emphasise that Habermas and Arendt identify that world 
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reception and world creation are integral to the constitution of the self. Habermas and 
Arendt both emphasise the point that engagement and control of the self translates 
directly to engagement and control of the world. What they conspire against is the 
passive construction of self in relation to a world that is determined by the 
constructions of those who control the identity forming contexts of public space. This 
is the threat carried by the public space of homo faber - which is instrumental and 
valued only in terms of its ends - and the “private” public spaces of homo 
spectaculorum - which are judged in terms of their capacity for desire-satisfaction. 
Habermas and Arendt believe that it is possible to reassert the importance of self in 
world creation through democratic action, action that resists the passive reception of 
reality and engages in the construction of the world. It is in this context that they 
present their democratic theories as emancipatory theories, taking the view that it is 
through aspiring toward a sound democratic form that a freer and better human 
existence can be generated.  
Applying Habermas’s and Arendt’s Theories to Contemporary 
Conditions 
The other contribution that this thesis makes to scholarship is to apply Habermas’s 
and Arendt’s theories to contemporary conditions. This application brings into focus 
the weakness of Arendt’s assertion about the persistent plural nature of reality given 
the loss of public space. Dana Villa has described this dilemma: 
From an Arendtian perspective, the challenge of a “postmodern” politics is to maintain the 
link between action and publicity in a context where the institutionalised public sphere is 
deeply compromised and the definition of what is properly “public” is perhaps the most hotly 
contested issue of all. (Villa 1997: 201) 
The argument developed here is that the fragmentation of publics, realities and 
identities that occurs following the colonisation of the lifeworld fundamentally   253 
undermines the link between action and publicity and does not facilitate their 
reconciliation with reality. The effect this has on the emancipatory potential of 
democratic action undermines the very basis of Arendt’s hope for the inerradicable 
emancipatory force of natality. Whilst Habermas’s theory is much more conducive to 
generating legitimacy even in the conditions of a highly “abstracted” reality, I have 
used Chapter Three to suggest that the loss of a real public undermines the 
individual’s concerns for legitimacy, reality and care for the “other”. 
 
Habermas acknowledges that the development of a completely cynical consciousness 
undermines the emancipatory potential of democratic processes. The condition of 
detachment from political power that I have suggested is a central characteristic of 
homo spectaculorum is such that it undermines Habermas’s own theory of actors 
seeking legitimacy. Under these conditions: 
law has to be transformed into an instrument of behaviour control; and democratic majority 
decision turns into an inconsequential spectacle of deception and self deception. A 
capitulation of constitutional principles in the face of overwhelming social complexity cannot 
be ruled out.  Should this occur, our concepts of justice and democracy will change, and 
citizens’ normative self-understanding, which still exists in our latitudes today, will undergo a 
radical transformation. (Habermas 2002: 242) 
Here Habermas acknowledges that the emancipatory potential of communicative 
action relies upon the existence of actors that are not thoroughly cynical and 
disillusioned with the processes of politics and law but who, rather, share concepts of 
democracy and justice that are in some sense inherent to a citizen’s normative 
understanding of self. In this thesis I assert that homo spectaculorum is thoroughly 
cynical and disillusioned in regard to politics and, thus, if there is any hope for 
democratic emancipation, it lies in the human search for reality and identity. 
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Hence, in this thesis I am seeking to assert the centrality of Arendt’s position on the 
importance of “natural right” to democratic emancipation
116. On the one hand, I 
believe that Arendt, who locates the need for democratic expression within the 
imperatives of the natural world, thereby identifies one fundamental imperative for 
reasonable action coordination - to care for the world that sustains us.  At the same 
time the idea that human action is the only possible source of emancipation and that 
our humanity is somehow irrepressible, implies that the power to be emancipated lies 
in our own hands and is not constrained by socially determined subjectivities such as 
homo spectaculorum. This is an important idea given the ascent of information and 
communication technologies - and it is a way to read Arendt as positive about the 
democratic potential of cyberspace.  
 
Arendt’s argument is fundamentally located in her view as to what it is to be human, 
and the rights granted to us by our human abilities. The prospect of finite abilities is 
not a problem for Arendt, who believes that such abilities may yet become 
immortalised in the public realm. Finiteness plagues homo spectaculorum, however, 
who has lost such a realm. We are seeking to reconcile this tension between a virtual 
reality, defined by Habermas as composed by a series of fragmented and 
independently legitimated subsystems, and the conditions of natural human existence. 
Arendt’s theories constitute a source of optimism concerning homines 
spectaculorum’s moments of founding in the information age, but only if we accept 
that homo spectaculorum has certain human elements - a need for identity, reality and 
natality - that are, in some sense, inalienable. If we accept this then the 
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communicative power and critical publicity but criticises Arendt for retreating ‘into the tradition of 
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communicative potential of virtual reality provides a basis for optimism about the 
development of internet technology.  
 
Part Two: Revisiting a Positive Synthesis of Arendt and 
Habermas 
In the previous chapter I presented a synthesis of the democratic theories of Arendt 
and Habermas that was quite pessimistic with respect to the ways in which the 
conditions of contemporary public space affect the critical capacities of democratic 
systems. This pessimism arises from the understanding that a critical interaction 
between reality and identity is unlikely to occur in a society dominated by homo 
spectaculorum. It is, however, possible to contend that homo spectaculorum has 
attributes that would allow for the emergence of an ideal democratic subjectivity 
according to the democratic theories of Habermas and Arendt. In this section I shall 
investigate how we can read Habermas’s and Arendt’s democratic theories as being 
positive about the democratic potentials of homo spectaculorum. Habermas’s view 
that communication is the basis of social progress and Arendt’s understanding of the 
benefits of plural interpretations of reality lead us to the conclusion that while homo 
spectaculorum may not be drawn to engage in ideal democratic practices, there are 
elements of spectacular existence that have the potential to promote and enable a 
critical public engagement. 
Habermas’s Optimism about Homo spectaculorum 
In terms of Habermas’s democratic theory, optimism about the democratic potential 
of homo spectaculorum comes in the form of the communicative evolution of the 
public sphere.  In his work The Reconstruction of Historical Materialism Habermas   256 
outlines how Marx misjudged the driving force of social progress (Habermas 1976). 
Habermas argues that it is development in the means of communication, rather than 
development in the means of production, that is the engine of human history
117. This 
is explained in his theory of communicative action in terms of the manner in which 
social progress is controlled by steering media; strategic control over areas of cultural 
reproduction translates to the ability to extend systemic influence over the lifeworld 
(Habermas 1976: 267). Habermas understands emancipation in terms of the critical 
access individuals have to substantive deliberation, and it is this understanding that 
underlies his emphasis on communicative action as a tool of emancipation.  
 
Thus, whereas Marx argues that conflict that derives from the concentration of control 
over the means of production in the hands of a few is the engine of social change, 
Habermas insists that control over the means of communication is the basic tool of 
human freedom. Despite this difference, the goal of emancipation remains the same. 
Habermas’s goal of reconciliation with the lifeworld more clearly resembles Marx’s 
early writings, in which Marx identifies the practical ramifications of emancipation as 
reconciling the personal and the political: 
All emancipation is a return of the human world and human relationships to humans 
themselves… Not until the real individual man has taken the abstract citizen back into himself 
and, as an individual man, has become a species being in his empirical life, in his individual 
work and individual relationships, not until man recognises and organises his ‘forces propres’ 
as social forces and this no longer separates social forces from himself in the form of political 
forces, not until then will human emancipation be completed. (Marx 1972: 44-45) 
While Marx went on to identify relations of production as the major source of 
liberation and oppression in modern society in his later work; Habermas has asserted 
that it is communication that is central to the project of human emancipation. 
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Habermas’s project is much more sensitive to the expressive freedom that Arendt 
regards so highly, rather than the material freedom that Marx took to be the source of 
liberation. In this way Habermas’s emancipatory project is more appropriate for the 
conditions of late-capitalism, as described in the previous chapter. 
 
This emphasis on communication is made even more explicit through a reading of 
Habermas’s earlier work. Knowledge and Human Interests,  Towards a Rational 
Society and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere all depict changes in 
communication as the instrumental factors in human emancipation. As was suggested 
in the first chapter, in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas 
argues that it is the development of a critical exchange of information that causes the 
rise of the emancipatiory public sphere, rather than developments in the mode of 
production. In his view, ‘the capitalist mode of production is of course decisive for the 
developmental dynamic that explicates the contents and functions of civil law, but not 
the developmental logic which alone explicates the form and structures of rationality 
of civil law’ (Habermas 1976: 267). While Habermas acknowledges that production 
might affect communication, the key to emancipation remains in the process of 
communication itself. So, if we are to conduct a search for the structural changes that 
might bring about emancipation in a Habermasian sense, it is essential that the search 
concentrates upon those who appropriate and control communication, as opposed to 
production.   
 
The development of the internet is important in this context, as it has several attributes 
that can be viewed positively in the light of Habermas’s view that communication is 
the basic element of progress. As a communicative structure the internet has arguably   258 
more “ideal” qualities than any previously encountered communications system. 
Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that the critical potential of humanity has been 
effectively harnessed in the development of a system of instantaneous and 
predominantly horizontal communication. As described in Chapter Two, Habermas’s 
basic requirements for ideal communication are inclusion and intersubjectivity. The 
internet presents a communicative structure that enables an almost infinite amount of 
communication to take place, removing the physical constraints associated with 
including mass participation in debate. At the same time, the bodiless “neutrality” of 
virtual space offers the prospect that arguments are judged purely on their 
reasonableness; for virtual space is, in a sense, conducive to intersubjectivity and the 
discursive redemption of claims to truth
118. In these fundamental ways the internet 
seems conducive to the kind of ideal conditions that seemed only theoretically 
possible when Habermas wrote The Theory of Communicative Action.  
 
In terms of communicative action, the internet offers the possibility that 
‘technologically mediated interactivity balances the rationalistic activities of the 
system… through the insertion and operation of the more communicative activities of 
the “lifeworld”’ (Wilson 1997: 146-147). The internet is the first communication 
platform to offer the possibility for creating an international public space that is 
theoretically equitable, inclusive and open. Even though the way that the internet is 
used might not currently reflect the practices that would constitute an ideal public, the 
development of the infrastructure alone is a quantum leap forward in terms of the 
creation of inclusive publics. Further, the emergence of the internet has certainly 
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enabled the proliferation of participants in a manner that undermines central authority 
and control. In the context of Habermas’s theory of communicative progress the 
development of such infrastructure can be perceived to be a good thing for the 
fostering of critical inputs in a democratic society.  
 
While the expansion of trade and communication through the internet may have 
systemically imperialist implications - the internet linguistifies the sacred and 
rationalises the lifeworld - the process has also generated a new kind of 
communication that presents new possibilities for critical interaction with the world. 
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas claimed that the 
development of the bourgeois critical public space was an unforeseen by-product of 
the increasing trade amongst nobles (Habermas 1989: 43). It is equally plausible to 
suggest that the expansion of communication in pursuit of trade may once again lead 
to the emergence of a critical public discourse. 
Arendt’s optimism about Homo spectaculorum 
From a perspective informed by Arendt’s work, the main reason for optimism with 
respect to the rise of homo spectaculorum is that homo spectaculorum has undermined 
the coherence of the public dominance of homo faber. For Arendt, the public 
dominance of homo faber signifies the end of the public space. As she states in The 
Human Condition, ‘the end of the common world has come, when it is seen only 
under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective’ (Arendt 
1958: 58). The rise of homo spectaculorum has meant that the public realm can no 
longer be claimed to be legitimate solely on the basis of utility. Instead, we see that 
those in the public realm seek to satisfy the spectacular imperatives of a wide array of   260 
“identity” and “interest” groups who make spectacular, rather than utilitarian, 
demands upon the public realm of homo faber. This fragmentation of the public realm 
invites greater levels of debate and even though spectacular society also occludes the 
space and agonistic drive that would engage this debate and generate action, the 
schism between the political capacities of homo faber and the political demands of 
homo spectaculorum suggests that some impetus toward political reform will develop 
through their interaction. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the impetus toward critical public space is 
undermined by the fact that homines spectaculorum gratify their need to display more 
readily through the market than through political public space. It is possible, however, 
to contend that engagement with plural private “public” spaces is more conducive to 
generating thoughtful consideration than engagement with a single ideologically 
dominated public space. In this context, the development of the internet, as described 
above, can be seen as an important step towards undermining the non-critical nature 
of public communication and introducing the reception of reality through an 
engagement with plural narratives in its place. Such an argument has been developed 
by Mark Poster, who suggests that new modes of communication, such as the internet, 
resist the coloniser/colonised dichotomy (Poster 1997: 222). Rather than allowing for 
the dissemination of a dominant ideology, the internet facilitates the proliferation of 
narratives, and it can be argued that it does so without privileging any one of those 
narratives as world defining. Homines spectaculorum, therefore, find that the world is 
not given to them and are presented with the opportunity (if not the impetus) to create 
themselves as a work of art. 
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If we accept Arendt’s assertion that emancipation is generated by natality and the 
subsequent human need to engage with reality, then the rise of homo spectaculorum 
seems to indicate a massive improvement upon the public dominance of homo faber. 
The potential for progress arises out of the human need to constantly create publics 
within which reality and truth can be determined. Because, following communicative 
evolution, this act of public creation is accompanied by ever greater access to plural 
input we can see that the undermining of homo faber’s pervasive and instrumental 
public realm presents liberating possibilities for future moments of founding. As 
Craig Calhoun notes, Arendt’s philosophy depicts the worldly estrangement brought 
about by the loss of a coherent public realm as the first step towards the assertion of 
individuality and action (Calhoun 1997: 242). If Arendt’s optimism concerning 
humanity’s irrepressible curiosity about reality and identity is well founded, the 
fragmentation of the public realm into a series of private realms, all vying for 
legitimacy, may be viewed as a positive step. Those seeking to recapture a coherent 
identity amongst a series of fragmented public spaces might be more likely to do so 
through the greater use of their faculties for critical reasoning. 
A Positive Synthesis: Homo spectaculorum in a World of Petite-
Narratives
119 
In many ways, the positive democratic potentials of homo spectaculorum arise from 
homo spectaculorum’s need to construct reality through a series of narratives. As a 
result, homo spectaculorum is far more liable to develop incredulity with respect to 
“ideologies” in general. At the same time, the expressive nature of narrative 
introduces subjective elements of place and identity into the interpretation of reality. 
                                                 
119 While the term “petit narratives” is intended to invoke Lyotard’s understanding of the postmodern 
challenge to metanarratives (Lyotard 1984), I am consciously using the feminine petite to indicate that 
much of this hope springs from incredulity towards dominant discourses such as masculinity.   262 
The positive aspect of this loss of meaning is reflected in Habermas’s argument that 
the loss of “real” (universally accepted) meaning providing contexts is an integral step 
in the development of democratic emancipation. In the work containing his most 
direct defence of modernity, Habermas asserts that:  
the rationalized lifeworld secures the continuity of its contexts of meaning with the 
discontinuous tools of critique; it preserves the context of social integration by the risky 
means of an individualistically isolating universalism; and it sublimates the overwhelming 
power of the genealogical nexus into a fragile and vulnerable universality by means of an 
extremely individualized socialization. The more abstractly the differentiated structures of the 
lifeworld operate in the ever more particularized forms of life, the more the rational potential 
of action oriented toward reaching understanding evolves solely by these means. (Habermas 
1987a: 346) 
Here Habermas implies that the more we exchange the overarching normative 
orientations that guide us as a society for individually differentiated and experienced 
lifeworlds the more we are forced to coordinate action through the pursuit of 
communicative action. Hence, the more homo spectaculorum becomes devolved from 
a social lifeworld and integrated into its systemic peculiarities, the more the 
opportunity exists to coordinate understanding and action entirely through 
communicative action. Just as the extension of the franchise was a positive step 
forward because it forced communicative engagement despite the loss of 
intersubjectivity it entailed, Habermas believes that this increasing detachment from a 
specific cultural lifeworld also should be viewed as a positive step. The loss of a 
shared lifeworld means that legitimacy might increasingly demand the discursive 
redemption of claims to truth, even though it makes communicative agreement a little 
harder to achieve. 
 
Habermas’s insistence that, in some senses, detachment from the lifeworld may be 
positive derives from his faith in the spirit of modernity, and his insistence that, given 
the need for action coordination, this coordination is best carried out   263 
communicatively. In the contemporary world, however, we tend to find that 
disagreements about truth are more often settled through a redistribution of steering 
media than through communicative action. Because of the materialist ramifications of 
a political public realm dominated by homo faber we find that materiality has more 
public salience than agreement. For Habermas this means that the lifeworld tends 
towards colonisation under the conditions of instrumental thought. The way to avoid 
this tendency is to tackle legitimacy at the level of communication itself. He is 
looking for a change in the basic requirements of communication; not only to ensure 
that action can be coordinated effectively, but also to ensure that communication takes 
place. Thus, Habermas and Arendt conclude that it is only by generating significant 
increases in the levels of participation and access to meaningful communication that 
the lifeworld can regain its integrity.  
 
This point of agreement between Habermas and Arendt suggests that human 
emancipation involves allowing all people to tell their story and have it heard. 
Habermas’s emphasis on the discursive redemption of truth claims is nicely 
complemented by Arendt’s emphasis on storytelling as an intersubjective 
communicative device
120. In both Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories the efforts to 
seek reconciliation through communication are not enacted as a violence, but as a 
recourse to peace. The nature of the reason uncovered by such a commitment may 
depend upon the communicative situation, but both Habermas and Arendt emphasise 
that a commitment to pursuing understanding is integral to an inclusive and ideal 
public. Their view that the act of telling stories simultaneously exposes and validates 
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the self, leads both Habermas and Arendt to refuse to validate the philosophical merits 
of the individual’s detachment from the real world and to emphasise public 
communication as the primary corrective to violence and injustice.  
 
Given the proliferation of petite-narratives under the condition of postmodernism, it is 
possible to contend that the loss of public meaning actually increases the 
emancipatory potential of a well designed democratic forum. The modern impetus to 
design such a forum arises from the inevitability of modernity’s impact on the world 
and a normative duty to facilitate the debate about that impact in the most reasonable 
way possible. The postmodern appeal of this synthesis is that it is an attempt to 
reinstitute critical debate as a form of public validation. This validation of the 
lifeworld not only allows it to resist colonisation but furnishes an opportunity to found 
new understandings in a cybernetic world. Alternatively, as Arendt may lead us to 
believe, the flourishing of the lifeworld may actually lead to a new relationship 
between humans and the world. 
 
This positive synthesis of Arendt’s and Habermas’s thought suggests that, in seeking 
to establish the real amongst a proliferation of new media, the urge for identity to 
become constant and real generates a critical exchange between self and world. This 
exchange is inherently communicative, as it is motivated by a person seeking an 
identity that manifests integrity, and, in turn, it precipitates a need for a community 
that gives a more immediate sense of reality. Such a synthesis points to the ways in 
which information and communication technologies can facilitate the development of 
a critical and engaging public space amongst the very public that needs it the most – 
that of the rationalised lifeworld of late-capitalist society. As established in the third   265 
chapter, agonistic expression affects the real world in accordance with one’s 
command over steering media. The impetus to reconcile identity and reality - if it is to 
be done through systemic reform - must come, therefore, from those in control of 
steering media. In a global sense, worldwide emancipation depends upon the 
emancipation of those of us with systemic power.  
 
Hence, it is possible to identify reasons to believe that homo spectaculorum can and 
might generate a more critical and engaging democratic system than the one formed 
by  homo faber. This hope is based, however, upon an understanding of the 
questionable normative presuppositions of Habermas’s and Arendt’s works. I argue 
that both Habermas and Arendt rely on the human predilection to search for truth, 
reality and identity in order to suggest that social change may be emancipatory. These 
convictions are not unproblematic, particularly given the challenges to identity, reality 
and humanity discussed in the previous chapter. Hope, therefore, is constructed by 
consciousness and not theoretically inevitable – it requires faith and is ineffective 
unless accompanied by action.   There is every chance that the internet, the 
development of the information economy and the rise of the society of homo 
spectaculorum are contributing to the emergence of something positive. The internet 
and virtual reality offer us a chance to create and engage in a truly public space. The 
development of communication technology offers the possibility that the lifeworld 
might strike back.   266 
Part Three: Revisiting Reality - the Material Constraints of 
Homo spectaculorum 
The reason that I did not explore this positive synthesis of Habermas and Arendt in 
this thesis is that I believe such an exploration required both speculation and a leap of 
faith that seemed inappropriate for a doctoral thesis. Further, as discussed in the third 
chapter, the conditions of contemporary existence make it extremely difficult to 
sustain and defend the optimism that Habermas and Arendt have with respect to the 
future. Certainly, if we place our hope in the idea that reality seeking individuals 
might come to form a critical and expressive consciousness in the context of a fluid 
and transient interaction of realities and subjectivities, we are neglecting that, for 
many, the loss of public reality is a reflection of the loss of the individual who 
partakes of the “two-in-one” of critical thought. This argument, as developed in 
Chapter Three, suggests that the fragmentation of public space mirrors the 
fragmentation of the individual and indicates the loss of that very kind of subjectivity 
that seeks to reconcile self and world.  
 
While Habermas’s theory can be used to generate optimism about homo 
spectaculorum, the development of an ideal network for communication is not the 
same as the proliferation of an ideal form of communication. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, there is considerable evidence that the proliferation of screens is serving not to 
bring a sharper image of reality but to make reality even harder to discern. The 
emergence of plural voices in public space is not causing individuals to interact with 
those voices critically but is fragmenting the individual in order to keep the individual 
functional. If the individual is not given those expressive opportunities that are 
important for a sense of defined self, then homo spectaculorum’s society enables the   267 
emancipation of the system from individual reason (or, to view the same phenomenon 
from another perspective, frees the individual from the requirements of a coherent 
world). 
 
Habermas assumes that, at some point, those who act strategically also wish to act 
communicatively in order to care for those around them and in order to develop their 
own world orientations correctly. Homo spectaculorum simply does not encounter 
such a communicative situation in a world where the political public realm is 
dominated by homo faber and every public space is privately owned and strategically 
employed. While families may resemble a communicative public in much of their 
structure, it does not necessarily follow that they manifest communicative spaces. The 
communicative interaction of a family depends upon the care that exists within that 
family, yet it requires a normative leap to suggest that the strategic success of family 
members is determined by the communicative care of that family. The colonisation of 
the lifeworld may mean that such a degree of care stifles systemic possibilities. 
Because of their lack of familiarity with the very public benefits of communicative 
care homo spectaculorum may increasingly resist such obligations in favour of the 
pursuit of desire-satisfaction. The loss of a shared source of meaning diminishes the 
need to critically engage with the identities of others and with the world in general. 
 
In order to contextualise the positive possibilities that the democratic theories of 
Habermas and Arendt suggest for homo spectaculorum, I shall describe a recent event 
during which the communicative dissemination enabled by the internet was 
undermined by the direct effect of consumptive, rather than critical, publicity. I 
believe this example is useful for situating optimism concerning information and   268 
communication technologies in a contemporary context. At the same time, though, it 
serves to highlight the continuing pertinence of an understanding of the political 
limitations and abilities of homo spectaculorum. Following this exploration, I shall 
briefly examine how the continuing rise of homo spectaculorum may affect the 
relationship between reality as determined through the public realm of homo faber 
and the preoccupying spectacles of homo spectaculorum. 
 
On 17 November 2004, there were two separate pieces of video footage released on 
the internet; each featured vision of two separate murders that occurred in the process 
of the occupation of the town of Fallujah in Iraq. The first was the murder of a charity 
worker who had been kidnapped by Iraqi soldiers. The soldiers were using the hostage 
as a “bargaining chip” in an attempt to get the American forces to cease their 
offensive on Fallujah. The Americans did not pull out, the hostage was killed and a 
video of the execution was distributed through the internet. 
 
The second video was of a wounded Iraqi soldier being shot in a mosque after a gun 
battle. The video was taken as two American squads descended upon the mosque in 
Fallujah, where they expected to find dead and wounded soldiers who had been left 
by United States forces after a battle the previous day. The video features one of the 
squad members executing a wounded Iraqi soldier with his machine gun. The video, 
captured by an “embedded” journalist, was subsequently distributed through the 
internet. 
 
Both videos feature footage of soldiers murdering defenceless and vulnerable human 
beings and both videos are testament to the hideous acts carried out under the guise of   269 
war. Importantly, the dissemination of both videos was also only possible because of 
the remarkably horizontal and control-resistant distribution structure of the internet. 
Yet when we look at how this information affected public debate, we come to 
understand that the existence of an egalitarian communication structure is not 
necessarily conducive to egalitarian communication; rather steering media such as 
money and power still dominate the lifeworld of homo spectaculorum
121. 
 
Upon monitoring five news broadcasts over Australian network television, it was 
remarkable that while all five ran the first story as a major headline, the second story 
was only covered by two of the networks. The two networks that ran the second story 
were the “public” networks (that is partly or fully government funded): the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission and the Special Broadcast Services. While those involved 
in providing news for these networks have a reputation for greater journalistic 
integrity than those who “make” news for the commercial networks, they tend to 
receive the lowest ratings. While viewing both videos produced yet another 
impression of the senseless waste and thoughtlessness of war, the lack of coverage of 
the second video meant that the likely impression created by the mainstream coverage 
was one of abhorrent Iraqis stooping to depths, to which the “coalition of the willing” 
would not sink (despite the fact there was evidence they had already done so). As 
Habermas suggests in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, such a one-
sided reception of reality is encouraged by commercial news, as the news aims to be 
consumable rather than critical. While the internet allows more critical voices to 
proliferate, it does not catalyse a need for critical engagement. 
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While it is possible to access either of the videos through the internet, this does not 
mean that the coverage it provides is necessarily equal. Social constructions of what is 
deemed consumable content still dominate the internet and, along with server filters, 
search engine sequencing and publishers’ concerns about sponsorship, online content 
still has a strategically determined flavour
122. More to the point, the internet is a 
subjective medium insofar as one finds on the internet only that for which one looks. 
There is no forced exposure to unpalatable perspectives, as might happen in a true 
public space. For the internet is the most exquisite form of narrowcasting, able to be 
finely tuned to the preconceived tastes and desires of its individual users.  So while 
the internet does present new possibilities for undermining the system, it does not 
present a ready made antidote to systemic dominance. Rather, the internet can 
contribute to the coherent appearance of a spectacular reality, as described in Chapter 
Three, by presenting information that reinforces preconceptions rather than exposing 
the plural perspectives of true public space. 
 
The chimerical character of the ideal communication offered by the internet is a 
reflection of the fact that ideal communication is not a function of structure but of 
communicative orientations and commitments. As with the feudal era, those who 
maintain the contemporary public realm seek to maintain the status quo and, to that 
end, purposefully alter publicity to make it consumptive rather than critical. While 
movements supporting Linux and open source programming do champion 
opportunities for critical engagement in the construction of technological publics, the 
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dominant form of computer software (proprietary software) encourages passive 
reception of the internet and the use of the internet to extend existing power 
structures, rather than to create new spaces/opportunities for founding. Interestingly, 
“Windows” software has developed so that it can now accommodate a number of 
different identities for one person on the one machine, making the machine integrate 
with the condition of fragmented users. From this we see that, while the opportunities 
for expressive and critical engagement within this communication exist, the passive, 
functional and fragmented meaning providing forms of interaction continue to 
dominate internet discourse. 
 
Habermas’s contribution to the search for ideal forms of sovereignty lies in his 
conviction that, given that action coordination happens, action is best coordinated 
through the use of reason. His position can be summed up in his statement: ‘Persistent 
thinking is certainly not enough, but without it you don’t get very far’ (Habermas 
1994b). Once again, however, hoping that persistent thinking is endemic to humanity 
is equivalent to hoping that all humans care for each other. The only thing that 
provides the impetus for someone to aspire towards ideal discursive conditions is 
some form of care to understand and be understood. Habermas merely asserts that if 
we are to conduct discussion in a legitimate and sustainable way then we need to 
agree to publicly redeem claims to truth, to publicly seek understandings and to 
publicly ask for interpretations. The internet does present the conditions for such 
discussions, and the proliferation of personal/public communication in the form of 
“blogs” has allowed for some heroic instances of achieving understanding through 
discussions of this kind. However, we still find that the emancipatory potential of   272 
blogging is limited by its narrow audience and the fact that blogging has not yet 
developed a culture of ideal communication. 
  
Hence, while the internet certainly allows us to envisage a more democratic 
communicative practice, it still seems that ‘nothing will change without the 
intervening, effective, innovative energy of social movements, and without the 
utopian images and energies that motivate such movements’ (Habermas 2002). 
According to Habermas’s own theory of lifeworld colonisation, however, we are born 
into a world that not only lacks real integrity but also suffers from a lack of public 
space, such that ‘the unresolved plurality of competing interests… makes it doubtful 
whether there could ever emerge a general interest of the kind to which a public 
opinion could refer to as a criterion’ (Habermas 1989: 232-234). Basically, as we are 
born into spectacular society, there is no impetus for us to seek reconciliation with 
reality or to seek to secure a world of critical legitimacy. 
 
The ramifications of this loss of touch with reality vary depending on how important 
encountering reality is to generating a care for that reality. Arendt’s and Habermas’s 
theories diverge in their different positions on the question of whether publics 
detached from reality can serve the role of publics. Habermas insists that certain 
communicative commitments can emulate the process of pure intersubjectivity that 
Arendt understands to exist in a real public. What makes Arendt’s real public as 
elusive as Habermas’s communicative action is the fact that it requires the 
interlocutors involved to be pursuing the better argument. Arendt believes that 
interlocutors will pursue the better argument because of the public nature of the 
forum, their care for reality as something they constitute and their desire to display   273 
their character in such a forum. Habermas does not account effectively for why 
anyone would want to discard the benefits of strategic manipulation in favour of 
communicative action, beyond the notion that communicative action is essentially 
more legitimate. Why people are motivated by legitimacy, particularly given the rise 
of homo spectaculorum, is not clear. What I wish to emphasise is that Habermas’s 
criticism does not acknowledge the pertinence of Arendt’s position on “natural right”, 
particularly given the challenge to the legitimacy of individual sovereignty witnessed 
in the operation of contemporary democratic institutions. 
  
In terms of Habermas and his redevelopment of historical materialism, I believe that it 
is possible to argue that the success of political movements has been determined by 
the degree in which they enable personal expressive freedom. There is a modern 
tendency to underestimate agency when declaring that there is an engine of human 
history, but again and again the individual’s struggle for expressive freedom seems to 
play that role. If a democratic forum can harness this as agonism, it can then use 
discursive conventions to allow expression while coordinating action in the most 
reasonable and legitimate way possible. Agonism, linked to a human search for truth 
and reality, is enough to inspire the care for the other that Habermas’s deliberative 
ethics require; or, at least, ideally this would be so. If agonism is the engine of human 
history, then our influence over history depends upon our ability to create and 
participate in the fora for agonistic expression. 
 
The rise of information and communication technologies, concurrent with the 
development of incredulity towards metanarratives and the occurrence of total 
subsumption, make the personal aspect of world creation more apparent than ever. In 
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place of disciplinary control, which effects control through the direct application of 
coercive power, homo spectaculorum controls through changing the environment one 
inhabits. It controls by usurping the institutional position of disciplinary power and 
inserting the self there. For this reason, it creates new opportunities for engaging the 
self in the act of world creation. Spectacular society, however, also usurps plural 
public space. It presents a “reality” tailored to the self which occludes the reality of 
shared public space. In doing so, the spectacle opens up opportunities for 
ressentiment, and indeed creates the impetus for the process of ressentiment to occur. 
 
In the environment in which information and communication technologies are central, 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s emphasis on inserting critical capacities into the process of 
self and world formation are all the more poignant. The advent of total subsumption, 
the incredulity towards metanarratives and the loss of public space in which to receive 
reality have resulted in the loss of any touchstone through which to judge reality as 
such, and the opportunity to create more virtual worlds has been enacted. This allows 
those in control of public space to issue us with our ressentiment, condemning passive 
receivers of publicness to what Nietzsche describes as a slave mentality - that is a 
servant of someone else’s interests. At the same time, the incredulity derived from 
these processes has created a proliferation of narratives, and what might become a 
healthy cynicism about the legitimacy of parties seeking to issue such ressentiment. 
The loss of reality can be taken to provide more opportunities for the creation of self, 
such that we might create ourselves as works of art. 
 
Contemporary liberal democracies survive on the memory of the notions of individual 
rights and sovereignty on which they were based. As suggested in the first chapter, 
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liberal democracies were initially designed to extend political sovereignty to those 
who displayed an investment in the world, achieving the level of engagement and 
intersubjectivity required for constructive critical engagement in political decisions. In 
overextending the franchise, however, the political fora of liberal democracies lost 
their intersubjective capacities and became a part of a system of world production that 
was not critical and responsive to the political will of its citizens. Perhaps by design, 
or perhaps by circumstance, those deprived of a political outlet in a political forum 
became politically engaged through their common access to the market. The market 
has since become the battleground for agonistic expression and, subsequently, the 
basis of contemporary innovation and progress. Hence we see how the market has 
become the “public” and usurped the role of politics. The market retains many of the 
meaning providing features of action coordination without having to deal with the 
requirements of legitimacy, accountability or reality that would make it a true public 
space by Habermasian or Arendtian standards.  
 
Hannah Arendt’s depiction of agonism as a social manifestation of a human desire to 
display suggests that world creation is a fundamental human imperative. It is her 
argument for the persistence of agonism that offers most hope that democracy might 
be revived. Although the political life may never be the domain of the many, in her 
work, along with John Stuart Mill and Frederick Nietzsche, she insists that there is an 
innate human potential for emancipation. Along with Habermas, these theorists all 
rely on the understanding that our public efforts to reason are actually an expression 
of our freedom. Our search for truth, individually or as a society, binds us to an 
agreement to engage critically with the world during moments of founding. This is the 
fundamental emancipatory force, as described by Marcuse. 
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Inasmuch as the struggle for truth ‘saves’ reality from destruction, truth commits and engages 
human existence. It is the essentially human project. If man has learned to see and know what 
really is, he will act in accordance with truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is 
epistemology. (Marcuse 1964: 125) 
The search for truth is a process of the elimination of the untenable elements of 
rhetoric and an attempt to come to an understanding. It is at this point that Habermas’s 
and Arendt’s theories combine to suggest that there is a natural inclination towards 
seeking reality and identity.  
 
Arendt’s particular contribution to this study is to remind us that we have to examine 
sovereignty in terms of one’s access to the communication that generates power. As 
Habermas notes in (Habermas 1983a), Arendt refuses to understand legitimate power 
as generated in other ways than through public communication, and thus she 
completely obscures the effect of systemic colonisation on power differentials. I 
argue, instead, that Arendt’s tendency to view power as only that which is 
communicatively generated in public represents her own normative investment in 
what Habermas describes as communicative action. Arendt’s phenomenological 
essentialism prohibits her from looking at the potential for political action from any 
other perspective than that of the individual. As a result, her understanding of the role 
that the public serves is actually significantly different from the idealisation that 
Habermas, Canovan, Triadafilopoulos and other contemporary theorists identify. 
Arendt insisted that we judge our notions of the political according to what we find in 
the world. Her real public forum was inherently tied, therefore, to the biological 
exegesis of natural life. Without ever grounding his theory in material conditions, 
Habermas’s communicative theory is much more amenable to the condition of 
detachment of reality; though, in a way, Habermas thereby loses touch with the very 
thing that brings human redemption to the process of legitimation.   277 
 
The fact that Habermas made a mistake in this respect is not a foregone conclusion; 
we cannot exclude the possibility of a cyborg existence and a synthesis of Habermas’s 
and Arendt’s ideas in this context may still prove to be useful. However, I believe 
Habermas is merely unable to declare his own assumptions about human existence - 
namely that legitimacy carries its own imperatives. The apparent incredulity towards 
metanarratives that defines the postmodern era undermines this assumption straight 
away, so I choose to base my hope for emancipation upon the irrepressibility of 
reality and human curiosity, rather than on a faith in the functional imperatives of 
legitimacy. Should Arendt be wrong, however, and there is no fundamental 
imperative to reconcile reality and identity, we can only predict that the increasingly 
detached legitimacy of the system will one day usher forth a non-human existence.  
Two Visions of the Future 
I shall now examine two possible futures that are suggested through a synthesis of 
Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories. These futures are constructed according to what 
we should expect to see resulting from the dominance of homo spectaculorum in light 
of Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories. The difference in the two visions arises from the 
differing regard to reality in Arendt’s and Habermas’s projects. In the first instance, 
the growing illegitimacy of the society of homo spectaculorum may well lead to a 
conflict in those societies in which legitimacy is still a precondition for the use of 
power. If this eventuates, Marx will have been proven to have been right in his 
prediction that the decadence of the bourgeoisie would eventually inspire a proletarian 
revolution. In terms of my Arendtian appropriation of the various subjectivities 
defined by action, this can be seen to reflect an irrevocable tension between the   278 
productive orientation of homo faber and the satisfaction orientation of homo 
spectaculorum. In the second instance, the development of homo spectaculorum 
beyond the legitimacy restrained by the real, natural world suggests the rise of the 
Cyborg - an individual unit integrated through functionality and desire-satisfaction 
rather than public action and reason. 
The Rise of the International Proletariat 
In the last chapter, I suggested that those who control capital have sought to 
appropriate public space in order to continually stimulate production. I also argued 
that, in the process, there has been a change in the nature of the means of production 
and a change in the relationship between self and world. On this basis, I endorsed the 
Marxist view that capital is the driving force of history, and it is interesting at this 
point to scrutinise the validity of Marx’s predictions. Marx predicted that capital 
would continue to expand and conquer new territory until it could expand no further, 
at which point it would invent and reorganise points within its territory in order 
simulate this expansion
123. Marx also predicted the development of the world market 
and a communications network that would undermine the constraints of space and 
time in order to stimulate growth (Marx 1973a: 408-539). All these things will 
conspire, Marx argues, to develop the tools and consciousness of a revolutionary 
proletariat (Marx 1973b: 73). While we may not see this consciousness emerging in 
the fragmented subjectivity of homo spectaculorum, it remains eminently possible 
that this consciousness is developing in the global working class and may conflict 
with the consciousness of homo spectaculorum in such a way as to generate progress.  
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While production is increasingly expunged from the capital intensive workplace of 
homo spectaculorum, this does not mean that the alienation generated though 
production simply vanishes. Instead, the globalisation of the market can be 
understood to have merely enabled the outsourcing of productive alienation (indeed in 
the previous chapter I argued that this condition is somewhat constitutive of the 
society of homo spectaculorum).  
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by immensely 
facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into 
civilisation…It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of 
production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to 
become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. (Marx 
1973b: 71)  
For Marx, the globalisation of the market and the subsequent globalisation of 
communication is the precondition for a worldwide revolutionary consciousness. The 
demands exacted upon the world by homo spectaculorum may be irreconcilable with 
what the real world can produce. The spectacular imperatives of homo spectaculorum 
still require the productive efforts of homo faber, while maintaining the machines may 
be alienating, the production of the spectacle still depends upon such machines. The 
need to resolve this tension implies that the emergence of homo spectaculorum may 
yet generate progress in a Marxist sense. 
 
As many have pointed out elsewhere, the system of international trade operates under 
extremely detached systems of legitimacy that are based on claims to truth that are not 
easily redeemed
124. While homo spectaculorum demands a more spectacular degree of 
consumption, the spectacular society requires the developing world to develop into 
the world of homo faber. The view that those in the developing world accept this role 
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because they so desperately want to be part of world trade relies upon the assumption 
that they will adopt the material fixations of homo faber. In order to generate those 
fixations, the material society of homo spectaculorum is presented to the rest of the 
world as innately virtuous and good. Such a depiction is only ever presented on a 
screen, it is rarely deeply examined. Through the inculcation of this idea homo 
spectaculorum seeks to convert the working class of the world into animal laborans. 
In part, this is done through the appropriation of action; homo spectaculorum markets 
itself through the productive capacities of the military-industrial-media-entertainment 
complex
125. At the same time homo spectaculorum isolates its workers by denying 
them access to anything other than an instrumental public realm. For nothing other 
than a representative liberal democracy is permitted to be seen as legitimate despite 
homines spectaculorum’s own alienation from such a public. Given that homo 
spectaculorum is highly detached from production, the imposition of a public realm 
that is essentially alienating may precipitate a revolutionary consciousness. 
 
When one comes to regard this dynamic in terms of the way that these differing 
populations are interacting with public space, we find that the interaction governed 
through the political public realm of homo faber engages with neither the silent 
participation of animal laborans nor the fragmented subjectivities of homo 
spectaculorum. Instead, the public realm of homo faber responds to the powerlessness 
of those in both the developed and developing world by increasing their productive 
and consumptive capacity. Here we confront the problem that the power that really 
needs to be equalised in this case is not productive power but rather communicative 
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power. Because of this failure to establish good communication, we find development 
is understood only in terms of productive capacity. 
 
As Arendt predicted, the failure to create a public realm that reconciles humanity with 
reality either precipitates a disregard for reality or a revolt against the public realm 
that fails to enable this reconciliation. As has been argued throughout this thesis, the 
impact of homo faber and homo spectaculorum upon the environment suggests that 
reality itself may give rise to such a reckoning. The loss of available drinking water, 
arable land and pollutant-free food are all pressing and immediate concerns for a large 
proportion of the global population. These very real concerns generate their own 
communicative power. Indeed, environmental disaster may be the first ‘general 
interest to which public opinion could refer to as a criterion’ (Habermas 1989: 234) 
that generates the intersubjectivity necessary for ideal communication. The effects of 
the consumption of homo spectaculorum are beginning not only to change our 
experience of the world but are changing the world itself. The rising water levels are 
seen everywhere as real; throughout the human plurality of the biosphere such 
universal environmental changes may finally usher in some degree of 
intersubjectivity. We are, after all, sharing the public space of earth, and our failure to 
face up to this fact is having spectacular effects upon our natural environment and our 
human selves. 
 
Amid all these situations of unequal relations it remains the case that the majority of 
the world’s animal laborans are excluded from the decision making fora that affect 
their lives. Along with the fact that their working conditions are defined by repressive 
national governments, which attract investment by banning workers from political   282 
organisation, international political institutions, such as the United Nations, fail to 
provide or demand legitimate democratic accountability
126. While the internet 
presents the possibility for increasing communicative action on an international level, 
the current nature of international institutions reflects the values of homo faber. The 
three major commitments of the United Nations Economic and Social Development 
Forum are to eradicate poverty, address underemployment and promote social 
integration. Along with the fact that this forum avoids communicatively engaging 
with the meaning of development, these three commitments are striking, insofar as 
they address the purely functional concerns of homo faber. Since the alienation of 
political agency generally requires the pacification of agonism through screens, homo 
spectaculorum will be forced to either exclude and antagonise the developing world, 
or to include and assimilate it. Becoming global remains a process of assimilation 
rather than integration because the international public sphere is dominated by the 
values of homo faber. 
 
In such a situation animal laborans is deprived of a correct outlet for action and may 
respond through an “imaginary” vengeance, whereby their interests are identified in a 
fundamental rejection of reason. Subsequently,  
where the institutions and discourses are missing that could permit that potential antagonisms 
manifest themselves under an agonistic mode, the danger exists that instead of a struggle 
among adversaries, what will take place is a war between enemies. (Mouffe 2000a: 30-31) 
The inability of vast quantities of the world’s people to gain access to a meaningful 
political forum results in the transformation of agonism into antagonism (as people 
fail to recognise their commonality). This phenomenon, when viewed in light of the 
theories of Arendt and Habermas, can be seen as a direct and simple result of the 
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absence of public space that can translate antagonism into agonism. As Arendt 
suggests, the failure of a public realm tends to generate the construction of new public 
realms. By significantly levelling communication, the internet represents the 
possibility of achieving global action coordination. As we have seen in the use of the 
internet to coordinate both “terrorism” and “regime change”, however, the utilisation 
of such a forum by strategic interests is already underway. Habermas and Arendt each 
suggest that our ability to use such a forum communicatively is the first step away 
from violence. If political actors fail to make this realisation, we can only hope they 
will be usurped by those who generate power communicatively. 
The Rise of the Cyborg 
If we do take the opportunity to avoid conflict through establishing a tradition of 
communicatively legitimate power, the final question that remains concerns whether 
that power needs to be reconciled with our earthly reality. Donna Harraway has 
suggested that this reconciliation with reality is largely unnecessary and would 
represent a backward step for humanity (Haraway 1991). Jean-Francois Lyotard has 
hinted that our detachment from the world is, in some sense, the foundation of our 
escape from its limitations (Lyotard 1992). If we are to take Arendt’s pronouncements 
about founding seriously we can interpret the benefits of the loss of world from only 
the most essentially phenomenological perspective; that is, we can believe that such a 
loss provides us with a new opportunity to rediscover our humanity as (somehow) 
independent of the world. As mentioned above, the prospect of developing beyond the 
natural constraints of the world is much more compatible with Habermas’s 
understanding of the requirements of legitimacy than it is with Arendt’s. I believe that 
Habermas’s theories leave open the possibility that we might actually evolve away   284 
from the earth, as communicative action’s emphasis on legitimacy provides us with 
the ability to achieve emancipation without recourse to the “real”. 
 
This discussion has been conducted in order to illustrate the possible futures that 
await homo spectaculorum according to the theories of Habermas and Arendt.  There 
are optimistic possibilities; however, if we are going to pursue the cyborg immersion 
or attempt to coordinate our survival as humans, the course of future action is going to 
require communicative action coordination on the largest scale. In a more pessimistic 
sense, the conflict between systemic and lifeworld realities is unsustainable and may 
well result in the spectacular decline of homo spectaculorum. Based upon my 
understanding of the theories of Habermas and Arendt I would suggest we should not 
demand that other people submit to the spectacle, as it is the attempt to do so that is 
causing friction between those who choose the spectacle and those who choose 
reality. Liberal democratic societies have traditionally been lauded because they avoid 
conflict by forcing agonism from the political arena into the market. However, their 
reliance on a continual increase in production means that reconciliation between homo 
spectaculorum and worldly reality now seems to lead to conflict. The alternative, for 
homo spectaculorum to fight and subjugate, is not a way to resolve conflict, but to 
generate it. Under these conditions, liberalism as a peaceful element of democracy 
loses its normative appeal, as does democracy itself.  
What Can Be Done 
My outline of the myopic development of contemporary public spaces is not intended 
to imply that there is no hope for humanity, but to generate awareness of this situation 
so that this consciousness might be expressed in moments of founding. Habermas’s   285 
and Arendt’s theories, although evasive about what should be done in moments of 
founding, can nonetheless be useful in this context. For a combination of their 
theories enables a characterisation of liberal democracies as inherently flawed in the 
way they reflect individual sovereignty. It, therefore, challenges the unproblematic use 
of “democratisation” as a legitimating principle of imperial expansion. At all points I 
have tried to remain faithful to Habermas’s and Arendt’s aspiration to never suppose 
to know. As a result, I have subsequently sought to redeem my claims to truth in a 
manner that encourages thoughtful consideration. 
 
The success of this thesis as critical theory is constrained by my abilities as a 
storyteller and the limitations of thesis production as a product of consciousness. 
Nonetheless, I have earnestly endeavoured to relate claims to truth in such a way that 
their redemption encourages thought and action. Put simply, I hope that this thesis 
generates an impetus to think and do things. As an exercise in consciousness the 
thesis faces the threat of becoming either an “organ of the zeitgeist” or a contribution 
to repressive knowledge. In highlighting how contemporary conditions undermine 
hope for emancipative development I hope to encourage readers to act independent 
from theory - the expressive action of one’s own, which, according to Habermas and 
Arendt, is really the only hope for any of us. My method has thus been in the realm of 
traditional critical theory - to create a consciousness of what is wrong in order to 
generate a consciousness that can contribute to making things right. If I have 
emphasised the trouble we are in, as opposed to the hope that we can find, it is only 
because nothing will change without the conscious motivation to act
127. As Gregory 
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Bateson has identified ‘the experience of defeat not only serves to convince [us] that 
change is necessary: it is the first step to change’ (Bateson 1987: 313). 
 
By alleging the emergence of homo spectaculorum I am instrumentalising my own 
philosophy in order to indicate how Habermas’s and Arendt’s theories apply to 
contemporary conditions.  In doing so I have neglected to highlight the continuing 
applicability of their solutions to contemporary problems in favour of focusing on 
their diagnosis of the problem. In part, I am trying to avoid the groundless optimism 
about the inherent positive characteristic of new technologies and new modes of 
being. The positive potentials of such an autonomous process of critical subject 
formation lies at the basis of Hardt and Negri’s revolutionary subjectivity, as 
described in Empire  (Hardt and Negri 2000). What Hardt and Negri lack is a 
depiction of how this subjectivity might be engaged, given the overwhelming 
colonisation of the lifeworld as it exists. Whilst the theoretical basis for optimism may 
be warranted and perhaps they don’t want to jeopardise the appeal of their vision with 
concreteness, I feel their optimism with respect to the potential of the multitude is 
misplaced if it is not accompanied by a concurrent change in the way political 
deliberation takes place.  
 
This thesis is, in part, an attempt to create the impetus for this change. Even the public 
realm of homo faber allows for the distinguishing of the utility of starting to think 
about what the human race is going to do about universal concerns such as global 
warming, depletion of drinking water and rising sea water levels. People who argue 
about incommensurability are generally to be respected, as they are fighting against 
what they see as an implicit violence. The continual appropriation of such   287 
incommensurability so as to confound the implementation of improved forms of 
action coordination, however, is placing the cart before the horse. We find ourselves 
in a concrete world with opportunities for founding and for clearing a space within 
which freedom can emerge. If governments do not take advantage of these spaces, 
they will continue to ossify and retain an ever decreasing proportion of steering 
media. I would say everyone in politics can use this as a motivation towards regaining 
legitimacy. 
 
Part of what we learn from Habermas and Arendt then, both through their argument 
and their action, is that the process of reification cannot avoid manifesting a 
consciousness. Even Habermas, who desperately seeks to avoid giving his project any 
normative slant, relies on some assumptions about legitimacy and humanity in order 
to generate some purpose to his project. In writing this thesis I understand that 
consciousness is inherently flawed, but I also understand that it unavoidably affects 
what we do, so ought to be discussed. Habermas and Arendt merely ask us to reveal 
this consciousness, communicate about it and understand it. They implore us not to 
avoid it for the sake of our selves and our world. Against this conception, the liberal 
argument that the state should leave the individual alone is completely inadequate as a 
way of conceptualising politics and sovereignty in a global era. We need to find a way 
to harness our self expression in order to validate ourselves; and at the same time this 
is precisely something from which the world would benefit. 
 
The world stands on the edge of a precipice in regard to the major concern of critical 
theory: universal emancipation. Whilst the means for equitable ideal communication 
may well have become available to all and we have “post-scarcity” economies, the   288 
economic gap between the richer and poorer nations is steadily increasing. 
Governments and international organisations look to the expansion of the 
international market to define value and force political change. In the process the 
market continues to undermine incommensurability and install a functional and 
productive ideology in its place. It is very interesting to note the ways in which the 
markets have managed to centralise their international management system and 
construct it as a public space for elites. They have done this despite problems with 
language, customs and values; indeed, they have flourished with energy and 
innovation derived from these differences. Perhaps what makes the market so 
successful in this regard is that it does not have to legitimate itself continuously 
through communicative power. Rather than pursuing agreement through reason, the 
market can neutralise disagreement through the judicious use of steering media. 
Unfortunately, it is the same characteristic that prohibits the market from being a 
thoughtful, legitimate or emancipatory means for coordinating action.  
 
Because of our regard for action and thought (or communication and strategy), 
politics and economics hold the positions they do in our society. Like Arendt and 
Habermas, I believe that returning politics to its public place is the primary condition 
for human emancipation insofar as it once again makes thought a public concern. The 
well spring for such a task lies in the intrinsic value and legitimacy of communicative 
power which always exists as a potential antidote to systemic abuses.  Opportunities 
to engage this power are not only available to homo spectaculorum but are abundant. 
Those who assume public status should be brought to redeem themselves publicly. 
Although the natural public spaces in which to do this have been occluded, the system 
has created some discursive situations that may suffice for this purpose. As Habermas   289 
points out, the court of law is largely designed to emulate an ideal speech situation 
and therefore enables the redress of systemic abuses. In addition we have the internet, 
an ideal communication structure that presents the possibility that communication and 
political power may be linked in an equitable and accessible way. Finally, even 
existing systems of government, although flawed, are sometimes required to justify 
their own legitimacy - particularly in moments of founding such as the emergence of 
an Australian Republic. All these systemic products present the opportunity for 
emancipation, but as Habermas and Arendt indicate, they will never be emancipatory 
fora until we regard them in this way.   290 
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